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Newsletter

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THE PRICE-PRIESTLEY NEWSLETTER

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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Contributors and Subscribers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Articles:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Brain</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Watson and the debate on toleration in the late eighteenth century</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Canovan</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two concepts of liberty: eighteenth century style</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James J. Hoecker</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Priestley and the reification of religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Peach</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On what point did Richard Price convince David Hume of a mistake? with a note by Henri Laboucheix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Peach</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Price's pamphlets on America: A new edition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Documents:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. O. Thomas</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Price's will</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Gwynn Williams</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Price and Rice Price</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for information</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertisement:</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bentham Studies Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bentham Newsletter</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Editorial

The first of our pleasant duties in introducing the second issue of this newsletter is to thank all our subscribers and our contributors for their most encouraging support. When we first thought of this project we were a little apprehensive that its scope would not be wide enough to attract a sufficiently large number of readers to make the whole venture viable, and we feared that there might not be sufficient scholars working in the field to sustain a newsletter devoted exclusively to Richard Price, Joseph Priestley and their associates. Such fears would have proved poor counsellors. We have been delighted to find that in the first year of its existence the number of subscribers has grown to a point where the continued appearance of the newsletter is ensured, and that there is every likelihood that contributions of quality will continue to be forthcoming in numbers sufficient to make the project eminently worthwhile. We have also been encouraged by the geographical spread of the initial response and to find that the newsletter is now received by scholars and institutions in the United States, Canada, France, Germany and Japan.

The solidity of this support has tempted us to consider whether we should aspire to convert the newsletter into the more traditional form of journal, and whether we should begin to look forward to a time when it will be printed. These are, we believe, temptations that we should resist. In choosing the present format we thought that we should try to find a mode of communication that was readable, serviceable, durable, at the lowest possible cost. At the outset there was more than one reason why we needed to have a keen regard for economy. If the readership remained small, the continued existence of this self-financing venture would require that the cost of production remain as low as possible. But quite apart from this reason for producing at a low cost, we thought that we should be doing our readers a service if we did our utmost to produce an efficient means of exchanging information as cheaply as possible. At a time when the costs of publishing were escalating, and when the resources available to meet those costs, whether private or institutional, were not expanding at the same rate, it seemed that it would be a positive recommendation for the newsletter that it sought to combine efficiency with economy. Perhaps not too immodestly, we believe that the mode of presentation we have adopted largely meets this aim, and, since the cold winds of financial stringency in academic life are not yet much less cold, we believe that we are more likely to continue to serve the interests of our readers by remaining faithful to our original intention rather than by embarking upon a glossier, and much more expensive, production.
It gives us great pleasure to welcome to the advisory editorial board the distinguished Priestley scholar, Robert E. Schofield, Lynn Thorndike Professor of the History of Science at Case Western Reserve University. Professor Schofield's advice will enable us to cater for the whole range of Priestley's manifold interests, and we particularly hope that his accession will encourage scholars working on Priestley's scientific activities to help us make the newsletter truly representative of Priestley's immensely varied output.

Once more we should like to invite all who receive this newsletter to bring its existence, its aims and its purposes to those who may have an interest in becoming either a subscriber or a contributor.

M.F.
D.O.T.

Notes to Contributors and Subscribers

CONTRIBUTORS are asked to send their typescripts to D. O. Thomas, Department of Philosophy, Hugh Owen Building, The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Dyfed SY23 3DY, Great Britain. Contributions of article length should be submitted in duplicate, and the author should retain a copy. Articles should not exceed 8,000 words in length. All contributions should be typed in double spacing, and the footnotes should be presented on separate sheets. It would be of immense help to the editors if authors would adopt the conventions recommended in The MLA Style Sheet.

It is hoped that readers will use the newsletter for the exchange of information by sending in short notes, queries, requests for information, reports of work in progress, and books for review.

SUBSCRIBERS who have not paid their subscriptions in advance will receive an invoice with each issue. The subscription for readers in Great Britain is £1.00 (including postage and packing) per annum. For overseas readers it is $3.00, or £1.30 sterling (including postage and packing).

All subscriptions and queries concerning them should be sent to Martin Fitzpatrick, The Department of History, The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Dyfed SY23 3DY, Great Britain.
In the study of the late eighteenth century debate on toleration in the British Isles attention has naturally centred on the role of the Protestant Dissenters, particularly on the rationalists, with the names of Richard Price, Joseph Priestley, Andrew Kippis, Philip Furneaux and Theophilus Lindsey figuring prominently in the discussion. Less attention has been devoted to the contributions of a small number of Anglican clergy who were rationalist in theology, Whig in politics, in touch with developments in science and philosophy, who sought reform of the articles, liturgy and constitution of the Church of England, and who adopted a liberal, latitudinarian attitude to the problem of toleration. Caroline Robbins and the late Dennis Wigmore-Beddoes have drawn attention to the importance of this progressive wing of the Establishment, (1) and although they were less radical than their Dissenting counterparts, and although their liberalism and their reforming tendencies were constrained by their loyalty to the Established Church, the study of their activities is no less interesting. Some, like John Jebb, William Frend and Gilbert Wakefield, became avowedly Unitarian and eventually left the Church, unable to reconcile their consciences with continued membership. (2) Some, like the influential Edmund Law, Master of Peterhouse and Bishop of Carlisle, and his son John, concentrated on attempts to maintain the comprehensive nature of the Church of England by reconciling dissident and conservative elements through moderate doctrinal and liturgical reform. (3) Others, like Samuel Parr and William Paley, reacting in the last years of the century to increased pressure from both Protestant Dissenters and Roman Catholics, publicly called for measures which would grant them more civil and political liberty. (4) Most prominent and most radical among the liberals who remained within the Church was Richard Watson, the notorious Bishop of Llandaff.

Richard Watson's reputation has suffered badly at the hands of historians. The great Victorian ecclesiastical historians, Abbey, Overton, and Relton, products of an Anglicanism transformed by the Evangelical and Tractarian revivals, found that he epitomized what they saw as the most besetting sins of the Hanoverian Church. (5) He did not reside in his diocese, preferring instead a wealthy retirement on the shores of Lake Windermere; he held sixteen livings in commendam with his see of Llandaff, a number seemingly excessive even by eighteenth century standards; he rejected the accumulated wisdom of the ages and sought a reform of the articles of the Church and a liturgy regarded by many as sacrosanct; and, above all, he loudly proclaimed his belief in greater toleration for Dissenters. Recent studies of this enigmatic man, made with greater detachment, have been more favourable in their assessment,
recognizing his genuine qualities and explaining some of the eccentricities of his career in the light of a reinterpretation of the eighteenth century Church itself. (6) Perhaps Watson cannot be excused all his faults, and his remarkable autobiography, Anecdotes of the life of Richard Watson certainly reveals him as a man of ambition, openly resentful at its frustration, and obstinately convinced of his own self-righteousness. (7) Nevertheless, he possessed many positive attributes, contributing to the English Enlightenment in full measure as a scientist, politician, and religious polemicist, and deserving the description of him in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, as 'one of the most versatile men of his age'. (8) His stand for the civil rights of both Protestant Dissenters and Catholics needs no apology.

Watson came from comparatively humble origins. The son of the Reverend Thomas Watson, headmaster of the local grammar school, he was born in the Westmoreland village of Heversham in August 1737. (9) He won a scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was admitted in November 1754. (10) A mathematician of some ability, he graduated Second Wrangler in 1759. (11) Thereafter he pursued an academic career, becoming a tutor in 1760, Professor of Chemistry in 1764, senior tutor at Trinity in 1767, and obtaining in 1772 eighteenth century Cambridge's most glittering prize, the Regius Professorship of Divinity. (12) In 1776 he achieved notoriety for a popular and well argued refutation of the anti-Christian views expressed in Gibbon's *The History of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire*, and for a sermon, *The principles of the Revolution vindicated* which he preached to the University on 29 May, and in which he supported the actions and the claims of the American colonists. (13) He preached similar sermons in October 1776 and in 1780. (14) Such a stand on principles obviously opposed to those of the government could easily have resulted in the ruin of his career, but Watson was fortunate. He had not only adopted Whiggism out of principle, but had attached himself to leading Whig personalities, namely the Marquis of Rockingham, the Duke of Grafton, and, the rising star, his former pupil, the Duke of Rutland, whose interests he represented at the University. (15) The failure of North's American policy led to the fall of his administration, and in 1782 the political parties that had been opposed to his conduct of the war, the Old Whigs under Rockingham and the Chathamite rump under Shelburne, came into office. Watson's political opinions no longer operated to his disadvantage. It appears that Rockingham intended to give him the first vacancy on the Episcopal Bench, but when it occurred Rockingham inconveniently died. (16) Shelburne, however, honoured Rockingham's intentions and appointed Watson to the see at Llandaff in July; rather surprisingly, although with some reluctance and only at Rutland's prompting (17), Watson accepted. Shelburne, it seems, expected Watson to use his pen in support of the political cause, but he was to be disappointed for Watson refused to be tied down
down by party allegiances and pursued a policy of rugged independence. In this he was helped by inheriting the estates and fortune of his old University friend John Luther, M.P. for Essex, who died in 1786. He was then able to build his elegant mansion at Calgarth and to be of independent means for the rest of his days. (18) He opposed successive administrations, particularly those of Pitt the Younger, when he thought it necessary, but, although remaining a Lockian Whig until his death, he was never drawn into alliance with the parliamentary opposition. (19) He welcomed the French Revolution and regretted the subsequent war, but later his patriotism compelled him to lend literary and vocal aid to Pitt's war administrations, a course which resulted in his losing the support of the radicals. (20) Watson was sufficiently well known for his independent political and religious opinions to be an annoyance and an embarrassment to the King and his ministers, but he did not carry enough weight to induce them to gain his support by promoting him. He ended his days in retirement at Calgarth, disillusioned with politicians and statesmen, writing his memoirs and finding himself reluctantly blaming George III and Pitt for denying him the archbishopric he thought he deserved. He died on 4 July 1816. (21)

Watson's contribution to the late eighteenth century English Enlightenment and his breadth of interests render him worthy of comparison with Price and Priestley. Watson, unlike his predecessors, took his duties as Professor of Chemistry seriously, becoming adept at the subject, and in his five volumes of Chemical Essays produced the best general text book available to contemporaries in English. In them he exhibited knowledge of the latest developments, a clarity of expression, and a systematic experimental technique that resulted in some minor original discoveries. (22) Whilst never an academic theologian of outstanding originality, he did become expert in the discipline and his six volumes of Theological Tracts, consisting of works by prominent seventeenth and eighteenth century latitudinarian theologians, from both the Established and the Dissenting Churches, accompanied by his own introductory essays and a comprehensive bibliography, represented a significant contribution to the study of the subject. (23) He wrote arguably the best defences of Christianity in opposition to Gibbon's Decline and Fall and Paine's Age of Reason, his writing characterized by a strength and a clarity of language. (24) He was an advocate of moderate Church reform, and his scheme for a more equitable distribution of wealth within the Church, designed to help the poorer clergymen and end the degrading spectacle of place-hunting, has led one modern ecclesiastical historian to place Watson at the beginning of the 'Third Church Reform Movement' which blossomed in the nineteenth century. (25) By suggesting in his plans for liturgical reform that doctrine and liturgy should be changed as man's knowledge develops, he was a quiet advocate of the idea of progress, itself a concept characteristic of

Latitudinarianism
Latitudinarianism. (26) But perhaps Watson deserves most credit for his call for toleration for the Dissenters and the Catholics. He deserves this not because of the extent of his radicalism, Price and Priestley being far more extreme, but because he made his stand on the Episcopal Bench at a time when to promote the cause of either was to go against the tide of popular opinion.

Watson's case for toleration rests on the essentially religious conviction that the Bible is 'the only sure foundation' upon which the individual 'ought to build every article of faith', for 'there is no certainty of truth but in the word of God'. (27) The Bible is God's direct revelation to Man of His Will, and it takes precedence, therefore, over the opinions of men in the formulation of faith; it is 'the one infallible rule by which we must measure the truth or falsehood of every religious opinion', and 'all other foundations, whether they be the decisions of councils, the confessions of churches, the precepts of popes, or the expositions of private men, ought to be considered by them as sandy and unsafe'. (28)

Following Locke, he believed that every individual is capable of exercising his own reason in religion, defining reason as 'that faculty of the human mind by which we are able to discover the truth'. (29) As each individual is capable of discovering religious truth, no one has the right to determine what the faith of another should be. It is, furthermore, essential that the individual should determine his own faith as, in the end, he is responsible to God for his beliefs:

'Want of genuine moderation towards those who differ from us in religious opinions, seems to be the most unaccountable thing in the world. Every man, who has any religion at all, feels within himself a stronger motive to judge right, than you can possibly suggest to him; and, if he judges wrong, what is that to you? To his own master he standeth or falleth; his wrong judgement may affect his own salvation, it cannot affect yours...... Do you undertake to measure the extent of any man's understanding, except your own; to estimate the strength and origin of his habits of thinking; to appreciate his merit or demerit in the use of the talent which God has given him, so as unerringly to pronounce that the belief of this or that doctrine is necessary to his salvation? It is undoubtedly necessary to yours, if you are persuaded that it comes from God; but you take too much upon you, when you erect yourself into an infallible judge of truth and falsehood.' (30)

Watson believed that although all men are endowed with the faculty of reason, there exist natural inequalities between them that prevent the use of that faculty in a uniform manner. Diversification of religious opinion is therefore unavoidable. (31) Under such circumstances he called for a 'suspicion of fallibility' to enter into the dealings between men on religious matters. (32) Although he believed that reason is the only means by which men can judge truth, he did not believe in the omnipotence of the human reason, and thought that it becomes virtually useless when it attempts to fathom the wisdom of God. (33) Absolute truth in religious affairs
affairs is unobtainable beyond those few truths clearly and unequivocally expressed in the Scriptures. (34) Like Locke he believed that there is a small body of undisputed truths common to all Christians, but even in this he refused to be dogmatic. (35) Progress towards the truth can be made by theological discussion and dispute, conducted in a spirit of Christian charity. (36) Together with Price and Priestley Watson believed that truth would naturally emerge in an atmosphere of free enquiry. (37) He did not believe that freedom of enquiry is a fundamental right, but he did see that it is necessary.

Finally, Watson was an advocate of toleration because he was naturally inclined to moderation, and because he believed that charity towards other men is the most important Christian virtue. He stated this belief in the following passage from his Letter to the members of the honourable House of Commons, written in 1772 under the pseudonym 'A Christian Whig', in which he sympathized with the demands of the Feathers Tavern Petitioners, addressing his argument to those who feared the consequences of abolishing subscription:

'But we shall be over-run with Arianism, Socinianism, Arminianism. And Who told You, that an Arian, a Socinian, or an Arminian, from Principle, shall not be saved as well as You? Are the Gates of Heaven open only to us, the Athanasians and Calvinists of the Age? Is Yours the only intelligible Interpretation of Scripture; Yours the only saving Faith? Away with such unlearned Arrogance, such an uncharitable Judgement! They are a Disgrace to Humanity, and a Dishonour to any Religion. The Question will not be at the last Day, Are You of the Church of Jerusalem or of Antioch, of Rome or England; Are You a Doctor of the Sorbonne or of Oxford, a Friend to the Remonstrants or the Synod of Dort? Not, what Articles, Confessions, Formularies, have you subscribed? But, what hungry have you fed? What Naked have you cloathed? What Sick have you visited? What Souls have you saved? Not, what barren metaphysical Creeds have you repeated? But, What Fruits of your Faith have you brought forth?' (38)

These principles upheld freedom of worship, but it did not follow that they formed the basis of an argument in favour of civil equality for Dissenters and Catholics. Opponents of toleration rarely denied the right of others to worship as they pleased, providing that they did not threaten the security of the State, but they did think that the Established Church could only be protected by measures of civil discrimination against nonconformists. (39) These principles were held by Watson before he publicly advocated a relaxation of the laws limiting the rights of Dissenters and Catholics. Although he was not a man to keep silent at the discovery of an injustice, equally he would not commit himself to a cause publicly until he was absolutely convinced of its justice. Thus of the four major issues which arose concerning toleration in late eighteenth century England, the first concerning the reform of the Thirty Nine Articles, the second concerning the relaxation of the Law obliging Dissenting Ministers and Schoolmasters to subscribe to most of those articles, the third concerning the use of a sacramental test as a qualification.
For office, and the fourth concerning the relief of the Roman Catholics, it is not at all surprising that it was the first that primarily engaged Watson, not only because the issue came first to his attention, but also because as a Church of England Man he was anxious to ensure that it would always hold a place for men of liberal views like himself. In the Subscription Controversy of 1772 he found himself unable to give unequivocal support to the Clerical Petition, but his sympathies lay with the Petitioners and he thought that subscription to the Thirty Nine Articles should be abolished in order to avoid a schism and to encourage a spirit of free enquiry within the Church. (40) He published his opinions in two Letters which he addressed to the house of Commons and hid his identity under the mask of 'A Christian Whig'. (41) This theme of reconciliation was one he continued in 1790 with his Considerations on the expediency of revising the liturgy in which, while never declaring himself to be a Unitarian, he thought that the question of the Trinity could not be answered with any certainty and that the Athanasian Creed should be expunged in order to avoid unnecessary controversy and pangs of conscience. (42) His schemes for the Established Church were designed essentially to stop clergymen leaving, but he was aware that they also offered the possibility of a reconciliation with some of the Dissenters, a possibility which he welcomed. (43)

Watson established his liberal sentiments early in his career, and was greatly influenced by the great mid-century latitudinarian divine, Edmund Law, with whom he was closely associated at Cambridge. (44) He developed slowly, reacting to particular circumstances; first subscription, then toleration for Dissenters, and finally toleration for Catholics. Unlike the radicals, Watson did not consider the question of toleration in terms of abstract right, but rather in terms of the reasonableness of the demands made by the Dissenters and the Catholics. He first displayed his theological liberalism in his two Letters of 1772 and in A brief state of the principles of Church authority, but he published these anonymously. The first public indication of his sympathies was manifested in his conduct respecting the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. The Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge had hitherto been regarded as the Society's unofficial chaplain. The Society, founded in 1701 with the intention of administering to British colonials and converting heathens within the Empire, was intimately connected with the Anglican Church and enjoyed considerable prestige through royal patronage. Watson never subscribed to the Society, because he believed that 'its missionaries were more zealous in proselytizing Dissenters to episcopacy, than in converting heathens to Christianity'. (45) Further indications of his opinions were given in the preface to Theological Tracts, which were written in 1785 and designed to influence young clergymen. Here he urges
all members of the establishment to demonstrate moderation and
good will towards those who differ from them in religion,
sentiments which he also expressed in his visitation charges
of 1784 and 1788. (46)

Early in 1787 the Committee of the Protestant Dissenting
Deputies inaugurated their campaign for the repeal of the Test
and Corporation Acts by approaching the Prime Minister,
William Pitt, whom they considered as a potential ally, in
order to ascertain his opinion. (47) Pitt informed them that on
such an issue he needed time to consider. He then, according to
Watson, sought the opinion of the Archbishop of Canterbury,
John Moore, who called a meeting of the bishops on 10 February.
At the meeting the question was put 'Ought the Test and
Corporation Acts to be maintained?' Watson related what
happened next:

'I was the junior bishop, and as such, was called upon to
deliver my opinion first, which I did in the negative. The only
bishop who voted with me was Bishop Shipley. The then
Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and the Bishops of Worcester,
Lincoln, Ely, Peterborough, Norwich, Exeter, Bangor, Bath and
Wells, Rochester, and Lichfield, voted that the Acts ought to be
maintained. When the question was thus decided, that my brethren
might see I was not sorry to be known to have voted as I had
done, I moved, that not only the result of the meeting, but that
the names of those who had voted for and against the maintenance
of the Acts, should be sent to Mr. Pitt; and the motion was
passed unanimously: (48)

The repeal motions of 1787, 1789 and 1790 were lost in the
Commons and, consequently, Watson had no opportunity to speak in
their favour in the Lords, even if he had so desired. But in
Anecdotes he recalls at least one attempt he made to influence
members of the Administration. After the defeat of the motion for
repeal in 1790 he saw Lord Camden, then Lord President of the
Council:

'I plainly asked him if he foresaw any danger likely to
result to the church establishment, from the repeal of the Test
Act: he answered at once, none whatever. On my urging the
policy of conciliating the Dissenters, by granting their
petition, his answer made a great impression on my mind, as it
showed the principle on which great statesmen sometimes condescend
to act. It was this: - Pitt was wrong in refusing the former
application of the Dissenters, but he must be now supported.' (49)

Watson still did not advocate publicly the repeal of the Test
and Corporation Acts, but in 1790 he took another significant step
in that direction. His anonymous Considerations on the expediency
of revising the liturgy was concerned mainly with internal reform
of the Church of England, but he did make two observations
relevant to the Dissenters. First, inspired by the
example of the religious reforms carried out in France after the
Revolution, he suggested the possibility of 'establishing', that
is, of granting state support to, more than one Christian
denomination. He did not expand this idea, leaving it as a
rather tentative proposal. (50) Secondly, he made a statement
concerning the role of the civil magistrate in religious matters
which clearly referred to the relationship between the Anglican
Church and the Dissenters.

'Sc far am I from thinking it to be the duty of a
Christian Magistrate, to influence men's judgements with respect
to religious Doctrines, by rewards and punishments, that I con-
ceive it to be quite the contrary; I conceive it to be his duty
to leave men's judgements as free and uninfluenced as he
possibly can, consistently with the safety of that Religious
Establishment, which, for the common good, he hath thought fit
to introduce and to support. It is an obstruction to truth for a
Magistrate to profess his attachment to any particular sect in
Religion; because the authority and reverence annexed to his
Civil station extend themselves to his__religious
persuasion; and men are induced to embrace Doctrines, not from a
conviction that they are true, but from a certainty that they are
believed to be so by the Magistrate, and from a confused notion
of infallibility of his judgement. This evil, unavoidably
incident to the situation of every Magistrate who supports any
one denomination of Christians by an exclusive patronage, should
be kept within as confined bounds as the nature of it will admit.
He should not be so narrow-minded as to imagine the common good
to be so inseparably connected with his religious belief, as that
he ought to discourage the free discussion of all other religious
opinions: he should not be so bigoted as to suppose himself
possessed of any degree of infallibility, but modestly to admit
that other men may be as honest and wise as himself; he ought in
no manner to obstruct, but to give free current to the sentiments
of others....(51).

Then in 1791, when the tide had turned firmly against the
Dissenters, Watson delivered a visitation charge in which he
praised the French National Assembly for 'the complete toleration
which it holds to all mankind in concerns of religion'. (52) He
went on to declare, 'If God Almighty thinks fit to tolerate
different religions in the world, suited, there is reason to
believe, to the different intellectual and moral attainments of
mankind, surely it becomes us to be kindly affectioned towards
those who, agreeing with us in all the fundamental verities of
the Christian Religion, differ from us only in matters of
little importance'. (53) Without mentioning the Test and
Corporation Acts by name, he remarked, 'You will readily perceive
that I am alluding to the case of the Protestant Dissenters amongst
ourselves
ourselves.' (54) The use of the phrase 'complete toleration' is, therefore, in need of some explanation. Watson does not mean 'comprehensive toleration' that is, freedom of worship and civil equality for all the members of all sects, but that the privileges of citizenship should be extended to the Dissenters. In The principles of moral and political philosophy William Paley distinguishes a partial toleration, for Dissenters, which consists in 'the unmolested profession and exercise of their religion, but with an exclusion from the offices of trust and emoluments of state', from a complete toleration which includes admitting them to all civil privileges. (55) It was a complete toleration in this sense that Watson sought for the Dissenters; he used the same concept as Paley but applied it differently, without including the Catholics in its scope.

Watson's case for the repeal of discriminatory legislation in 1791 was based partly on the fundamental right of the Dissenters to worship God in their own way. (56) It was also based on his confidence in freedom of enquiry: that truth will triumph naturally and that Christianity does not need the support of civil legislation to establish its validity. (57) But while Watson declared that he was opposed to discriminatory legislation on account both of its 'injustice and impolicy' it was really the latter, its impolicy, which formed the kernel of his argument. (58) In A letter concerning toleration, Locke, by whose philosophy Watson was heavily influenced, had not envisaged an absolute right to toleration for all. He had made toleration of a religious opinion conditional upon its not threatening the security of the state. (59) In 1791 Watson sought to demonstrate that the Dissenters were no longer, if they ever had been, a threat to the physical wellbeing of the State. He observed that the Dissenters were not a homogeneous group, that their only bond of unity was the legal discrimination to which they were subjected, and that, if this was removed, their disunity would become apparent. (60) He thought a display of charity and magnanimity on the part of the British legislature would encourage reciprocal goodwill on the part of the Dissenters and thus strengthen their loyalty to the State. He believed that the indulgence of the Toleration Act and the relief from subscription given to the schoolmasters and to the ministers of the Dissenters had already 'softened their dislike' of both Church and State, and that as a result 'they have become better citizens as they have experienced more confidence from the State; they have become less of Dissenters from the Church, as they have had less fears of ecclesiastical persecution'. (61) Above all, the Dissenters had already demonstrated their loyalty to the State on several occasions; not only had they felt as much for the constitution as the Anglicans had, but they had done 'as much for
for its preservation, not only in bringing back Charles the Second, but in bringing in King William, and in resisting the rebellions of fifteen and forty-five, as any other body of citizens'. (62)

He echoed these sentiments in 1803, in The substance of a speech intended to have been spoken in the House of Lords when he specifically called for a repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in the face of the renewal of the war with France, in order to enhance the unity and therefore the strength of the nation.

'I am well aware that on this point I differ in opinion from men whom I esteem; but without arrogating to myself, without allowing to others, any infallibility of Judgement, I am anxious, in the Crisis of our Fate, to speak my whole mind. What I presume to recommend is - a Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts - as a Means of combining together, in the cords of mutual amity and confidence, the whole Strength and Spirit of the Country. It has been said that the Dissenters constitute above a fifth part of the population of the Kingdom; I do not think them to be so numerous; but I am convinced that they are too loyal to be treated with Distrust at any time, and too numerous to be soured by neglect at this time....I have never had any design, any wish, my Lords, to gain the good-will of the Dissenters, by becoming a Champion in their Cause - much less have I any inclination to provoke the Disesteem of my Brethren, by a forward display, or a forward retention of an Opinion opposite to their's. I may be wrong in thinking that the repeal of the Test Act would in no degree endanger the Safety of either the Church or State; but whilst I do think so, I should act a timid, interested, dishonourable, part, if I concealed my Sentiments.' (63)

In the same work Watson also made his first public pronouncements on the problem of Catholicism in the British Isles. He had always disliked Catholicism, rejecting what he saw as superstition and spiritual arrogance. (64) His initial refusal to request for Catholics what he sought for the Dissenters was based on what he saw as their failure to satisfy the conditions for toleration set by Locke. He believed that they posed a threat to the security of the State, 'No Civil Society of Protestants can tolerate a Clergy professing Belief in the Doctrines of the Church of Rome, respecting the Supremacy of the Pope; because a general Belief of the Authority of the See of Rome to excommunicate or depose the Civil Magistrate, or to absolve the Subjects from their Allegiance to Him, would in fact be a Dissolution of the Civil Society itself.' (65) In 1784 in a private letter to the Duke of Rutland, then Lord

Lieutenant
Lieutenant of Ireland, he conceded that English Catholics no longer represented such a threat; 'every indulgence, even a participation of all civil rights might be granted with safety to Catholics in England, because they are so far from being the majority, that they do not constitute one-seventieth part of the inhabitants', but in Ireland, 'the proportion between Catholics and Protestants being widely different, the whole of the attitude of government should be different also'. (66) However, in 1791 when the Catholic Relief Act extended full religious toleration to the English Catholics, Watson found himself unable to support the measure because he felt that they would abuse the privileges granted to them to effect conversions from Protestantism, through the lure of its doctrines, its threat of persecution, its accent on proselytism, and its claim to hold the key to salvation. For a moment prejudice seems to have got the better of him, and he lost confidence in the triumph of rational Protestantism under a system of free enquiry. He made his fears known in a letter which he wrote to Pitt in March 1791, explaining why he felt unable to support the Bill:

'Might it not be proper to introduce into the Oath of Protestation, a declaration of this kind? And that we believe salvation is not restricted to the members of the Church of Rome. Whilst the doctrine of there being no salvation out of the Romish pale is maintained, the Catholics have such a motive for making proselytes as belongs not to Protestants, and it is a motive which must operate with great force on the mind of every sincere Papist. I am apprehensive that Catholic schools will become numerous; the glare of ceremonies will fascinate the minds of the common people; and the doctrine of absolution, and of praying souls out of purgatory, will be palatable to many. I am afraid of Popery, because, where it has the power, it assumes the right of persecution, and whilst it believes that in afflicting the body, it saves the soul of a convert, I do not see how it can abandon the idea of the utility of persecution. If schools are allowed for the Catholics at home, what is to become of the sums, which have been appropriated by the English Catholics, to the maintenance of foreign seminaries?' (67).

In Anecdotes Watson revealed that he subsequently concurred with the measure which Pitt introduced, but in this letter he defends State intervention against Catholics on purely doctrinal grounds. Although in 1787 he viewed Catholicism with suspicion he had already advocated in private the radical attitudes that he made public in 1803 and 1805. In common with all statesmen of the day he saw that peace in Ireland was essential to the security of the whole Empire, and that a settlement of the religious question held the key to obtaining that pacification. In January 1787 he wrote to Rutland
Rutland calling for a strong hand against any who disturbed the peace, but at the same time he also recommended that genuine injustices should be remedied. (68) In particular he thought it unjust that the Catholic majority should be required to give financial support to the minority Protestant establishment. He observed, 'as Popery is the religion of the majority of the State in strict justice it ought to be the established religion of the country'. (69) More particularly, he was aware of the potentially beneficial effect of the payment of Catholic bishops and priests by the State:

'There are some enlightened gentlemen among the Catholics; but the persecuting spirit of the Roman Church remains in the hearts of the generality of its members; and whilst it does remain, Popery must be watched, intimidated, restrained. Is it an impossible stroke of policy to attach the bishops and clergy of the Papists to the state, by making it their interest to be faithful and peaceable subjects? A Regium Donum of forty or fifty thousand a year would have a great effect.' (70)

In his letter to Rutland, Watson stressed the expediency of a State grant to the Catholic clergy, and it may not be going too far to suggest that he hoped to buy the loyalty of the Catholics. In 1803 he made public his idea of a State grant to the clergy, but by then his attitude had changed. He was altogether more trusting of Catholic intentions; preferring to ignore his earlier misgivings, he rested his case for a State payment to priests, not on its usefulness but on its justice:

'One circumstance in the situation of Ireland has always appeared to me an hardship, and that hardship still remains un-diminished. I have always thought it an hardship, that a great Majority of the Irish People should be obliged, at their own expence, to provide religious Teachers for themselves and their families.... I love, my Lords, to have Politics, on all occasions, founded on substantial Justice, and never on apparent temporary Expedience, in violation of Justice; and it does appear to me to be just, That the religious Teachers of a large Majority of a State should be maintained at the Public Expence.' (71)

Perhaps Watson would merit greater praise if he had been more honest about his earlier prejudice against the Catholics, but there can be no doubt about the progressive nature of his ideas by 1803. He inverted Lockian doctrine on this point. Instead of suggesting that Catholics should be granted concessions as a reward for the loyalty they had already demonstrated, he recommended that they should receive them to bring about a change of heart on their part. He hoped to win their loyalty by a display of good will, and to gain another 'cordial friend' in the fight against France. (72)

Watson had gone further than it was politic for any clergyman with an eye on promotion to do, but he had still not advocated a comprehensive toleration, or emancipation for Catholics. In 1803
he called for the payment of clergy by the State and no more.
He did not intend to disestablish the Protestant Church in Ireland,
having accepted as early as 1790 the idea that more than one sect
should be established. By stipulating that the Catholic Church was
not to be supported by the tithe, he hoped to avoid any intimate
financial tie with the Irish people; payment by the State would
make the Catholic Church dependent upon the Government for support.
Political concessions were not yet envisaged. He explained his
position to his Westmoreland neighbour, Viscount Lowther, in a letter of 30 November 1804:

'Accept, my dear Lord, my best thanks for the venison and for
every other instance of your kind attention to me and mine. You
will soon no doubt, be going to Town, where I shall not be this
winter; I sincerely wish the session well over, but I tremble for
Ireland; that country is infatuated if she distresses
Administration by moving at this moment the question of
Emancipation; Emancipation is one thing, a provision for her clergy
another; on the last thing my mind is made up, but not on the
former. A fair answer may be given I think, to the Catholic Peers,
urging their claim to a seat in the House of Peers, - You are not
allowed to sit in that House, because the King is not allowed as a
Catholic, to sit on the throne.'

Given this caution in 1804, it is perhaps surprising that he
supported the Catholics when they petitioned in 1805. The Union of
1801 meant that Emancipation had become a national issue, and while
he referred mainly to Irish Catholics in his Charge of 1805, he must
have been aware that any political concessions made to them would
have to be made in England as well. It is not clear why Watson
changed his mind in such a short space of time, but it is possible
that he was satisfied with the declaration of allegiance made by the
petitioners. As with the Dissenters and in contract to his fears of
1791, he focused his attention on purely political criteria. In the
past toleration could not be considered because Catholics had refused
to keep faith with heretics, and because they had offered allegiance
to a foreign power. (74) By 1805 he had come to believe that the
position of the Catholics had altered, and he now recognized that to
exclude a Catholic from Parliament, not just from the Lords, on the
grounds that the King could not as a Catholic sit on the throne, was
no longer an adequate argument:

'It may, however, be said, and properly said, that the
influence of a Catholic King is very different, both in degree and
kind, from that of a Catholic Peer or commoner in Parliament that
a Catholic King may by his influence, oppress a Protestant People,
and subvert their religion; but that a few Catholic legislators,
when mixed with the majority of Protestants, cannot be dangerous,
either to the Established Church of these dominions, or to the
avowed principles of all the reformed churches in Europe. To
apprehend danger from the admission of Catholics into
Parliament proceeds not, I humbly think, from any correct view of
the habitudes of human nature; from any enlightened foresight

of
of future events; or enlarged notions of political expedience; but rather, from an inadvertence to our present situation, as connected with, or more truly speaking, as unconnected with the rest of Europe, and from a too strong attachment to the prejudices of education. We have from our childhood been taught to combine into one idea the Pope and the Pretender, as consisting an object of our detestation; united they were dangerous, but a Pope without a Pretender can be no reasonable subject for alarm; nor can the Catholics be now considered as dangerous, especially when they disclaim and soundly abjure, as they have done, any intention to overturn the Protestant Church Establishment for the purpose of substituting a Catholic Establishment in its stead; and when they declare, that they will not exercise any privilege to which they may become entitled, to disturb the Protestant Religion and Protestant Government. This reasoning is not devoid of strength; I submit it to your consideration.' (75)

Watson's scheme for a State grant to the Catholic Church in Ireland was not such a forlorn hope as it might at first seem. Pitt himself toyed with the payment of 'securities' to Irish priests, and the principle of State aid to the Irish clergy had already been accepted in 1795 with the founding of Maynooth seminary by government grant. (76) Also, increasingly in the nineteenth century, many conservative British politicians, despite their abhorrence of constitutional change, began to look more favourably on Catholicism, as they saw in it a barrier against revolutionary enthusiasm. (77) But in 1808 the priests themselves firmly rejected the idea of securities. From the time when Watson first tentatively suggested State payment of Irish priests to Rutland it took eighteen years before he came round to accepting emancipation itself, but even in 1805 he was far in advance of the vast majority of the members of the political and ecclesiastical establishments. Somewhat ironically he had initially lagged behind one of his episcopal colleagues, the conservative yet unpredictable Horsley who, in the debate on the second reading of the Catholic Relief Bill in 1791, had declared that those Catholics who abjured the extremes of papal authority no longer represented a physical threat to the security of the State, and that he found himself obliged to oppose the measure because he believed it did not give enough to such dissenting Catholics. Horsley, however, opposed the Irish Catholic petition of 1805. (78)

In calling for a repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts Watson was in accord with the practical demands of the majority of the Protestant Dissenters, but in the theory which formed the basis of his arguments he fell someway behind the ideas advanced by Price and Priestley. Not least among the differences between them was that Watson accepted the need for intervention by the magistrate and he accepted the need for an Established Church.
Watson's justification of an Established Church, which he defined as, 'A Religion, the doctrines and rites of which are taught and administered by men, who are paid for their service by the State.' was stated in terms similar to those of Warburton's Alliance of Church and State, and he drew heavily on Locke. (79) Watson believed that Christianity is essential to civil society; the doctrine of a future state in which the virtuous are rewarded and the vicious punished provides a social bond denied to those who found the distinction between right and wrong in the deliverances of reason. (80) In Two Treatises of Government Locke had argued that it is the duty of the magistrate to preserve society and promote the public good; (81) in this claim Watson found the justification of an Established Church. In his Charge of 1791, in which he called for an end to discriminatory legislation against the Dissenters, he expressed his belief in the right of the magistrate to establish a religion:

'I know it is the duty of the civil magistrate, not only to punish crimes, but to prevent the commission of them; and as the belief of the existence of a God governing the affairs of this present world and ordering a future state of rewards and punishments, is amongst the most powerful means of such prevention, it seems to be his duty to provide, at the public expense, public teachers of some religion, and in fact every nation in the world has made such a provision.' (82)

But although he defended the need for an Established Church, Watson was quite flexible when he came to discuss practical details. As has already been noted, he considered the possibility that the establishment should consist of more than one denomination, and he thought that it should represent the majority religion in a state. (83) The magistrate has no right to impose his own religion, and when the 'tide' of religious opinion turns against him 'he ought to suffer himself to be carried away by it. (84) Furthermore, 'whatever right may be allowed to the civil magistrate of introducing amongst his subjects what he may judge to be the most perfect system of morality or religion, no right can be allowed him of supporting his own religion by the suppression of others.' (85) By contrast, Priestley came to reject all forms of establishment, and Price, although reluctantly prepared to countenance a system in which the magistrate gave support to all denominations, preferred to have no State intervention in religious matters at all. (86)

It is not clear from Watson's works whether he was in favour of abolishing all religious tests. Some doubts as to his position on this point arise in considering a note which was published in The World and Fashionable Advertiser for 9 March 1787:

'The plea of the Dissenters comes from Dr. Price and Co. and not from the Society of yore at the Feathers Tavern. This object
object, no improper one, is to beg relief from a sacramental test. Bishops 'Watson' and 'Shipley' so far approve the plan, as objecting to the Test being merely sacramental; and are anxious to form another form, either by some other declaration, where the matter and expression being 'more general' may be less exceptionable. The World agrees.' (87)

As far as can be ascertained Watson did not say whether he wished to see an end to all tests, but confined himself to calling for an end to the Test and Corporation Acts. He was also silent on the matter of the Blasphemy Acts, which excluded Unitarians from the protection of the Toleration Act. (88)

Watson also differed from the radicals in believing that the magistrate has a right to intervene in matters of religious opinion. He followed Locke in distinguishing 'speculative' and 'practical' religious opinions. (89) Practical religious opinions are those which affect the security of the State, such as the profession of Catholicism, atheism, passive obedience and general vice. (90) Opinions such as these the magistrate has to suppress. Speculative opinions, on the other hand, are those which concern only the salvation of the individual, and these the magistrate has no right either to promote or to suppress:

'When portentous political principles spring from religious opinions as scions from a root, and when civil actions originate in political principle, I cannot agree with those who think that the State has nothing to do with men's opinions religious or political but merely with their actions....

With speculative opinions the state has no concern, and it should be very cautious in denying an opinion to be speculative, on account of consequences which may be supposed to follow it in practice; but as there is more wisdom as well as more humanity, in preventing crimes than in punishing criminals, I cannot admit that the state has nothing to do with the religious opinions of its members'. (91)

It might be argued that Watson was allowing the magistrate an area of discretion in defining speculative and practical opinions which might be abused, but if this is an ambiguous matter in Watson's teaching it is also one in Locke's. Indeed, an ambiguity of this kind is an inevitable consequence of allowing the magistrate a role in religious matters even if that role is confined to practical opinions. The radicals argued that freedom of worship is a fundamental natural right. Watson, on the other hand, was primarily interested, not in abstract rights, but in the practical demands that the Dissenters and the Catholics made. He may not have couched his arguments in such exciting terms or propounded theories so advanced, and he may have moved more slowly, but he pushed towards the same ends. In his arguments in favour of greater toleration he looked back to Locke, but in using political loyalty as the criterion by which the claims of the Dissenters and the Catholics were to be judged, he used an argument that was much more likely
likely to convince conservative politicians at the turn of the century. Increasingly, religious laws were justified not upon their alleged foundation in the rights of the State, but because they were believed to be an essential part of the constitution which it was imperative to defend against revolutionary fervour from the Continent. That this was so, was perfectly expressed by Addington, then Prime Minister, in a letter to Watson written in October 1803:

"On the subject of the Test and Corporation Act(s), I think it incumbent on me to acknowledge a difference of opinion; not founded, believe me, on feelings of persecution and intolerance, but on a deliberate and settled conviction that concessions on that point would fundamentally weaken and endanger the whole fabric." (92)

Watson's cautious, even persuasive, arguments were to be of no avail, and the politically conservative held the centre of the stage for a whole generation.

Acknowledgements

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The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth.

2. John Jebb (1736-86) was admitted to Trinity College, Cambridge in 1754. Ordained into the Church of England in 1762. A protagonist of academic reform at Cambridge, in which he was supported by Watson. A leading member of the Clerical Petitioning Movement of 1771-1772. Resigned his preferments in 1775. Theophilus Lindsey (1723-1808) resigned his rectory at Catterick in 1773 and established the first Unitarian Chapel in Essex Street, London in 1774. William Frend (1757-1841) was educated at Christ's College, Cambridge. Removed from his University appointments on account of his Unitarianism after a spectacular hearing before the Senate in 1793. On that occasion the prosecution was conducted by Thomas Kipling, ironically Watson's deputy as Regius Professor. By that time Watson had ceased to play any active part in Cambridge affairs, and Kipling was in no way acting on Watson's behalf. Gilbert Wakefield (1756-1801) was educated at Jesus College, Cambridge; ordained in 1778, and resigned in 1779. He attacked the government in a reply he wrote to Watson's Address to the people of Great Britain in 1798. He was duly arrested and charged with seditious libel. Watson took no part in the proceedings. Wakefield died in prison.

3. Edmund Law (1703-87), Master of Peterhouse and Bishop of Carlisle. He published a translation of William King's De origine mali in 1731. Sympathized with the Unitarians but did not sign the Feathers Tavern Petition. John Law (1745-1810), Edmund Law's eldest son, was successively Bishop of Clonfert, Killula and Elphin. He too sympathized with the Petitioners but did not sign. Samuel Horsley (1733-1806) was educated at Trinity Hall, Cambridge and became successively Bishop of St. David's, Rochester and St. Asaph. A conservative in religion and politics, he surprisingly favoured concessions to Catholics willing to adjure papal authority. But he did not favour concessions to the Dissenters.

4. Samuel Parr (1747-1825), 'The Whig Dr. Johnson'. Educated at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Favoured liturgical reform but refused to give public support to the Petition of 1772. Urged concessions for Catholics and Dissenters. Samuel Horsley (1733-1806) was educated at Trinity Hall, Cambridge and became successively Bishop of St. David's, Rochester and St. Asaph. A conservative in religion and politics, he surprisingly favoured concessions to Catholics willing to adjure papal authority. But he did not favour concessions to the Dissenters.


9. Watson, Anecdotes, 3. Watson was quite definite that he was born in 1737, but the manuscript of the Heversham Parish Register gives the year of his birth and baptism as 1736. See J. R. Guy, 'Bishop Watson and his Lakeland friends', Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmoreland Archaeological Society, LXXVII (1977), 139; and G. Atkinson, The worthies of Westmoreland (London, 1849), I, 188.


12. Ibid., 22-36.

13. Richard Watson, An apology for Christianity in a series of letters addressed to Edward Gibbon, esq. (Cambridge, 1776); The principles of the revolution vindicated, a sermon preached before the University on Wednesday, May 29, 1776 (Cambridge, 1776).

14. Richard Watson, A sermon preached before the University of Cambridge on October 25, 1776, being the anniversary of his majesty's accession to the throne (Cambridge, 1776); A sermon preached before the University of Cambridge Feb. 4, 1780, being the day appointed for a general fast (Cambridge, 1780).


17. Watson, Anecdotes, 93, 94.

18. Ibid., 94, 132.

19. He most notably opposed Pitt in debates in the House of Lords on his Commercial Treaty with France on 23 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1787, and on the Regency Crisis on 22 Jan. 1789. Parl. Hist., XXVI, 519-521, 538-551; and XXVII, 1,045, 1,059
20. He spoke in favour of the Duke of Bedford's motion for peace with France on 27 Jan. 1795, Parl. Hist., XXXI, 1,257-79. His most comprehensive statement in support of the war came in his An address to the people of Great Britain 13th edn. (London, 1798) in which he explained his position thus: 'Whatever doubts I formerly entertained, or (notwithstanding all I have read on the subject) may still entertain, either on the justice or the necessity of commencing this war in which we are engaged, I entertain none of the present necessity and justice of continuing it. Under whatever circumstances the war was begun, it is now become just; since the enemy has refused to treat, on equitable terms for the restoration of peace' (p.11). The loss of radical support may be best illustrated by remarks made in the Cambridge Intelligencer from 1795 to 1798 which gradually became more critical until it was concluded that despite his former principles Watson 'has since been courting Mr. Pitt for further preferment, and has totally apostatized from his former excellent sentiments'. Cambridge Intelligencer, 21 July 1798, No. 262.

27. Watson, Theological tracts, I, xi.
28. Ibid.
30. Theological tracts, i, xi -xvi. See also Miscellaneous tracts, I, 319-23.
31. Watson, A brief state, 3.
32. Watson, Miscellaneous tracts, I, 319.
33. Ibid., 21, 76.
34. Watson, 46, 47.
36. In advising his clergy on theological controversy Watson declared: 'Nice distinctions of doctrines, and subtle inferences of great apparent Importance from detached Texts of disputed Authenticity or dubious Interpretation,
should never find their way into the pulpit. I am far from wishing to stifle the discussion of disputable doctrines; on the contrary, full and free investigation seems to me to be the only means of rendering them not disputable; but both the attack and the defence of them, are most properly committed to those Champions of our Faith, who find themselves disposed to exhibit proofs of their Theological Prowess, on the Amphitheatre of public Controversy - the Press; or on that of liberal and learned Disputation - the Schools of the Universities., A charge delivered to the clergy of the diocese of Llandaff, in June 1788 (Cambridge, 1788), 30.


38. (Richard Watson), A letter to the members of the honourable House of Commons; respecting the petition for relief in the matter of subscription, by A Christian Whig (London, 1772), 21-22.

39. For example, two anonymous opponents who refuted Watson's Charge of 1791. Both upheld freedom of worship but insisted on the retention of the Test and Corporation Acts. See Vindiciae Landavenseis: or strictures on the Bishop of Llandaff's late charge in a letter to his lordship (Oxford, 1792); and A letter to the Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Llandaff, containing remarks on his Lordship's charge to the clergy of the diocese of Llandaff (London, 1792).

40. See A letter to the members and A Christian Whig's two letters to the members of the honourable House of Commons (London, 1772).

41. His justification for calling himself 'A Christian Whig' is interesting. The Whigs he considered were the guardians of liberty; 'Considered as individuals, I have the honour to know many, have heard more hope there are hundreds in the House, who upon all occasions think for themselves, and are never languid in the cause of liberty. Religious liberty, indeed, was the thing contested for: but he is no whig in principle, who does not wish to see it prevail universally. It should not be considered what profession of men apply for relief; but, whether their request be reasonable, whether it can be granted with safety to the state.' A Christian Whig's two letters, 52.

42. Considerations.

43. Watson, A letter to the members, 16.

44. Watson, Anecdotes, 8.

45. Ibid., 65.
46. Watson, Theological tracts, I, xiv.
48. Watson, Anecdotes, 162.
49. Ibid., 162-3.
50. Watson, Considerations, 15-18.
51. Ibid., 98, 99.
52. Watson, A charge delivered to the clergy of the diocese of Llandaff, June, 1791 (London, 1792), 8.
53. Ibid., 9.
54. Ibid.
56. Watson, Charge 1791), 8-11, 17.
57. Ibid., 18, 19.
58. Ibid., 16.
60. Watson, Charge (1791), 13.
61. Ibid., 15.
62. Ibid., 14.
63. Richard Watson, The substance of a speech, intended to have been spoken in the House of Lords, November 22nd, 1803, 2nd edn. (London, 1803), 28-30.
64. Watson, A letter to the members, 10; Theological tracts, I, xiv; Miscellaneous tracts, I. 69, 74.
65. Watson, A letter to the members, 10.
67. Ibid., 245.
68. Ibid., 155-8.
69. Ibid., 156-7.
70. Ibid.
72. Ibid., 27.
73. Richard Watson to Viscount Lowther, 30 Nov. 1804. MS. Carlisle County Record Office, D/Lons/L., Deed Box 1, bundle 8.
74. Richard Watson, A charge delivered to the clergy of the diocese of Llandaff in June, 1805 (London, 1807), 10-17.
75. Ibid., 19.
76. Henriques, 142.
77. Ibid., 136.
79. Watson, Considerations, 15. William Warburton, (1698-1779), Bishop of Gloucester. In The alliance between church and state Warburton argued that the Church, which has the care of souls, and the State, which has the care of bodies, have distinct functions but cannot exist apart. Religion is necessary to civil society and useful to the State; The Church therefore deserves the protection given by a
test law, and it deserved material support. Warburton insisted that the freedom of worship of other sects should be protected provided they did not threaten the security of the State, but he did not admit that all individuals have equal civil rights whatever their religious opinions.

80. Richard Watson, Christianity consistent with every social duty: a sermon preached at the University church in Cambridge, at the assizes (Cambridge, 1769), 3; A charge delivered to the clergy of the diocese of Llandaf; in June 1802 (London, 1802), 7, 9, 11, 12.


82. Watson, Charge (1791), 10.
83. Watson, Considerations, 16; Charge (1791), 11; Charge (1805), 12, 13.
84. Watson, Considerations, 99-100.
85. Watson, A brief state, 29.
87. 'Church concerns', The world and fashionable advertiser, 9 Mar. 1787.
88. Priestley called for their repeal in A letter to the right honourable William Pitt, 23-25. The Unitarians petitioned for the repeal of the Blasphemy Act in 1791.
89. Locke, A letter concerning toleration, 152; Watson, A letter to the members, 8, 9.
90. Watson, ibid., 11-14.
91. Watson, Charge (1805), 11, 12.
92. Henry Addington to Richard Watson 25 Oct. 1803, David Watson MSS. Letter Book, fo. 46; Addington was referring to The substance of a speech.
Liberty is not something that lends itself to clear definition. The notion is an intrinsically difficult one, leading inexorably to paradoxes and inconsistencies: while in view of its favourable connotations, attempts to capture it for a particular political standpoint have been frequent and ingenious. In a famous essay (1) Sir Isaiah Berlin analysed the dangerous implications of one such transformation in the nineteenth century: that from a 'negative' concept of liberty to the 'positive', idealist concept, sponsored in England by T. H. Green, according to which freedom consists in acting according to one's 'real will'. However, the liberal individualist tradition of 'negative' liberty, which Sir Isaiah took as his starting point, is itself (as he remarked) comparatively modern. Although its roots can be traced a good way back, it was only in the eighteenth century that it triumphed even in England over older conceptions of liberty.

Such changes in the climate of opinion, though perceptible, are often hard to document; and the purpose of this essay is to illustrate the confrontation between emerging liberalism and its declining opponent by means of a specific and dramatically clear case. In the 1760's, two English divines published books in defence of liberty, the later of the two being intended as an answer to the former. (2) The author of the first was the Rev. John Brown, Anglican Vicar of Newcastle, while his opponent was the Rev. Joseph Priestley, a young Dissenting minister, later famous for his Unitarianism, his scientific investigations and his radical political opinions. What makes their disagreement significant is that Brown was one of the last thoroughgoing English defenders of liberty as understood within the tradition of classical republicanism: whereas Priestley was a pioneer liberal, who stated the classic case for political and cultural liberalism as clearly as Adam Smith stated that for liberalism in economics.

In his recent study of The machiavellian moment (3) Professor J. G. A. Pocock has conclusively demonstrated the reliance of many English political writers in the eighteenth century (and of Americans even beyond that) upon a vocabulary of political concepts and values developed, with numerous modifications and adjustments, out of the classical republicanism of Machiavelli and his fellow humanists. Within this tradition, conceptions of the good citizen and the good state were strongly coloured
coloured by idealised recollections of Sparta and of republican Rome. Such states were recognised to be inherently fragile and unstable works of art, saved from corruption and decay only by the heroic virtue and self-denying patriotism of their citizens. In eighteenth-century Britain, as Professor Pocock has shown, the image of the ancient republic had become entangled with the ideal of the mixed constitution of England, the preservation of which depended upon the virtue of independent and frugal landowners, and which was threatened by the corruption of both government and manners resulting from the new expansion of commercial wealth. (4)

The writers of the classical republican tradition invariably thought of themselves as defenders of liberty, in contradistinction to tyranny or autocratic rule. However, the liberty of the citizen of a free state, understood within this classical context, was very different from liberal notions of freedom. The implications of the classical approach can be clearly seen in the writings of the Rev. John Brown, a fairly typical representative of the tradition in mid-eighteenth-century England.

In 1757 John Brown published An estimate of the manners and principles of the times which enjoyed great celebrity. The situation of Britain at that time seemed to him to be critical, and following Montesquieu he attributed this not to chance events but to general causes lying in the attitudes and way of life of the British people. His object, in short, was to enquire, "how far the present ruling manners and principles of this nation may tend to its continuance or destruction". (5)

His answer was not encouraging. All around he saw signs of luxury and corruption all too reminiscent of the decline of Rome. Manners, he maintained, were characterised by "a vain, luxurious and selfish EFFEMINACY" (6) which was corrupting the political classes from their earliest years:

'As the first habits of infancy and youth commonly determine the character of the man, we might trace the effeminacy of modern manners, even to the unwholesome warmth of a nursery....the youth of quality and fortune is wrapt up from the wholesome keenness of the air, and thus becomes incapable of enduring the natural rigours of his own climate.'

Brown placed great stress upon the enervating effects of physical comfort, which seemed to him of obvious and direct relevance to the quality of political life. For how could the Man of Fashion be expected to show the Spartan virtue required of the citizen?

'Wherever
'Wherever he goes, he meets the same false delicacy in all: every circumstance of modern use conspires to soothe him into the excess of effeminacy: warm carpets are spread under his feet; warm hangings surround him; doors and windows nicely jointed prevent the least rude encroachment of the external air.' (7)

The effects of all this luxury were, according to Brown, what any student of the ancient republics would expect. Religion was despised as bad taste: honour had given way to vanity; and patriotism and courage had disappeared, as the panic over the Pretender's invasion of 1745 had amply demonstrated. As a result of the loss of public spirit the country had split into a chaos of selfish factions, fighting for the spoils of office and buying and selling seats in Parliament: while those few honest gentlemen who remained could no longer gain entrance to the House of Commons.

Brown attributed this general corruption of manners and principles to the growth of trade and commercial wealth, and predicted that its ultimate effect would be the loss of British liberty through conquest by France - for the French, though inured to despotism, and decadent also in their own way, at least retained some of the national pride and military honour that commerce had destroyed in Britain.

The Estimate caused a considerable stir on its publication in the early days of the Seven Years' War, before military victories restored British morale. In spite of the falsification of his predictions of defeat, however, Brown was not reassured, and he followed up his diagnosis of the sickness of the state with some recommendations for a cure. In 1765 he published Thoughts on civil liberty, on licentiousness and faction, in which he addressed himself to the problem of the preservation of a free state. He based his argument upon the principle - which was a commonplace of the classical republican tradition - that no free state can be maintained by laws and institutions alone. The principles and opinions of the citizens can alone give life to their laws, and preserve a free constitution intact. It followed that to assert, as some writers had done, that a man's thoughts are no concern of the state, is clearly erroneous. If liberty is not to become licentiousness, 'a certain regulation of principles' is necessary. Liberty, as was well known, depended upon virtue, and virtue could only be secure if the citizens had the right principles and the right training: in short, the right education. Brown had come to the conclusion that only a strict civic education for boys of the political classes could save British virtue and British liberty.

In support of his thesis, Brown pointed to the examples of the ancient republics. Athens, where no settled manners and principles had been inculcated into the youth of the city, was a dreadful warning of the political disintegration through

factional
factional strife to which such neglect must lead. Rome also, in spite of its legendary patriotism, honour and piety, had eventually fallen into corruption and tyranny, largely because the Romans had allowed the manners and principles of foreign nations to creep in among the citizens, instead of taking pains to hand on their own to their children. The only example worth following was clearly that of Sparta, which demonstrated that freedom and stability in a state could be secured only by 'an early and rigorous education.' In Sparta, Brown pointed out,

'No father had a right to educate his children according to the caprice of his own fancy. They were delivered to public officers.... Family connections had no place. The first and leading object of their affection was the public welfare....they were prohibited from travelling into other countries, lest they should catch infection from ill example: on the same foundation, all visits from strangers were forbidden. Thus were they strongly and unalterably possessed with the love of their country.' (8)

Brown's recommendations for Britain were based directly upon the Spartan example. If the free British constitution were to be preserved, young gentlemen must be prevented from travelling to despotic countries and adopting lax foreign customs; attempts should be made to limit trade and wealth, the worst sources of corruption; the licentiousness of the press should be curtailed in order to stop religion and patriotism being undermined; and, above all, there should be a system of civic education for the upper classes, modelled on that of Sparta. In an appendix attached to a sermon published in the same year, Brown gave some indication of the sort of education he had in mind:

'A system of principles, religious, moral and political; whose tendency may be the preservation of the blessings of society, as they are enjoyed in a free state: to be instilled effectually into the infant and growing minds of the community, for this great end of public happiness.' (9)

John Brown was perhaps rather unusual in spelling out the practical implications of judging eighteenth-century Britain by the yardstick of classical republican values: but he was certainly not at all unusual in holding those values. The political language in which he spoke, and the tradition to which he appealed, were enormously venerable and prestigious, and so was the conception of freedom that he enunciated. A modern reader cannot help but be struck by the parallels with totalitarianism when a writer proposes to save a 'free state' by clamping down on travel, commerce and the liberty of the press, and deliberately indoctrinating all those who are likely to be politically
politically active. But it is important to realise that Brown was innocent of irony and of the conscious sophistication that Berlin castigated in Idealist reinterpretations of 'positive' freedom. When Brown talked about 'liberty', he used it in a perfectly familiar and highly respectable sense to mean the situation of law-abiding citizens who were not subject to an arbitrary monarch, and who had the will and capacity to defend their rights: whereas by 'licentiousness' he meant the anarchic self-indulgence that could easily destroy law and liberty.

The epithet of 'innovator' - almost invariably, at the time, an opprobrious one - could be applied with very much more justice to the young Dissenting minister who rushed into print to attack Brown's educational schemes, Joseph Priestley. (10) To attribute originality to Priestley's classically liberal position may seem strange, for Priestley was, like Brown, fortified by the sense of belonging to an established political tradition, although one considerably less venerable. He was a Dissenter and a Whig, the conscious heir of the sectaries who had defended the Protestant Succession and helped to make the Glorious Revolution, and who had also (though this was something to be kept at the back of one's mind rather than stressed in public, since it continued to provide Tory Churchmen with ammunition) cut off King Charles's head. The liberties to which he was born included not only habeas corpus and no taxation without representation - liberties to be jealously defended against monarchical encroachment - but also a considerable degree of religious toleration, wrested from a hostile Church, qualified by Test Acts, and in need of continual reassertion.

Connections between Dissenting Whiggery and the Classical republicanism of much 'Country' rhetoric were numerous and complex. (11) Priestley and his Dissenting friends habitually identified themselves with 'Country' criticisms of the court, with the traditional opposition to standing armies, placemen and pensioners, the traditional suspicion of the King as the source of corruption. (12) Nevertheless, there were differences. The political outlook of Dissenters seems to have been less classical, more rationalist and individualistic than in other circles - no doubt partly because, being strong in commercial circles, they found it harder than did the Anglican country gentry to see themselves as reincarnations of Cincinnatus at the plough. At the Dissenting Academy at Daventry where he was educated, Priestley read Grotius, Pufendorf, and, above all, Locke on government, and the political language that came most naturally to him was the rationalist one of natural rights, contract and utility.

To this traditional Dissenting Whiggism, however, Priestley added an extra dimension with far-reaching implications - a belief
belief in the inevitable progress of mankind under divine
guidance. Priestley was not, in fact, typical of eighteenth-
century Dissenters (although he foreshadowed with remarkable
accuracy many of the characteristics of enlightened Non-
conformists a hundred years later). For he was a man of the
Enlightenment, a pioneer scientist, a Christian who had rejected
Calvinism, and who was in the process of working out his own
version of rationalist Unitarianism. Unlike his scientific
contemporaries in France, however, his Christian faith was no
less strong for being unorthodox, and the hallmark of his
thought was that his fervent belief in progress had a religious
basis. (13) History seemed to him to demonstrate the gradual
education of the human race, under divine guidance, from
primitive error to comparative enlightenment, and to give promise
of similar progress in the future. Just as each individual man
required the discipline of learning and experience in order to
reach wisdom, so also did humanity itself:

....the human species itself is capable of similar
and unbounded improvement; whereby mankind in a later
age are greatly superior to mankind in a former
age ..a man at this time, who has been tolerably well-
educated, in an improved Christian country, is a being
possessed of much greater power, to be and to make
happy, than a person of the same age, in the same or
any other country, some centuries ago. And, for this
reason, I make no doubt, that a person some centuries
hence will, at the same age, be as much superior to
us.' (14)

The key factor in progress, according to Priestley, was the
accumulation of knowledge, and its correction by experience:
'Thus all knowledge will be subdivided and extended;
and knowledge, as Lord Bacon observes, being power,
the human powers will, in fact, be enlarged; nature ....
will be more at our command; men will make their
situation in this world abundantly more easy and
comfortable....and will grow daily more happy....Thus
whatever was the beginning of this world, the end will
be glorious and paradisiacal, beyond what our
imaginations can now conceive.' (15)

This disposition to see history as a record of improvement
rather than degeneration, which contrasts so sharply with the
views of classical republicans like Brown, was bound up with
Priestley's rejection of their characteristic puritanism. As we
have seen, Brown saw nothing strange in connecting political
decline with modern draughtproofing of houses, whereas Priestley
could quote as evidence of the manifest superiority of modern
life such material comforts as glass windows and a fire in one's
bedroom. (16) The irony here is that it was Priestley, not
Brown, who was directly descended from Puritan forebears.

Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, during his period as a teacher at the Dissenting Academy at Warrington, he could declare roundly (in a course of lectures written for his students and subsequently published) (17): 'That the state of the world at present, and particularly the state of Europe, is vastly preferable to what it was in any former period, is evident from the very first view of things. A thousand circumstances show how inferior the ancients were to the moderns in religious knowledge, in science in general, in government, in laws, both the laws of nations and those of particular states, in arts, in commerce, in the conveniences of life, in manners, and, in consequence of all these, in happiness.'

We see, then, that against Brown's classical vision of the 'Machiavellian moment' in history, in which the preservation of a free state required a constant and unremitting struggle to maintain its principles in face of the inevitable tendency of all human works to corruption, Priestley set a totally different attitude to history, according to which the past represented the gradual education of mankind from error to truth, under the beneficent guidance of Providence. The implications of this perspective for the understanding of liberty were made clear in the pamphlet Priestley wrote in answer to Brown's educational schemes, An essay on the first principles of government, and on the nature of political, civil and religious liberty, published in 1768.

Priestley took great care to define liberty in the Essay, and his definition is best given in his own words:

'If I be asked what I mean by liberty, I should choose, for the sake of greater clearness, to divide it into two kinds, political and civil; and the importance of having clear ideas on the subject, will be my apology for the innovation. POLITICAL LIBERTY, I would say, consists in the power which the members of the state reserve to themselves, of arriving at the public offices, or, at least, of having votes in the nomination of those who fill them; and I would choose to call CIVIL LIBERTY that power over their own actions, which the members of the state reserve to themselves, and which their officers must not infringe.

'Political Liberty, therefore is equivalent to the right of magistracy, being the claim that any member of the state hath, to have his private opinion or judgement become that of the public, and thereby control the actions of others; whereas civil liberty extends no farther than to a man's own conduct, and signifies the right he has to be exempt from the control of the society, or its agents; that is, the power he has of providing for his own advantage and happiness.' (18)
Priestley went on to make it clear that, in his view, it was civil liberty rather than political that was supremely important. Political liberty - the classically exalted right of the citizen to participate in government, instead of being subject to a king - was certainly not to be despised, since civil liberty was not likely to be safe for long without it. Priestley paid the customary tribute to the heroic citizens of ancient and modern times who had resisted tyrants - the classical Harmodius and Aristogiton, and the Whiggish Russell and Sidney. But he insisted that the ultimate criterion of a good state was to be found in the quality of private life rather than in public: it depended upon the extent of the individual's civil liberty:

'If the power of government be very extensive, and the subjects of it have, consequently, little power over their own actions, that government is tyrannical and oppressive: whether, with respect to its form, it be a monarchy, an aristocracy, or even a republic: for the government of the temporary magistrates of a democracy, or even the laws themselves, may be as tyrannical as the maxims of the most despotic monarchy, and the administration of the government may be as destructive of private happiness.' (19)

In opposition to Brown's desire to see education and public opinion controlled by the state, Priestley maintained that the government was already interfering far too much in private life, and should be restricted to its proper functions of the maintenance of security and law and order. His manner of supporting this claim places him firmly within the Lockian tradition. In the first place, he maintained that the criteria for deciding on the proper extent of governmental interference must be utilitarian:

'It must necessarily be understood....whether it be expressed or not, that all people live in society for their mutual advantage: so that the good and happiness of the members, that is, the majority of the members of any state, is the great standard by which everything relating to that state must finally be determined.' (20)

He went on to argue that one could give this utilitarian criterion more concrete substance by applying the familiar model of the social contract:

'We may be assisted....by considering what it is that men propose to gain by entering into society. Now, it is evident that we are not led to wish for a state of society by the want of anything that we can conveniently procure for ourselves. As a man, and a member of civil society, I am desirous to receive such assistance as numbers can give to individuals.' (21)
The business of governments, in other words, is only with those aspects of social life that individuals cannot manage for themselves, and rulers have no right to intervene beyond this.

Nevertheless, a classical republican like Brown (or, indeed, an orthodox Christian) might well reply that, on this showing, even the free state still has a duty to take charge of truth, and to preserve its subjects from fatal errors in religion, morals or politics. It is the addition of Priestley's belief in the providential progress of mankind towards truth that allows his Lockian criterion to blossom into a classic statement of what was to become orthodox nineteenth century liberalism.

The primary purpose of the Essay was to refute Brown's claim that England needed a system of patriotic education in order to preserve her liberty: and Priestley's central strategy was to oppose this by tying the idea of liberty to that of progress. His position was that any such educational establishment - and also, as he hastened to point out, the existing religious establishment - was contrary to God's providential design, namely the progress of the human race through the free play of opinion, resulting in the elimination of error and the gradual accumulation of truth!

'It seems to have been the intention of Divine Providence, that mankind should be, as far as possible, self-taught: that we should attain to everything excellent and useful, as the result of our own experience and observation... But by the unnatural system of rigid, unalterable establishments, we put it out of our power to instruct ourselves....and thereby, as far as is in our power, we counteract the kind intentions of the Deity in the constitution of the world, and in providing for a state of constant though slow improvement in everything.' (22)

The kernel of Priestley's argument was that truth, whether scientific, moral, religious or political, was a product of gradual discovery, a treasure that could only be uncovered by arduous researches. Consequently, to establish any particular set of opinions as an unquestionable orthodoxy must inevitably be to perpetuate error, and to slow down the process whereby, in the end, truth would prevail. As he pointed out, one need only imagine that the intellectual and political evolution of Britain had been arrested at some point in the past - for instance, in those golden days of Alfred so dear to sentimental Radical pamphleteers - to see the fallacy inherent in attempts to prevent innovation in contemporary Britain. Instead of attempting to restrict discussion on any questions, indeed, Priestley considered that his contemporaries should rather welcome the expression of the greatest possible variety of views and approaches.

He was able to be uninhibited in his recommendation of such variety because, unlike the classical republicans, he did not share the aesthetic predilection for uniformity usual in the eighteenth century. It was entirely typical of his outlook that,
in defiance of current orthodoxy, he preferred Athens to Sparta in this, as in so many other respects, anticipating the attitudes of nineteenth-century liberals. On this point he was uncompromisingly heterodox:

'What advantage did Sparta (the constitution of whose government was so much admired by the ancients, and many moderns) reap from those institutions which contributed to its longevity, but the longer continuance of what I should not scruple to call the worst government we read of in the world: a government which secured to a man the fewest of his natural rights, and of which a man who had a taste for life would least of all choose to be a member. While the arts of life were improving in all the neighbouring states, Sparta derived this noble prerogative from her constitution, that she continued the nearest to her pristine barbarity...The convulsions of Athens, where life was in some measure enjoyed...were, in my opinion, far preferable to the savage uniformity of Sparta.' (23)

Nevertheless, like John Stuart Mill after him, (24) Priestley did not believe that complete freedom of thought and expression, of religion and education, would lead to a mere Babel of conflicting opinions - for he was convinced that where opinions were free, truth must eventually prevail. As he wrote in a later work,

'Some persons dislike controversy, as leading to a diversity of opinions. But as this is a necessary, so it is only a temporary inconvenience. It is the only way to arrive at a permanent and useful unifoLmity, which it is sure to bring about at last'. (25)

Against Brown's ideal of indoctrination for freedom, therefore, Priestley advanced a case that rested heavily upon his belief in progress. On the one hand, he maintained that any such attempt at political indoctrination would invade that realm of private liberty which was the great source of new discoveries and insights; while on the other hand he rejected Brown's aim, to preserve the British constitution intact - for that, too, ought to be improved rather than merely perpetuated, and improvement in political affairs as in everything else would come only through discussion and experiment.

The similarities between Priestley's progressive individualism and John Stuart Mill's are striking, and it is possible that they are not accidental. Mill's primary intellectual stimulus came, of course, from Benthamite philosophy and classical economics, while one of the major influences on On Liberty was the German conception of self-development as enunciated by Wilhelm von Humboldt. But according to Mill's own testimony (26) his essay on liberty, even more than the rest of his work, bore the impress of the views of Harriet Taylor: and Harriet Taylor was a Unitarian, who moved in London Unitarian circles in direct line
of descent from Priestley and his disciples. (27) At any rate, whether or not any such connection can be demonstrated, there can be no doubt that Priestley's descendants, the rationalist Nonconformists of the nineteenth century, were prominent among the exponents of classic Victorian liberalism, and that the faith in divinely-guaranteed progress which Priestley enunciated so clearly remained (in however watered down a form) at the back of their minds. (28)

Let us try now to spell out the similarities and differences between our two eighteenth-century concepts of liberty, Brown's and Priestley's. Clearly, the two were not entirely opposed to one another, and they shared a good deal of common ground: for both of them placed a value upon civil rights on the one hand and political participation on the other. Although, as we have seen, Priestley emphasized civil liberty much more than Brown, their differences should not be pushed too far, for a concern for the protection of legal rights was an essential republican tradition. The hallmark of all classical republicans was the will to defend their rights against any king, and one of their most characteristic slogans was 'laws, not men'. Priestley and Brown differed a great deal in their views on the proper extent of civil rights, but they were fully agreed about the need to defend whatever came under that heading.

Similarly, both Brown and Priestley, and the different traditions they represented, shared a high regard for political activity of self-governing citizens. This side of the question was of course given much greater emphasis within the Machiavellian tradition, and Priestley drew his distinction between civil and political liberty precisely in order to make the point that the latter was a subordinate concern. But nevertheless, like John Stuart Mill after him, he was still very much alive to the value of participation by citizens in politics.

Thus far, the differences between the two men might seem a matter of emphasis rather than of substance. The fundamental divergence only becomes apparent when we consider their understanding of liberty in the context of their views on history and truth. For Brown, as for others in the tradition coming down from Machiavelli, the stream of history could be seen only as a hostile force, since time brings change, which implies corruption. History is the eroding torrent threatening to undermine the fortress walls of the republic, against whose assaults they must be constantly repaired. As for the question of truth, this was not a matter of particular interest to the classical republican writers. What did interest them was belief, in so far as it either reinforced or threatened the political order. Brown's scheme for a civic education to train up citizens who would defend the free constitution of England was very much in the same tradition as Machiavelli's estimation of religions less in terms of their truth than of their civic usefulness.

Precisely
Precisely the opposite was true of the optimistic liberal tradition coming down through Priestley to the Victorians. Here, on the contrary, the quest for truth was pushed into the spotlight, and history was viewed as the arena within which truth proves itself. Consequently, religion, education and the expression of opinion in general were to be valued in relation to this evolving truth rather than for their tendency to support specific political institutions. It was assumed, in fact, that progress in knowledge and understanding would lead to changes for the better in political institutions, as in everything else. (29) This change of historical outlook had two implications for the understanding of liberty, implications that are somewhat paradoxically connected.

On the one hand a belief in progress released the heroic tension of the Machiavellian tradition. In place of the old vision of free states almost as lighthouses continually battered by the waves of chaos and tyranny, there was a new sense of history as a broad stream down which men were floating towards better societies, which they could reach easily, without any need for Spartan efforts. There was no longer any need to watch jealously over the morals and manners of the citizens, and to fight constantly against human nature. Opinions and private habits were no longer politically important, and could become a part of civil liberty precisely because they had become politically indifferent, things that could neither make nor mar the state.

One effect of the new historical outlook, that is, was to make morals and manners seem much less important in political terms than before. The other, paradoxically, was that these very aspects of private life that now seemed indifferent from the point of view of politics, acquired a new dignity when seen in the perspective of history. For, given the new conception of history as a progress in the discovery of truth, it was not merely the right of the individual to think for himself, to work out his own moral code, or to experiment with ways of living: it was also his duty to do so, since only in this way would the truth in all these matters be reached. (Hence the somewhat ambiguous aspect of Mill's recommended 'experiments in living', which seem to be defended simultaneously on the grounds that they are too trivial for society's cognisance, since they do no-one any harm, and that they are too important to be interfered with, since they are the vehicle of progress.)

To any liberal living in late nineteenth-century England and aware of eighteenth-century preoccupations it must have seemed obvious that the classical tradition in which men like Brown wrote was utterly outdated, having been replaced by a much truer appreciation of the human situation. Such a liberal might be doubtful about whether to go along with T. H. Green's new and ingenious notions of 'positive' freedom, or to stay with the great liberal tradition of negative freedom: but the ancient

republican
republican tradition of political freedom must have been a closed book to him. Since then, however, there has been a curious reversal of fortune. For optimistic liberalism has ceased to carry much conviction, while the classical republican tradition has gained a new and unexpected relevance to the present day.

The most damaging blows to the liberal belief in the progress of enlightenment have been pragmatic ones, dealt by twentieth-century political experience. Looking back to the nineteenth-century liberals across two world wars, totalitarianism, revolution, and the general predominance of bad governments over good, it is hard to share the optimism, and easy to see the unsupported assumptions upon which it rested. In the first place, their belief in progress presumed a benevolent providence to supervise the process. To his credit, Priestley made this quite explicit: but many of his semi-agnostic successors supposed themselves to have adopted a secular world-view, while in fact being still sustained in their optimism by the belief in an invisible hand. (30) It is also clearer to us now, in the shadow of nuclear weapons, that there is no necessary connection between progress in the sense of having more knowledge, and progress in the sense of behaving better. Further, the confidence in 'truth' which we have seen Priestley expressing so enthusiastically, seems peculiarly unconvincing, because we have greatly narrowed the areas to which we regard the notion as applicable, and no longer attach much meaning to the notion of 'truth' in morals, politics or religion.

Now that the optimistic liberal package of views about history, truth and liberty has been taken apart, many of the insights of the classical republican tradition suddenly seem relevant again. The main reason for this is that the classical outlook was much more genuinely secular than optimistic liberalism. The classical republicans saw political institutions as human constructions imposed with effort upon a chaotic and meaningless nature. As a result they were fragile, in need of constant maintenance, and could not be expected to stand without the right foundations.

In the nineteenth century heyday of Progress and Evolution, it became fashionable to believe that political institutions were not made, but grew. The accounts, so common in the classical tradition, of the deliberate foundation of states, were rejected as unhistorical, and the heroic figures of legislators dismissed as myths. Modern political experience, however, has dramatically refuted these assumptions. The twentieth century has been an age not of evolution, but of creation and destruction in politics. We have seen states founded on a heroic scale, and the personal predilections of leaders stamped upon them to a degree that dwarfs Lycurgus. It is ironical that the most conspicuous example should be Chairman Mao,
committed by his official ideological connections to an evolutionary view of history: for to no state does the classical model of foundation seem more appropriate than to revolutionary China, where the deliberate attempt has been made to mould citizens to fit the state, and where attention to manners and morals has been as precise as any Roman or Spartan could wish. Indeed, Chinese education in the Thoughts of Chairman Mao might be seen in this context as a grotesquely ironic parody of the classical cliche, repeated by John Brown, about the need for civic education to maintain the state.

Communist China, needless to say, does not correspond closely to the classical image of the free republic, in which laws, not men, would rule. (31) However, in politics that are comparatively free by the criterion of the absence of personal tyranny, the insights of the classical tradition have recently become relevant once more.

In the days of liberal optimism it could be assumed that all states would eventually progress, more or less automatically, to a happy condition of freedom and stability. Since it has become obvious, however, that most of the states in the world show no signs of any such inherent progression, political scientists have found their attention drawn once again to the classic Machiavellian problem: what is it that enables a few states to be both free and stable, while all others are either despotic or unstable or both? And, reflecting upon this problem, the political scientists have come up, whether consciously or not, with the classical solution: that it is, in effect, the virtue of the citizens that most decisively affects the fortunes of the state. Not, of course, that modern political scientists use the word 'virtue': but when they write about the crucial importance of 'political culture' for democratic stability, they come very close to the same thing. Dahl, for example, stresses the importance of mutual trust and commitment to the rules of the electoral process as preconditions of 'polyarchy', and cites Argentina as a case where all the materials and social conditions for polyarchy appeared to be present, but were defeated by the lack of appropriate commitments on the part of the citizens. (32) Almond and Verba, in *The Civic Culture* (33) stress the importance of these commitments in the maintenance of a free and democratic state, and the need for appropriate political socialization to implant them.

This renewed emphasis on the need for the right beliefs and commitments on the part of the citizens of a free state is of course completely contrary to the liberal position, according to which a man's views are no concern of the public authorities, and it is conducive to progress to have an unregulated diversity of views on all subjects. The political scientists have not so far gone the whole classical hog and suggested that public opinion...
opinion should be deliberately controlled in the interests of freedom and stability - although they do stress the importance of education - but their demonstration of the consensus that exists underneath the apparent diversity in liberal states raises problems about the precise differences between overt, totalitarian thought control and informal socialization. (34)

Situated as we are now, therefore, it may be worth our while to ponder the two concepts of liberty that we have contrasted. Neither is, in toto, an option available to us now. Living in countries with liberal traditions, we are likely to value the liberal notion of personal freedom coming down to us from writers like Priestley and Mill, but we can no longer resort to their defences. We cannot now have confidence in a providential progress towards truth: but neither can we any longer feel confident that what ordinary people think, and how they behave in private, is something politically indifferent. It is all too obvious that a certain level of public spirit, general morality, and mutual trust is relevant to the preservation of liberty. However, while we may have to concede this point to the Machiavellians, we can hardly adopt the recommendations of the classical tradition, since we have seen too many totalitarian demonstrations that attempts to bring morals, religion and culture into the service of politics quickly stamp out liberty altogether. Since the symbolic clash two hundred years ago between Brown, representative of the dying tradition of classical republicanism, and Priestley, typical of rising liberalism, we have had a great deal of chastening political experience: but it would be difficult to claim that it has left us with a more satisfactory understanding of liberty and its preconditions.

The University of Keele.
2. John Brown, Thoughts on civil liberty, on licentiousness, and faction (London, 1765); Joseph Priestley, An essay on the first principles of government, and on the nature of political, civil and religious liberty (London, 1768).
4. Ibid., 466.
6. Ibid., 29.
7. Ibid., 36.
8. John Brown, Thoughts on civil liberty, on licentiousness, and faction, 46.
9. John Brown, A sermon on the female character and education, with an appendix relative to a proposed code of education (London, 1765).
10. First in an appendix attached to An essay on a course of liberal education for civil and active life (London, 1765); then at greater length in Priestley's Essay on the first principles of government.
12. See, for instance, Priestley's strictures on placemen and pensioners in his pamphlet, The present state of liberty in Great Britain and her colonies (London, 1769).
13. He seems in fact to have got the idea from the writings of a group of Anglican divines, John Edwards, William Worthington and Edmund Law. See R. S. Crane, 'Anglican apologetics and the idea of progress; 1699-1745', Modern Philology, XXXI (1934), 213-306; 349-82. He did not, as is sometimes suggested, inherit it along with association psychology from David Hartley, since Hartley did not believe in progress in a secular sense. See Margaret Leslie, 'Mysticism Misunderstood - David Hartley and the idea of progress', Journal of the history of ideas XXXIII (1972), No. 4, 625-32.
15. Ibid., 9.
16. Also potatoes: see Lectures on history and general policy (Birmingham, 1788) reprinted in Works, XXIV.
17. Ibid., 425.
18. Works, XXII, 11.
19. Ibid., 29.
20. Ibid., 12.
21. Ibid., 30.
22. Ibid., 124.
23. Ibid., 119.
28. Those who (like Mill) did not share this Christian faith, tended to make do with a Comtean surrogate.
29. Ironically, it was in the heyday of Victorian liberalism that something rather like Brown's scheme for patriotic and spartan education for the upper classes grew up, unofficially, in the public schools.
30. See, for example, Beatrice Webb's observations on Spencer and Darwin in My apprenticeship (London, 1929), 90-1
31. The classical republicans were in fact somewhat ambiguous in their attitudes to the heroic legislators who figure in their theories. Although these, reputedly, created the conditions for a free state, their own rule could hardly be other than absolute. This inherent ambiguity in the tradition is expressed most clearly in the chapter on the Lawgiver in Rousseau's Du Contrat Social.
33. Op.cit., (Little, Brown & Co., 1963). The biggest difference between the new political scientists and the old Machiavellians (as far as political theory is concerned) is that where the latter assumed that riches brought corruption, the former usually argue that economic development and a high standard of living are essential. Just as the English neo-Harringtonians translated Machiavelli's citizen soldiers into independent landowners, the modern political scientists have translated these freeholders into members of the educated middle class.
34. Marcuse took advantage of this line of argument to maintain that Western societies are themselves totalitarian, all the more since they rarely need to employ overt repression. See H. Marcuse, One dimensional man (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964).
"I can truly say, that the greatest satisfaction I receive from the success of my philosophical pursuits, arises from the weight it may give to my attempts to defend Christianity, and to free it from those corruptions which prevent its reception with philosophical and thinking persons, whose influence with the vulgar, and the unthinking, is very great."

Priestley

"What does Priestley mean, by an Unbeliever? When he applies it to you? How much did he 'unbeliever himself? Gibbon had him right, when he denominated his Creed, 'Scanty'. We are to understand, no doubt, that he believed The Resurrection of Jesus, some of his Miracles. His Inspiration, but in what degree? He did not believe in the Inspiration of the Writings that contain his History. Yet he believed in the Apocalyptic Beast, and he believed as much as he pleased in the writings of Daniel and John. This great, excellent, and extraordinary Man, whom I sincerely loved, esteemed and respected, was really a Phenomenon; a Comet in the System, like Voltaire, Bolingbroke and Hume. Had Bolingbroke or Hume taken him in hand, what would they have made of him and his Creed?"

John Adams, letter to Jefferson
Joseph Priestley believed instinctively in the natural progress of all knowledge, including religious knowledge. He believed that true Christianity and the Scriptures constituted a reflection, a plan, and an instrument of human perfectibility, indeed so much so that Biblical prophecy became a preoccupation of his later years. Priestley understood the natural world, at bottom, as a providential engine of human progress and perfection. What concerns us here, however, is not that he was a thoroughly religious man but that a particular kind of theology evolved from these premises. To Priestley's way of thinking, the greatest accomplishment of an enlightened age could only be the synthesis of modern science and philosophy with the ageless, divinely-inspired truths of Christianity. The doctrinal refinements which emerged from his attention to this task no doubt appeared to be hybridized nonsense to both the religiously orthodox and to those rationalists of the day who followed their ideas into deism or atheism. 'Truths, held sacred by the whole Christian world', exclaimed an alarmist critic of the Theological Repository, 'are now being openly opposed'. (1) Dr. Johnson once stated simply and perceptively that Priestley's theological publications 'tended to unsettle every thing, and yet settle nothing'. (2) The Socinianism which Priestley deemed the logical product of consistent, scientific, yet moral thinking, was not credible to opponents who defended authority, tradition, or revelation, or to those who demanded intellectual rigour.

'The unpopularity which this creed brought Priestley is almost unbelievable: we have to go to Paine and Godwin for anything to equal it, and even then he probably came in for the largest share of vituperation.' (3) Priestley's Socinian beliefs were, in spirit if not by force of logic, the apotheosis of rational Protestantism. In promulgating and refining them, Priestley intended to invest religion with intellectual certitude and to divest it of its 'corruptions', to make moral behaviour a pursuit of the mind rather than the heart. 'If what is called a mystery of Christianity, be really a falsehood in philosophy...', he wrote blandly, 'the belief of it must be abandoned altogether, at any hazard'.(4) In an age of reason, 'Christian knowledge should keep pace with the philosophical'.(5) The doctrinal stagnation of orthodoxy simply reinforced the tendencies towards infidelity, claimed Priestley. Yet, by the attacks of its heathen opponents and the renewed formulations of its clear-headed defenders, Christianity, 'will acquire such a fixed character of truth, as it could never have obtained without the opposition which it has met with. Such has been the fate of all branches of true philosophy, of the Copernican system, the Newtonian theory of light and colours, and the Franklinian theory of electricity'. (6)
I have chosen to call this tendency 'reification' or
demythologizing. In other words, Priestley's rational theology
constituted a reduction of ineffable mysteries, metaphysical
presumptions, and moral sensibilities to intellectual tactility. He
envisioned a religion upon which all men of good understanding
could agree. When he wrote of the moral improvement of mankind, he
did so as a scientist not as a seer. If Christianity was to assume
its central and moralizing role in modern life, it could do so only
if expunged of its erroneous, unguenuine, and unschientific beliefs,
namely, the immaterial soul, the divinity of Christ, or the
doctrine of atonement. Hypotheses refuted by empirical, historical,
or analogical facts had to be abandoned, insisted Priestley. (7)
Reason and religion both issued from God: how could they be
antagonistic to one another? How in fact could there be any
contradiction between the word and the works of God?

'Distrust, therefore, all those who decry human
reason, and who require you to abandon it, where-
ever religion is concerned. When once they have
gained this point with you, they can lead you
whither they please'. (8)

'Christianity is adapted to give us the most rational
and consistent principles of Religion. It incourages
a spirit of enquiry and instructs us to use our
understanding and judgment in matters of religion.' (9)

This course of thought, optimistic as it was, was predicated on two
unwarranted assumptions: first, that knowledge of God's natural
system was of a fixed nature, awaiting only sophisticated science
to reveal it; secondly, that knowledge of nature and knowledge of
God, man, and the moral relationship between them were of the same
variety. The philosophical tradition which had sought to endow
science with religious foundations was being resolved into a new
and peculiar outlook, that is, that both belonged essentially to
the same realms of speculation. Hume had, on the one hand,
eliminated the certainty and metaphysical meanings of empirical
evidence about nature on various epistemological grounds, making
science as relative as religion. (10) Priestley, on the other hand,
desired to bring religious truth into the certain sphere of
scientific explanation. Yet in his reliance on analogy and
inferences about the uniformity of nature and its relation to God,
Priestley is logically - though not temperamentally - close to
scepticism, as we shall see. A certain leap of faith, if not a
lapse of logic, was necessary even to rational religion.

In the galaxy of Priestley's ideas, a rationalized belief
made sense, however. It was holistic in view, allowing minimal
distinctions among all the objects of human inquiry. It reduced
metaphysics, as it had human nature, to the realm of scientific,
or rather scientific, knowledge. This was a manifestation of the
attachment for the tangible, consistent, practical, concrete, and
useful qualities and concepts which, as noted previously,
characterized the classic liberal philosophy. In religion, this
attachment may appear intrusive and alien. Yet Priestley thought

otherwise
otherwise. Characteristically, he sought to create a 'reasonable' admixture of Christianity and philosophy, succeeding, I believe, only by allowing the latter to devour the former. Religion was 'reified' into a branch of philosophy, natural and social. 'The general tendency of his argument', wrote Leslie Stephen of Priestley's rejection of the immaterial soul, 'is to reduce all religious theory to a department of inductive science'. (11) Priestley's defense of miracles and the prophetic books of Scripture appears less a concession to tradition in this light than a masterpiece of illogic. There can be no question that in his good-hearted quest for a theology of universal and rational appeal Priestley's ambition far outdistanced his powers.

Theology and ecclesiastical establishments were submitted to overwhelming rational scrutiny in the eighteenth century. As Carl Becker noted, God was on trial and the extent and nature of his rule was an issue which set the salons and presses of Europe humming. (12) Priestley's theological rationalism had its antecedents, both inside (Locke, Clarke, Hoadly, Paley) and outside (Doddridge, Watts, Lardner) the Church, men who had sought a reasonable harmony between the supernatural and the new naturalism and a virtuosity based on rationality and tolerance. Science was still seen as the ally of religion. Accordingly, the true philosophy for Priestley was a combination of the two, revealed to the philosopher of 'cool and dispassionate temper' who would adhere to the 'rules of philosophizing'. (13) The great Newton himself, stated Priestley, 'would alone be a sufficient justification for us, in uniting two pursuits which are too often considered as the reverse of each other'. (14) This was already a popular assertion:

'The scientific community itself long kept a religious cast; while there were some tensions between science and religion in the eighteenth century, the conflict did not reach the stage of war until a hundred years later, with Darwin. The worshipful study of God's work, which had inspired Christians for centuries, retained its vitality for many perhaps most, scientists throughout the age of the Enlightenment.' (15)

The seventeenth century had bequeathed a science which was religious in purpose, in that, 'not only was there in some of the intellectual leaders a great aspiration to demonstrate that the universe ran like a piece of clockwork, but this was itself initially a religious aspiration. It was felt that there would be something defective in Creation itself... something not quite worthy of God... unless the whole system could be shown to be interlocking, so that it carried the pattern of reasonableness and orderliness.' (16)
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The reductive logic of science led either to what Priestley considered atheistical in the works of Hume, Paine, and Gibbon, or to his own theological stance which was intended to counter unbelief by stealing the rational thunder from under it. In the final analysis, it was a personal characteristic or instinct which separated Priestley from those who dispensed with natural and revealed religion: 'he was made not to be a doubter, but a believer: he was not a man to be happy without a system'. (17) Priestley, as Coleridge later, found in Hartleianism, for example, a scientific bulwark against unbelief as well as an explanation of human nature. (18) We can now see that he was perhaps only whistling in the dark. Science was already arming the enemies of religion, so that 'theological explanations of mechanical laws turned out to be not merely false but irrelevant'. (19) In abandoning the mysteries of religion, the sense of sin, and the contempt for material possessions, liberal theology, argues one historian, 'thereby lost most of its excuse for existence'. (20)

In the mildest of terms, Priestley can be seen as 'the last representative of the fusion of two main currents in English life and thought: the mechanical philosophy and the traditional spirit of Protestant Dissent'. (21) Beyond that, Priestley was a prophet of the modern, dare I say liberal, tendency to embrace rational, calculable, in a word scientistic, doctrines, and to disparage not only the irrational but the non-rational — emotion, mystery, instinct, faith. This trait generalized ultimately allowed rational Dissent to be supplanted in popularity by Methodism and evangelicalism which did not ignore the non-intellectualized side of religion. Unlike his friend Lindsey, who once called Wesley 'a prevaricating time-serving wretch', (22) Priestley was not bitterly opposed to 'enthusiastic' religion. He praised the tendency of Methodists to promote sobriety, industry and frugality among the poor. 'I only wish', he would add dutifully, 'they had more knowledge, and more charity along with their zeal; and these also will come in due time'. Wesley's anti-rationalist inclinations were always suspect, however. Enthusiasm, as Priestley told his Leeds congregation, was 'warmth and zeal without the foundation of just principles and rational conviction'. (23) As the fortunes of Unitarianism, and rational Dissent as a whole, declined, the rationalist heritage remained to reinforce the social science and philosophy of the new industrial order. (24)

In his theology, Priestley did not abandon revealed for natural religion. His defence of revelation no doubt seemed peculiar to rational theorists of the deistic stripe, but the special inspiration of the Scripture, the legitimacy of miracles and prophecy, the necessities of moral duty, prayer, and faithful supplication, all were major concerns in his religious works. As we shall see, the historical validity of Biblical revelations was of the greatest importance for Priestley in this regard. Perhaps because
because of the contemporary ridicule of revealed religion, Priestley devoted most of his theological studies to it.

Basically, natural religion was hegemonic in Priestley's theology because he believed that the business of defending and purifying Christian doctrine was both possible and necessary on a 'scientific' level. Religion, in other words, would survive or fall on the basis of its reasonableness. 'If I have a stronger bias than many other persons in favour of Christianity', he prefaced some experiments, 'it is that which philosophy gives me'.

Priestley distinguished natural from revealed religion this way:

'Natural religion being that knowledge of God, and our duty, and future expectations, which we acquire from our observations on the usual course of nature, revealed religion may be defined to be the knowledge, relating to the same subjects, which we acquire from interruptions of the usual course of nature, by the interposition of the God of nature, the sole controller of the laws which he himself has established.'

Moreover, natural religion was, 'all that can be demonstrated, or proved to be true by natural reason, though it was never, in fact, discovered by it; and even though it be probable that mankind would never have known it without the assistance of revelation'.

Reason thus appeared historically secondary to, and contingent upon, revelation. Imperfect knowledge of the natural world and corrupt morals in the heathen world of antiquity made divine 'interposition' an 'absolute necessity'. The implication Priestley clearly meant to leave, of course, was that mankind was presently verging on such intellectual capabilities and insights as to make unassisted reason an adequate instrument to divine religious truth. Reason could show certain scriptural events and verities to have been, at the very least, 'probable from the light of nature'.

To what evidence, then, could reason turn for substantiation of Christian revelation? Priestley's arguments draw both on a priori or logically self-evident truths, for example, that God is unitary sincere logic itself denies that there can be both one god and three, and a posteriori evidence, ranging from observation of nature to Biblical criticism. Priestley was happiest with those forms of evidence or demonstration which were empirical, historical, or textual, in other words, not deductive, emotive, or 'metaphysical'. This evidence was of three types: testimony, present appearances, and prophecy, this last apparently depending heavily on the other two. 'Now all the evidence of religious truths is of these kinds', wrote Priestley in objecting to the 'common sense' doctrines, 'being either general conclusions, by induction from a number of particular appearances, or founded on historical evidence'.
of natural design, consideration of causal relations, and natural properties constituted evidence for natural religion, included in which was empirical proof of God's existence. (32) Priestley asked his contemporaries primarily for an adherence to rational canons of verification with regard to religion.

'I invite you to admit nothing but what shall appear to be least contrary to natural analogy, and consequently to probability. For I maintain that, as unbelievers in revealed religion, you admit what is far more contrary to common experiences, and daily observation, than I do.' (33)

Even revelation was in part demonstrable from appearances, if the testimony of the Bible was given its due.

'In like manner, a variety of present appearances may be considered as so many standing evidences of several leading articles in revealed religion; because, unless we admit that the divine being has interposed in the government of the world, in such a manner as the histories of Jewish and Christian revelations assert, it is impossible to give a satisfactory account of the known state of the world in past and present times.' (34)

Priestley denied the plenary inspiration of Holy Scripture. (35) It was, he held, laced with contradiction and fable and the normal errors of historical writing. (36) Biblical stories such as that of the Fall were rejected by Priestley: 'there is mixture of fable, or allegory, in it'. (37) He further doubted the authenticity of some epistles and the reasoning of Biblical figures. For example:

'Priestley thought that the Apostle Paul sometimes reasoned illogically; and he said so. He thought that Christ made mistakes about the nature of mental derangement and the meaning of Hebrew prophecy; and he said so. He thought that Moses gave a lame account of the creation of the world and the origin of evil; and he said so.' (38)

Priestley nevertheless valued the Bible as a historical document. He considered it valid and authoritative on matters revelatory. It was simply,
certain of their authenticity because the event had been foretold and Christ had most definitely been seen and touched by others afterwards. Could the body have been stolen? The grief of the disciples, the size of the stone before the tomb, the impossibility of such a deed occurring without detection, and the usual discipline and watchfulness of the Roman guard, all these things militated against this hypothesis. (40)

To Priestley's way of thinking, the legitimacy of the Judeo-Christian tradition as the only truly divine system of revelation was attested by examination of the cultural context of its origins, the sophistication of Jewry at the time for instance. (41) It only made good sense that, in such a culture, wide-spread fabrication could not survive. Scriptural writings, with the exception of Genesis, all sufficiently historical, had traditionally been ascribed to certain authors such as Matthew and Luke, men whose good character is testified to elsewhere. (42) Even the fact that witnesses to Christ's life and rebirth were 'men of middling circumstances, neither desperate through poverty on the one hand, nor peculiarly within the influence of ambition on the other' enhanced the believability of their stories. (43) Biblical authors from Moses to the disciples were endowed by Priestley with the credibility of ordinary on-the-spot witnesses. Books of the New Testament which were of dubious authorship were at least written in the apostolic age, explained Priestley, and probably by persons of knowledge or authority. (44) Priestley's faith in Biblical history, therefore, was based on a plain understanding of the evidence. That evidence was of the internal variety - that is, the comparative superiority of Mosaic and Christian institutions and the dignity of characters like Jesus and Moses (45) - and also external proofs or Biblical criticism - i.e. the matters of authorship, comparison of accounts, interpretation of words and meanings. (46) Knowledge of the Scriptures was vital to understanding the importance of religion and Priestley assailed those arrogant unbelievers who, like Paine, lived in ignorance of it. (47)

An examination of Scripture had indicated to Priestley that primitive Christianity had been simple and built on a plain and practical understanding of things. Yet in his own age, it had become metaphysical, corrupted, and riddled with platonic mysteries and institutional prejudices. He perceived it his duty to help reverse this trend, to help effect a rebirth of true Christian principles and basic morality. (48)

'The gross darkness of that night which has for many centuries obscured our holy religion, we may clearly see, is past; the morning is opening upon
us; and we cannot doubt but that the light will increase, and extend itself more and more unto the perfect day. Happy are they who contribute to diffuse the pure light of this everlasting gospel. The time is coming when the detection of one error, or prejudice, relating to this most important subject, and the success we have in opening and enlarging the minds of men with respect to it, will be considered as far more honourable than any discovery we can make in other branches of knowledge, or our success in propagating them. (49)

And if undoubted revelation from God be clogged with human additions and incumbrances, it is of importance to us to free it from them; and a freedom from error and superstition, especially hurtful errors, though no original light be gained, and no truth properly new be discovered, is certainly an advancement in useful knowledge. (50)

As God permitted corruptions to occur, so he 'is also now in the course of his providence, employing these means to purge his floor'. (51) Priestley planned to do God's work using the 'historical method' which, he claimed, 'will be found to be one of the most satisfactory modes of argumentation, in order to prove that what I object to is really a corruption of genuine Christianity, and no part of the original scheme'. (52)

The objective of purification was to bring unbelievers back to the fold, preparing the way for the return of Christ. The opprobrium heaped indiscriminately upon religion and church institutions in the modern age was dangerous perhaps, but Priestley admitted that it was in large part warranted and occasioned by false doctrines.

'The very great corruptions of Christianity have been the occasion of many persons abandoning it, and writing against it, in this learned and inquisitive age; by which means the evidences of it have stood such a test as no scheme of religion was ever put to before; and yet, instead of appearing to disadvantage under the severe scrutiny, this trial has been a means of purging it from its many corruptions; men of the greatest virtue, learning, and diligent inquiry, and even many of those who have the least worldly interest in promoting the belief of it, are its steadiest friends; and its enemies are generally such persons as have manifestly never given sufficient attention to the subject.' (53)
Once the corruptions had been winnowed from the pure Christian doctrine, Priestley was confident that 'the objection to us as deists, or lukewarm Xns (Christians), may be no longer made (to) us'. (54) Just as Priestley found the purest religion among dissenters, so he also found the greatest corruption within the great church establishments. (55) The trinitarianism of the Church of England was idolatrous in Priestley's opinion. But Catholicism remained the chief bogey in Priestley's mind and the 'Popish establishment' a 'mystery of iniquity and abomination'. (56) The Reformation had overthrown the 'grosser idolatry' and 'heathenism' of Catholicism but there still survived, much to the purists' disgust, an idolatrous christology, an alliance between church and state, and a host of doctrinal errors. (57) True Christianity had no need of civil power to support it, claimed Priestley, citing Newton's alleged remark that primitive Christianity would return with the destruction of antichristian parties and corruption. (58)

Priestley therefore mustered pointed criticisms of numerous Christian conventions. The sacrament of the Lord's Supper was a memorial, purely and simply, and a public declaration of faith, not a transubstantial mystery; baptism was similarly a profession of Christian faith and not a divine gift of grace. (59) Clergy were consequently non-essential to such ministrations, properly defined, and had no unique spiritual powers. (60) Priestley dispensed with Satan as allegorical, finding evil a necessary part of the nature of things. (61) The Holy Spirit was a miscreance and Scriptural reference to it meant nothing more than a divine power. (62) Of original sin, Priestley remarked that 'you find nothing like any part of this in your bibles'. (63) Of Calvinistic election and reprobation, he noted that 'such tender mercy is cruelty'. (64) The miraculous conception of Christ was another dubious notion because the Biblical report of Luke was most likely ungrounded or second-hand; the account was flawed, stated Priestley, by troublesome contradictions, for example that Joseph appears to have been a man of substance who could certainly have done better than a stable. (65) Priestley had discarded the doctrine of Christ's atonement for men's sins early in his studies. (66) Atonement was an addition to Christian doctrine long after Christ's death. No merciful God could have required so mortifying a sacrifice. In any case, Scriptural references to atonement were obscure. (67)

Of course, the capital corruption from which all others flowed was that of the immaterial soul. (68) Priestley's materialist theory of human nature, elaborated previously, was substantiated with theories gleaned from Hartley, Newton, and Boscovich and left no room in his mind for the immaterial hypothesis.
hypothesis. On the logical face of things, Priestley believed that a simple, unextended, yet sentient and immaterial soul made no sense. (69) After searching Scripture for any possible evidence of immateriality, he concluded that such testimony only supported a 'vulgar opinion' predicated on 'a few passages ill translated, or ill understood'. (70) As was his custom, Priestley ransacked Scripture for passages vindicating a primitive, Unitarian, and materialist theology. Such exercises are responsible for the great bulk of his theological writings. In the case of the soul, the Bible showed man to have been created from dust into a 'living soul', meaning alive. (Genesis 2.7; 46-26.) Soul was commonly used to mean simply 'man'. (Exodus 18.4; Ezekiel 13.19; Psalms 7.1-2.) Elsewhere it indicated 'dead body'. (Psalms 89.48; Job 33.30; Genesis 35.18; I Kings 17.22.) (71) The immortality of the soul was also unscriptural; the Bible spoke of complete death, body and mind. (Genesis 2.17; 3.9.) Biblical raisings from the dead, notably the cases of Elijah and Lazarus, had nothing to do with recalling the soul but with restoring the 'property' of life alone. (72) Christ's use of the term 'soul' could have meant something quite different than body, admitted Priestley, but it was most likely a colloquialism. (73)

The Disquisitions contain lengthy treatments of the historical origins of the idea of an immaterial spirit, concluding that such a concept was unknown in Old Testament times. (74) Rather, it had originated in the heathenism of Egyptian funereal rites and the oriental mysticisms which later infiltrated Western thought between the times of Socrates and Augustus, according to Priestley. The immaterial soul was the historical product of ignorance, superstition, and liquor. (75) The Greeks incorporated immaterialism into their philosophies; Plato was a pre-eminent orientalist with his theory of eternal ideas and a pre-existent soul lost from heaven; Pythagoras's idea of divine emanations is further evidence and example of the orientalizing influence. (76) The fact was, claimed Priestley, that the early Church Fathers believed in material souls 'considerably more gross than those of many of the heathens'.(77) After the time of Christ, ideas changed. The Pharisees adopted the heathen concept of immateriality and such platonizing Christians as Justin Martyr began to accept this as true doctrine. Others, like Tertullian, resisted the corruption, apparently with decreasing effectiveness. (78) Priestley then delineated a third period in the development of this corruption, the period from the sixth century to Descartes. Surprisingly, he found what he believed to be widespread belief in the corporeal nature
nature of the soul and its close connection with the body in the thought of many theologians, including Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas. (79) In post-Cartesian Christianity, the dualism of mind and body and the idea of an immaterial soul became regnant, an accomplishment blamed on Descartes. Even Locke, lamented Priestley, had adopted part of the Cartesian system, believing that the power of thought was superadded to matter. (80)

Priestley therefore bravely concluded that, with no immaterial soul, human death was complete. In Hartleian fashion, he wrote:

'I rather think that the whole man is of some uniform composition, and that the property of perception, as well as the other powers that are termed mental, is the result (whether necessary or not) of such an organical structure as that of the brain. Consequently, that the whole man becomes extinct at death, and that we have no hope of surviving the grave but what is derived from the scheme of revelation.' (81)

And what is derived from revelation? Certainly not an intermediate state of purgatory. (82) Rather there will be, theorized Priestley, a kind of sleep, an arresting of all mental and physical functions from which God can make us to wake... at any distant time.' (83) 'Whatever is decomposed', it must be assumed, 'may certainly be recomposed, by the almighty power that first composed it'. (84) Matter, Priestley asserted in his debates with Price, is never annihilated; it 'will, I doubt not, be collected, and revivified, at the resurrection, when the power of thinking will return of course'. (85) Priestley therefore foresaw a general resurrection of all humankind by way of physical recomposition. Will men be exactly the same? Men, Priestley answered, would be the same only as a river is the same by flowing in the same channel; the particles will be different, but the organization, especially the power of thought, will be recognizably identical. (86) Resurrection of this sort awaited the second coming of Christ and God's judgment of all men. "(Luke 14; 14.) (87)

Priestley wrote of divine retribution at the end of the world in terms of an 'unquenchable fire' for the wicked. (88) Yet we know that he generally found it difficult to think that a compassionate God could punish finite beings infinitely and cruelly.

'Since all the dead are to be raised, the wicked as well as the righteous, it is highly improbable that this will be merely for the sake of their being punished, and then consigned to annihilation, as if they were incapable of improvement.' (89)
Hell was an ineffectual concept, thought Priestley; it deterred few and its punishments were more than that necessary to reform human conduct. (90) In other words, Priestley is, in a fit of literal-mindedness, injecting the reformist principle of association into the afterlife, where men will undergo a final perfecting.

The unity of God and the humanity of Jesus Christ form the primary purifying doctrine of Priestley's theology. Together with his espousal of materialism, it became the basis for the lengthy controversy with Bishop Horsley, a debate which further occasioned Priestley's most thorough examination of Christ's meaning to early Christians. (91) Priestley's view of Christ, so often repeated, was clear:

'The great outline of it is, that the universal parent of mankind commissioned Jesus Christ, to invite men to the practice of virtue, by the assurance of his mercy to the penitent, and of his purpose to raise to immortal life and happiness all the virtuous and good, but to inflict adequate punishment on the wicked. In proof of this he wrought many miracles, and after a public execution he rose again from the dead. He also directed that proselytes to his religion should be admitted by baptism, and that his disciples should eat bread and drink wine in commemoration of his death. (92) Christ was a mere man, naturally possessed of no other powers than other men have, but a distinguished messenger of God, and chief instrument in his hands for the good of men.' (93)

To Priestley there was no question that Christ was 'a man approved of God, and assisted by him', 'the spiritual Physician appointed by the Almighty to heal our diseases'. (94) But that was all. Worship of him as a peer of God was plainly idolatrous. Priestley thus turned to Scripture, church history, and the patristic writings for factual demonstration of the legitimacy of his views. In this exercise, Priestley was not extraordinary but he certainly was more obsessed with external evidence than most other theologians.

'He is compelled...to accept the Protestant theory that there was in the earliest ages a body of absolutely sound doctrine; though, in the effort to identify this with Unitarianism, he is driven to great straits, and forced to discover it in obscure sects, and to make inferences from the negative argument of silence rather than from positive assertions. Though he makes free with the reasoning of the Apostles, he cannot give up their authority; and accepting without question the authenticity of the Gospels, labours to interpret them in the Unitarian sense.' (95)
Those early Christians, particularly the Ebionites and Nazarenes, had believed, or so Priestley insisted, that the word 'logos' was an indication of the word and wisdom of God, a facet of the divine mind. It appeared that this notion was corroborated by John the Apostle and Tertullian. (96) That this sectarian conviction that Christ was neither divine nor pre-existent was not labelled heresy encouraged Priestley to venture that not only were the apostles Unitarian but most of the common people of the Jewish and Gentile worlds were as well. Moreover, the early Fathers were corporealists who believed God and Jesus to be consubstantial. (97) Platonizing philosophers, however, soon made the 'logos' a divine emanation and ultimately personified it as Christ. Thus began the trinitarian tradition which became orthodoxy at the Council of Nicaea (375 A.D.). (98) The Athanasian system, corrupt and oriental in nature, thereby supplanted Arianism by the fifth century. To Priestley's critical mind, it was a system riddled with contradiction: three gods were one; Christ was equal to God but created by him; the Lord's prayer was to one God alone: Jesus was a God and yet called the apostles brethren and he never spoke as though his powers were his own. In light of common sense and all evidence, Priestley must have puzzled how anyone could possibly defend the horrifying and popish creed which Horsley espoused. (99) The historical evidence for Unitarianism was overwhelming, so he thought.

'Had the minds of the primitive christians continued uncontaminated with the wisdom of this world, and considered Christ as his apostles, who lived and conversed with him, evidently appear to have considered him, viz. as a mere man approved of God, by signs and wonders which God did by him, they would have entertained for him all the sentiments of love and reverence that were due the captain of their salvation, and the first begotten from the dead: who, as their elder brother, was gone to prepare a place for them...; but they could never have arrogated for him divine honours'. (100)

As if recognizing the radical potential of his Christology, Priestley went to lengths to show Christ's moral superiority to the heathen Philosophers like Socrates, his genuine inspiration and the divine nature of his mission, over and above his personal imperfections. (101)

How then was one to cope with the greatest mystery of all, an invisible and omnipotent deity, within a religion devoid of mystery? Can the attributes, indeed the very existence and activity, of God be the objects of rational and 'scientific' inquiry? Priestley had to concede that reason had only a limited
limited power to grasp such matters with absolute certitude. Nevertheless, he apparently felt that evidence induced from nature would be conclusive for the man with faith and very persuasive even for the man with none. It was not a rare conviction in the eighteenth century that the natural world implied the presence of an intelligent and creative force in the universe. 'My study of the works of nature gives me a stronger feeling of this persuasion (that life is controlled by infinite wisdom and goodness) than I have ever had before', Priestley wrote to Lindsey, 'and it increases with every day observation'. (102) No better way of venerating God existed than to contemplate and explore his works. (103) 'Our characters approach to perfection in proportion as we keep it (divine agency in the world) in view, and they are debased and bad, in proportion as we lose sight of it.' (104) The main question for Priestley was simply this: 'Whether the world we inhabit, and ourselves who inhabit it, had an intelligent author; or no proper author at all? Whether our conduct be inspected, and we are under a righteous government, or under no government at all? And lastly, whether, we have something to hope and fear beyond the grave, or are at liberty to adopt the Epicurean maxim, Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die?' (105) In beckoning to the philosophers of France, Priestley persisted in illustrating the consonance of religion and logical proofs: 'I invite you to admit nothing but what shall appear to be least contrary to natural analogy, and consequently to probability...When I say that there is a God, I mean, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and I maintain that it is most agreeable to natural analogy to admit this; because marks of design, which we universally consider as indications of mind, are as conspicuous in the works of nature, as in those of art.' (106) Of course, the argument from natural design was an old and facile one. Hume had repudiated it and other evidence supporting natural religion and had blamed natural religion itself for the decline of Christianity. (107) Design and natural analogy received widespread exposition, for example in the works of Cudworth, Derham and Paley. (108) These religious inferences had naturally been given impetus by Newtonian revelations about the order and efficiency of the universe. Images of providential power were being changed. 'God, now the chief mechanic of the universe, has become the cosmic conservative. His aim is to maintain the status quo.' (109) In this manner, one of the greatest expositors of Newtonian theory, W. J. s'Gravesande, claimed that one notion was axiomatic.
axiomatic in the Newtonian approach: 'That the Creator of the universe governs all things, by laws determined by His wisdom, or spontaneously flowing from the nature of things.' (110) Priestley, who read s'Gravesande at Daventry and who must have been deeply impressed with the Dutchman's ideas, held tightly to this assumption of a pre-ordained uniformity in nature, for he realized, as had s'Gravesande, that without it all our past knowledge and experiences cease to be valid criteria and our future actions become incalculable. Analogical reasoning, the inferential logic from uniformity in nature to design and mechanism in divine and human natures, was necessarily practical, though not always strictly logical. 'Scientific prediction does not then involve the syllogistically necessary conclusions of formal logic; it is, nevertheless, a valid and indispensable conclusion by analogy.' (111) Analogisms were vital to Priestley's description of God but they were not mathematical; rather, analogism is an implication, a kind of biological pre-supposition, a reliance ultimately upon divine benevolence instead of on a scientific calculation of self-justified realities. (112) In proposing to inform unbelievers about God, then, Priestley had already made some major concessions about the power of reason to understand God and nature, no doubt unintentionally. His distaste for Hume's 'atheistical' conclusions forced him to proceed as though the rational nature of religion had been unscathed by the Scotsman's scepticism. (113)

Priestley began with an assurance of God's existence as an uncaused first cause, an argument he thought was 'irrefragable'. To conceive of the universe as an infinite chain of self-causation or a 'fortuitous concourse of atoms' (Epicurean theory) was absurd. (114) The mechanical cause and effect relationships of the cosmos issue, thought Priestley, quite naturally from God and nothing can be said to be uncaused since this admission would eliminate the basic argument for God's existence. (115)

The divine attributes were next explicated, first, by analogy from nature and, secondly, from revelation. From the hypothesis of an uncaused cause, man can know that God is eternal, since there cannot have been a time when nothing existed, immutable, since to be uncaused is to be unchanged, and perhaps immaterial, since God acted everywhere (a proposition he seems to discard eventually). (116) From the 'subordinate parts of this great machine of the universe', man can perceive 'that the great design of the divine being, in all works of his hands, was to produce happiness'. (117) This, of course, showed the attribute of benevolence. Priestley thus pointed to human society and the 'animal economy' to illustrate how 'the world is in a state of melioration, in a variety of respects'. (118) Most importantly, Priestley insisted that
that many and 'perhaps all pains and evils (the causes of pain) tend to check and exterminate themselves, whereas pleasures extend and propagate themselves, and that without limits'. (119) The human condition was mixed with pain but for Priestley it was a gradation from worse to better, thereby always providing hope. Enjoyments increased with age, for example, and justice, mercy, and veracity characterized the divine government of the world. (120) The problem of theodicy is continually resolved in this amiable fashion in Priestley's mind and his portrait of God is a liberal and generous one. 'That every part of so complex a system as this should be so formed, as to conspire to promote this one great end, namely the happiness of the creation, is a clear proof of the wisdom of God'. (121) From these various qualities, Priestley derived the presence of 'divine agency' in the world, omniscience and omnipresence, God needing to act everywhere and to foresee the consequences of his actions. (122) According to Priestley, revelation and Scripture described the same attributes, thereby corroborating natural evidence. (123) The Almighty thus emerges as the sovereign creator, upholder, and preserver of the system of natural laws, engineering a cosmic process of improvement through his benevolence, justice, mercy, and wisdom. It is a god to be imitated more than worshipped, to be described as the Great Exemplar.

The idea of an immaterial God expressed in the Institutes (124) was uncomfortable for older, materialist Priestley. According to his own admission, nothing can act where it is not, or with something with which it shared no properties. Was God then material? While acknowledging that 'the Divine essence cannot be the object of any of our (created and finite) senses', Priestley disallowed immateriality, if what was meant by that term was a substance having no properties in common with matter and no relation to space. (125) An idea of matter, after all, depended more on manifested properties than on substance itself in Priestley's theories and God could be said to share several properties of human nature. The Scriptures mentioned no immaterial divinity; when God is said to be a spirit, clearly it meant only that he is invisible. (126) In fact, the Bible speaks of God's place of residence and his very movements. (Genesis 41:4; 5:16; 11:5.) God's appearances as a burning bush, a bright cloud, a flame by night, and Moses's impression that he saw God's hind side were indications to Priestley that materiality was not too far fetched. (127)

As natural religion was intended to demonstrate the regularity of the world order and its intelligent authorship, so revealed religion demonstrated the power of God through interruptions in that orderly system. The credibility and superiority of Christianity depended, inevitably and ultimately, on evidence of divine power within the
natural order. Ironically, Priestley defended miracles and prophecy, not in contradiction to rational evidence, but in conjunction with it. Early in the eighteenth century, theologians and theorists, including Locke, Butler, and Paley, had treated miracles as objective facts, demonstrated by the credible testimony of Scriptural spectators. (128) Hume's criticism of such historical evidence did not deter Priestley from accepting miraculous events as demonstrations of God's influence. (129) This demonstration, in effect, saved Priestley's universe from becoming deistic or a self-moving and self-justified machine.

'It is wise and even necessary to establish general laws', Priestley stated, 'yet occasional deviations from them may contribute more to promote the same great end than a perfect uniformity'. By acknowledging miracles 'we more easily preserve a just sense of our connection with and dependence upon God'. (130) In promoting moral behaviour, miracles served a utilitarian purpose. In attacking corruptions in religion, Priestley suggested that external proofs like miracles were more effective in demonstrating the true system than internal proofs alone. (131) Miracles were evidenced by present appearance, as in the case of a large chasm at the foot of Calvary 'such as cannot well be supposed to have been produced by any natural earthquake.' (132) 'As to the evidence of miracles, it is precisely of the same nature as that of other facts. It is only requisite that it be stronger, on account of their want of analogy to the facts.' (133) Moreover, Priestley saw the traditions of literate Jewish and Christian culture as legitimations of reported revelations. The historical accounts of prophecies fulfilled through some exceptional character was plain testament to divine prescience and intervention. (134) The vast number of witnesses to Biblical miracles constituted the most convincing evidence of divine government, according to Priestley. To claim that all the numerous attestations to miracles were delusive or hoaxes would be a denial of universal laws of human nature. (135) Faith in revelation was an historical faith, held Priestley. 'If we appeal to experience, to determine the actual weight and effect of different kinds of evidence of testimony is adapted to give as much satisfaction to the mind of man as any other kind of evidence.' (136) To believe in an historical Julius Caesar was, accordingly, the same as believing that 2+2=4. If the seeker after facts can gauge a witness's prejudices, his opportunities to be informed, his competence, the number, independence and principles of several witnesses, he can judge the credibility of their testimony. (137) Priestley could therefore appeal to Biblical testimony about Christ's miracles, coming as it often did from strangers and enemies, as demonstration
of God's power and assurance. If one were to consider how the Jews converted, why the apostles were moved to persevere, why Thomas's doubts disappeared, and the confidence of Christ's followers, Christianity would shine the brighter as the most miraculous and truthful of all systems. (138) Priestley of course discredited those miracles which failed to support Jewish or Christian revelation by attacking the historical evidence, for example that Mohammed's Koran was inferior in style to the Old Testament. (139)

Finally, we come to the sociology of Priestley's religion, its intended social functions. The intellectual and reified theology described above was hardly an opiate for the masses. Neither Unitarianism, orthodox dissent, nor English free thought tried to reach the lower classes in the eighteenth century. (140) Bourgeois religionists tended in fact to accept a certain scheme of social subordination, though their moral principles were universalistic and customarily humanitarian. Consider Priestley's remarks in a sermon on the slave trade:

'We (Christians) have juster ideas of the dignity of human nature, and of the common rights of humanity, than heathens ever had. At the same time that we justly think that every man is a great and exalted being (i.e., capable of becoming such) we consider all distinctions among men as temporary, calculated for the ultimate benefit of all; and consequently that it is for the interest of the lower orders, as well as of the highest, that such a subordination should subsist. But with this persuasion all christian masters will respect and love their servants and dependents, and will think it their duty to make their situation as easy as possible; considering them as brothers and equals, in one, and that the most important sense, while they treat them as inferiors in another.' (141)

Religion then did not prevent one class from being 'more equal' than others. Christianity thereby became morally paradigmatic, an instrument of human improvement of the lower orders by moral example. (142) Priestley preached that all in a position to know its rational tenets should actively combat ignorance, superstition, and error with education for the young, examination of doctrine, public service and compassion. (143) Until Christian education could equalize the human race, he perceived and accepted a kind of natural differentiation.

Christianity was to effect moral behaviour through the associative process. In fact, it became increasingly a moral code, a rule of life to use Hartley's phrase, rather than a faithful anticipation of salvation. Priestley was most interested in the psychological mechanism of moral behaviour rather than moral law itself. After all, the moral purpose of the divine system was
built-in, awaiting perfection of the species in accordance with it. The problem of this liberalized attitude towards religion was that Christianity stood in danger of losing its identity and independence.

'Many new things might emerge once religion had been reduced to a 'compartment', to mere vague morality. The real point of departure towards the modern idea of secular progress would appear to be the exclusion of Christian ideas from society. Christianity as increasingly 'Arminianized' was a moral code increasingly indistinguishable from secular behaviour.' (144)

As a guide to moral behaviour, Priestley's theology mollified the Christian condemnation of evil, for as part of the symmetry and purpose of God's work, evil promoted human betterment. All men would be judged by God according to their environment anyway and even the wicked need not suffer punishment in excess of that necessary to reform them. (145) The moral duty of mankind was 'to feel and act, as our own true and ultimate happiness, in conjunction with that of others, requires'. (146) Religious preachments thus became social injunctions. Caveats against lust, gluttony, idleness or the encouragement of sobriety, chastity, industry, and compassion were neither extraordinary nor emotionally challenging, but they were unquestionably utilitarian. The truths of Christianity were to ennoble men in this life: 'if a man expects to die like a dog, it cannot but be supposed that he will also live like one'. (147) In prostrating himself before the author of creation in petition and thanksgiving, man enhanced his own character, and this was Priestley's concern. 'Prayer is a necessary step in the intellectual and moral improvement of man.' (148)

Progress in religion, as in everything else, was a matter of independency. The value of Christianity in improving the human personality necessitated toleration of all shades of opinion and restraint on civil establishments, thereby permitting the truest principles to triumph on their own merits. (149) The good-natured defence of dissent and a free and rational religion contained in Priestley's Essay on First Principles had turned to recrimination by 1791 when he wrote against Burke. His youthful expectations for a free society had not been fulfilled. The petitions for repeal of the religious tests had failed time and again over two decades, still leaving dissenters in what Priestley had once termed 'comparative servitude'. (150) In 1791 he asserted that dissenters 'are avowedly hostile to every establishment' and he himself began to perceive a vast conspiracy of church and state against natural liberties. 'The growing light of the age' was revealing the insufficiency and oppressiveness of established religion. (151) 'Now...I think is the time to exhibit to public view all the defects of the church establishment', wrote
wrote Priestley, 'without sparing, but without malignity'. (152) Characteristically, Priestley viewed the corrupt establishment as an obstruction to the return of a true and primitive Christianity for all men. 'Every article...within the compass of the civil establishment of Christianity, is evidently an innovation.' (153) Contrary to Burke, Priestley saw no necessary mutual dependence between church and state, only the violation of civil rights and the moral turpitude bred by ease, affluence, and splendour. (154) Whereas Priestley's recommendations in 1769 amounted to a pruning of the authority of the Church, his later views amounted to disestablishment - voluntary church rates, removal of the church from Ireland and Bishops from the Lords, and the election of clergy. (155) For ultimately, Priestley believed another 'rational uniformity' would occur naturally based not on civil authority but the free choice of individuals for the true principles of Christianity, Socinianism of course. (156)

Priestley's influence on the rise of Unitarianism in England and America is a matter of debate. (157) Certainly, he remained one of its chief symbols, for he embodied its bourgeois character and its rational democratic inclinations. If Unitarianism was 'the very quintessence of dissent', (158) Priestley's theology, for all its lack of poetry might well be 'one of the most characteristic, and not the least admirable, of the products of the English eighteenth century'. (159) But more importantly, his approach to religious freedom was that of dissent as a whole, making claims on society which were intended 'to secularize its relations to the larger community'. (160)

Madison, Wisconsin.
5. Joseph Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit. To which is added, the history of the philosophical doctrine concerning the origin of the soul, and the nature of matter; with its influence on Christianity, especially with respect to the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ, 2nd edn. (Birmingham, 1782), 297.
6. Joseph Priestley, Institutes of natural and revealed Religion, 3 vols (London, 1772-1774), II, 312. 'Now I, for my part, am truly pleased with such publications as these of Mr. Hume, and I do not think it requires any great sagacity, or strength of mind to see that such writings must be of great service to religion, natural and revealed. They have actually occasioned the subject to be more thoroughly canvassed, and consequently to be better understood than ever it was before....' Priestley, An examination of Dr. Reid's inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense, Dr. Beattie's essay on the nature and immutability of truth, and Dr. Oswald's appeal to common sense in behalf of religion, 2nd edn. (London, 1775), 193.
7. Joseph Priestley, Letters to Dr. Horsley in answer to his animadversions on the history of the corruptions of Christianity. With additional evidence that the primitive christian church was Unitarian. (Birmingham, 1783), xii-xiii.
8. Joseph Priestley, An appeal to the serious and candid professors of Christianity, on the following subjects, viz. I. The use of reason in matters of religion. II. The power of man to do the will of God. III. Original sin. IV. Election and reprobation. V. The divinity of Christ, and VI. Atonement for sin by the death of Christ. By a lover of the Gospel, 5th edn. London, 1775), 4-5. This ranks as Priestley's bestselling work; reaching 60,000 copies in the first edition alone.

10. 'Now it is not religion which, thanks to its higher "absolute" truth, can provide a solid foundation for science; it is rather the relativity of scientific knowledge which draws religion also into its magic circle.' E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. by Fritz C. A. Koelin and James P. Pettegrove (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), 63.


17. Philip Harwood, Priestley and Unitarianism, 21.

18. Clarke Garrett, 'Joseph Priestley, the millenium and the French Revolution', Journal of the History of Ideas, XXXIV, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1973), 55. Priestley went so far as to claim that the fate of science conversely depended on Christian faith: 'The man who enters fully...into the spirit of infidelity, will have little respect for the liberal pursuits of science. Expecting to exist but a few years, he will naturally say, what is your history, your philosophy, or your astronomy, to me.' Joseph Priestley, Letters to Mr. Volney, occasioned by a work of his entitled Ruins, and by his letter to the author (Philadelphia, 1797), 10-11.


22. Letter, T. Lindsey to a friend (M. Turner), London, Dec. 12, 1775, Dr. Williams's Library, Priestley-Lindsey Correspondence.

24. The natural alliance of science and Unitarianism, and the eventual decline of the latter, is alluded to in Thackray's study of the Unitarian members of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society: 'Their espousal of the progressivist values of Unitarianism and a progressivist interpretation of science can then be seen as deriving from their need to justify themselves, and to do so in terms of belief systems that simultaneously affirmed their commitment to high culture, announced their distance from the traditional value systems of English society, and offered a coherent explanatory scheme for the unprecedented, change-oriented society in which they found themselves unavoidably if willingly cast in leading roles." Arnold Thackray, 'Natural Knowledge in Cultural Context: The Manchester Model', American Historical Review, LXXIX, no. 3 (June, 1974), 682. As science, the liberal ideology, and the middle class moved to center stage in nineteenth century English society, the need for a nonconformist religion vanished.


26. Joseph Priestley, Institutes, II, 73-74. The Institutes deal separately with natural (vol. I) and revealed (vols. II and III) religion; similarly, volume I of Letters to a philosophical unbeliever is devoted to natural, and volume II to revealed, religion.


29. Ibid., I, 4.

30. An elaboration of Priestley's evidentiary premises is available in Chapin, 'Theology: the use of reason', 66-80; examination of Scripture, 97-123; historical evidence, 124-87.

31. Priestley, Institutes, III, x. Three kinds of evidence mentioned elsewhere are demonstration (2+2=4, air is elastic), first-hand knowledge (experiment and observation), and second hand evidence (history or testimony), the latter being most frequently used in matters theological. Priestley, Letters to a philosophical unbeliever, I, 32-33.


33. Ibid., 5.

34. Priestley, Institutes, II, 75.

35. Ibid., II, 276.

36. Ibid., II, 271-73, 290-94.

37. Ibid., II, 160.

39. Ibid., II, 94-95.
40. Ibid., II, 133-50.
41. Ibid., II, 161-77.
43. Ibid., II, 145.
44. Ibid., II, 106.
46. Priestley's attitude was in part Lockian, 'Locke's understanding of the Bible as a book of specially revealed propositional truths; his reduction of its doctrinal content to God, virtue, and a future life; his appeal to internal and external evidences; his stress on the 'plain direct meaning' of the words; and his elevation of the general 'drift of the discourse' over specific verses, characterized the approach to Scripture typical of the Age of Reason.' Chapin, 'Theology', 84, 97-123. Priestley sought to explicate the whole Scripture in detail: Notes on all the books of Scripture, for the use of the pulpit and private families, 4 vols, (Northumberland, 1803-1804).
47. Joseph Priestley, *An answer to Mr. Paine's age of reason*, being a continuation of letters to the philosophers and politicians of France, on the subject of religion; and of letters to a philosophical unbeliever. (London, 1795, 97.
50. The Theological Repository, consisting of original essays, hints, queries, etc. calculated to promote religious knowledge, J. Priestley, 6 vols (London, 1769-88). I,xv.
52. Ibid., I, xVIII-xIX.
53. Priestley, Institutes, II, 147-48; Answer to Mr. Paine, 77-89.
55. 'I must re-assert...that among Dissenters only, is the worship of the one living and true God known', Priestley, Letters to the author of remarks on several late publications relative to the Dissenters, in a letter to Dr. Priestley (London, 1770), 20.
56. Ibid., 31. Priestley, Corruptions, II, Pts. IX, X, XI.
57. Joseph Priestley, The proper objects of education in the present state of the world; represented in a discourse, delivered on Wednesday, the 27th of April, 1791, at the meeting-house in the Old Jewry, London; to the supporters of the New College at Hackney (London, 1791), 15-17. Priestley presented what he believed to be Scriptural evidence for the reformations of the church by secular powers which formerly supported the anti-Christian system; in other words, those 'who have Oven their power and strength unto the beast (Rev. xvii. 13) now begin to hate her, and are ready to make her desolate and naked, v.16'. Corruptions, I, viII.
58. Joseph Priestley, The present state of Europe compared with ancient prophecies; a sermon, preached at the Gravel Pit Meeting in Hackney, February 28, 1794, being the day appointed for a general fast, with a preface containing the reasons for the author's leaving England (London, 1794), 24-25.
59. Priestley, Institutes, III, 154-65; Corruptions, II, Pts. IV, VIII.
62. Joseph Priestley, A harmony of the evangelists in English; with critical dissertations, an occasional paraphrase, and notes for the use of the unlearned (London, 1780), v.
63. Priestley, Serious and candid professors, 9.
64. Priestley, Serious and candid professors, 10.
66. Joseph Priestley, The Scripture doctrine of remission, which showeth that the death of Christ is no proper sacrifice nor satisfaction for sin (London, 1761).

68. Joseph Priestley, A free discussion of the doctrines of materialism and philosophical necessity, in a correspondence between Dr. Price and Dr. Priestley to which are added, by Dr. Priestley, an introduction, explanation the nature of the controversy, and letters to several writers who have animadverted to his disquisitions relating to matter and spirit, or his treatise on necessity (London, 1778), xvii-xviii.

69. Priestley, Disquisitions, 53-59.

70. Ibid., 153.

71. Ibid., 153-56.

72. Ibid., 157-60.

73. Ibid., 168-69.

74. Ibid., 206-347.

75. Ibid., 207-10.

76. Ibid., 317-26.

77. Ibid., 243.

78. Ibid., 245-51; Corruptions, I, 23-44.

79. Priestley, Disquisitions, 251-56.

80. Ibid., 258-63. The doctrine of pure spiritualism was not firmly established before Descartes, who...made the want of extension the distinguishing property of mind or spirit.' Ibid., 269.


82. Priestley, Disquisitions, 278-80; Institutes, III, 202-7.

83. Ibid., I, 158; Disquisitions, 280.

84. Ibid., 204, 200.

85. Priestley, Free discussion, 83.

86. Priestley, Disquisitions, 194-205; Free discussion, 72-76.


90. Ibid., I, 164-65.

91. An history of early opinions concerning Jesus Christ is extensive in its treatment of christology but perhaps the major innovation of the work is Priestley's maxims of historical criticism in Chapter 10 of the fourth volume (4 vols, Birmingham, 1786). An earlier examination of Christ's historical status is in Corruptions, I, Pt. I.
92. Ibid., II, 447; I, 23-44.
93. Priestley, Letters to Dr. Horsley, I, ii-iii; Corruptions, I, 6-20. Joseph Priestley, A general view of the arguments for the unity of God; and against the divinity and pre-existence of Christ; from reason, from the Scriptures, and from history, rev. ed. (London, 1794), 20.
95. Stephen, English thought, I, 368.
96. Priestley, Letters to Dr. Horsley, Letters I and II 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God'. John i.i. Priestley credited Nathaniel Lardner's (1684-1768) Letter on the logos (1759) with making a Socinian of him.
97. Priestley, Letters to Dr. Horsley, I, 22-25; Disquisitions, 352, 144.
98. Priestley, Letters to Dr. Horsley, I, Letter VI, Disquisitions, 347-56. According to Priestley, Justin Martyr had taken the fatal step toward popularizing a non-materialist trinity and had even equated the logos with the Church itself. Corruptions, I, 29. Letter, J. Priestley to T. Lindsey, Birmingham, Oct. 18, 1790, Dr. Williams's Library, Priestley-Lindsey Correspondence. Also see, Joseph Priestley, A general history of the Christian Church to the fall of the Western Empire, 2 vols. (Birmingham, 1790), II, Period VII; Early Opinions, III, ch. XVI.
100. Priestley, Disquisitions, 72.
102. Letter, J. Priestley to T. Lindsey, Northumberland, Dec. 18, 1801, American Philosophical Society, Priestley papers.
103. Priestley, Experiments and observations on different kinds of air, 3 vols. (London, 1774-7), I, xii.
104. Priestley, 'Doctrine of Divine Influence,' Discourses on various subjects, including several on particular occasions iBirmirTjham, 1787), T242.
106. Priestley, Letters to the philosophers, 5-6.
110. Cited by I. Bernard Cohen, Franklin and Newton: an inquiry into speculative Newtonian experimental science and Franklin's work in electricity as an example thereof (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1956), 236. From s'Gravesande's Mathematical elements of natural philosophy (1720-1721). This author also transmitted some Newtonian rules of method which became important to Priestley, namely, not to admit of more causes than are sufficient to explain a phenomenon; that there are the same causes of natural effects of the same kind; and that only those qualities whose virtue cannot be increased or diminished and which belong to all bodies upon which experiment can be made are said to be properties of all bodies. Ibid.
111. Cassirer, Enlightenment, 61. s'Gravesande: 'The author of nature has made it necessary for us to reason by analogy, which consequently can be a legitimate basis for our reasoning.' cited Ibid.
112. Cassirer perceives that analogy is tantamount to relinquishing objective truth and logical necessity to subjective impressions and personal needs, thereby placing s'Gravesande's thought close to Humean skepticism 'separated only by a wall so thin a mere breath could blow it down'. Ibid.
61-62
113. Priestley, Letters to a philosophical unbeliever, I, Letters IX, XII, XIV.
114. Priestley, Institutes, I, 5-17; Disquisitions, i86-94; Letters to a philosophical unbeliever, I, 1-57. Burtt, Metaphysical foundations, 98-104.
115. Priestley, Philosophical necessity, 15-16.
117. Ibid., I, 20.
118. Priestley, Letters to a philosophical unbeliever, I, 80.
119. Ibid., I, 76.
120. Ibid., I, 85-114; Institutes, I, sections V and VI.
121. Ibid., I, 32.
122. Ibid., I, 38-41.
123. Ibid., III 3-47.
124. Ibid., I, 16, 40-41.
125. Priestley, Disquisitions, 142-43, 74. Immateriality which meant only something different from created matter would have been acceptable to Priestley. Boscovichian atomism, it will be remembered, was 'materialistic' in Priestley's mind but it was really a theory of forces, not substances. See Chapter
126. Priestley, Disquisitions, 138-50; Free discussion, 95-105, 67.
127. Priestley, Disquisitions, 174-78.
129. Ibid., 143-44. 'The beautifully articulated machine of the philosophers is not a Christian but a pagan machine. What is remarkable is not the supposed resemblance of this machine to Christianity but its always implicit and often explicit repudiation of miracles. God acts through general and uniform laws alone.' Peter Gay, 'Carl Becker's Heavenly City,' in Raymond O. Rockwood, ed. Carl Becker's Heavenly City Revised (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), 36. Priestley attacked Hume's objections to miracles as contrary to natural uniformity by claiming that such was not the case in another age. The paradox is that Priestley's analogical theory of design depends implicitly on such uniformity. Priestley, Institutes, II, 80-83.
130. Ibid., II, 69.
131. Ibid., II, 72; Answer to Mr. Paine, 38-46; Letters to the philosophers, 14-41; Disquisitions, 293-95. Also consult, on the evidences of revelation: Joseph Priestley, Discourses on the evidences of revealed religion (London, 1794); Joseph Priestley, Discourses relating to the evidences of revealed religion, delivered in the church of the Universalists, at Philadelphia, 1796, and published at the request of many of the hearers. (Philadelphia, 1796).
133. Priestley, Answer to Mr. Paine, 17, 15-19.
135. Ibid.
137. Ibid., II, 87-91.
139. Ibid., II, 236-47.
140. Stromberg, Religious liberalism, 164-65.
141. Priestley, Sermon on the subject of the slave trade; delivered to a Society of Protestant Dissenters, at the New Meeting, in Birmingham; and published at their request (Birmingham, 1788), vii-viii.
142. Ibid., 15-19.
143. Priestley, 'Christians, the Salt of the Earth', MS. sermon, Manchester College, Oxford.
144. Stromberg, Religious liberalism, 162.
147. Priestley, Institutes, II, vi.
148. Priestley Answer to Mr. Paine, 33-34.
149. Priestley, An essay on the first principles of government and on the nature of political, civil and religious liberty, including remarks on Dr. Brown's code of education, and on Dr. Baiuy's sermon on c'ure' n authority, 2nd edn. (Lon&n, 1771), 120-137. A free address to those who have petitioned for the repeal of the late act of Parliament, in favour of the Roman Catholics, by a lover of peace and truth (London, 1780), 11-14.
150. Joseph Priestley, The conduct to be observed by Dissenters in order procure the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, recommended in a sermon (Birmingham, 1789), 4. Priestley often criticized the religious lethargy of his fellow dissenters but he usually defended their rights. One famous case was his attack on Blackstone's assertion in his Commentaries that dissenters' principles made them poor citizens. After a fiery pamphlet by Priestley, Blackstone apologized. Joseph Priestley, Remarks on some paragraphs in the fourth volume of Dr. Blackstone's commentaries on the laws of England, relating to the Dissenters (London, 1769).
152. Letter, J. Priestley to T. Lindsey, Birmingham, May 24, 1899, Dr. Williams's Library (I).
154. Ibid., 41-51.
155. Ibid., 78-84. A letter to the right honourable William Pitt, first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer; on the subject of toleration and church establishments; occasioned by his speech against repeal of the Test and Corporation acts on Wednesday, the 28th of March, 1787, 2nd edn. (London, 1787), 40-48; Essay on the first principles, 181-207.


ON WHAT POINT DID RICHARD PRICE CONVINCE

DAVID HUME OF A MISTAKE?

BERNARD PEACH

One of the most intriguing details in the history of the relationship between Richard Price and David Hume is the report by William Morgan that Price convinced Hume he was mistaken on one point, or at least inconclusive. (1) M. Henri Laboucheix, in his excellent book on Price, indicates that the point was Hume's view that our feeling of liberty is delusive. (2)

In the relevant section of the text Laboucheix points out that Price preferred to criticize Hume not point for point, as Laboucheix's commentary might suggest, but as if Hume's thought were unified and systematic. Granting that Price's argumentation is just and even that it might be strengthened by this approach, Laboucheix nevertheless considers some of its implications to be unacceptable. As an example he urges that it is excessive of Price to accuse Hume of "destroying" all external existence, at least of giving to that expression the sense of a scientific determinism to which Hume was in large part a stranger. Leaving aside the larger issue of Hume's theory of the external world, the point of present relevance is that Laboucheix contributes a footnote to the passage "...quelles que soient meme les retouches qu'il apporta 1 sa critique..." in which he is apparently illustrating a complication arising from Price's procedures:

"Price, apres que Hume eut lui-meme abandonne son assimilation de la liberte au hasard, supprime une note importante p.318 de la 1re edition (p.183 de l'edition de D. D. Raphael), et des la fin de A Review, (3) paru en 1758, ajoute un "advertisement" ou il ecrit notamment:...he has very candidly acknowledged that he was mistaken when he asserted that we have a feeling of liberty, and that this feeling is delusive." "...he has...

substituted sense and perception in the room of feeling." '(4) Laboucheix seems to be saying that Hume admitted he was mistaken in holding that our feeling of liberty is delusive. He does not say, however, that Price had convinced him of that mistake. So we must turn to the original passages in hope that they will fill this gap.

Price's
Price's "advertisement" added at the end of the first edition of the Review reads as follows:

'After this Treatise had been printed off, I observed a second edition advertised in the publick papers, of The Essay on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, With Alterations and Additions. Upon perusal of this edition, I have found that the author has made considerable alterations in that very part of his book which had occasioned the note which I have given in page 318 of this Treatise. [The note reads: "The ingenious author of the Essay on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, grants that morality in general, all praise and blame, merit and accountableness, and moral obligation, suppose liberty. (See the Advertisement, and the Essay on Liberty and Necessity.) He grants too, that we have a feeling of liberty; that the divine plan required that we should be so made as to seem to ourselves free; that the whole constitution of things is as if we were free; and that being under a necessity of approving and disapproving actions and characters, we are so far under a necessity of believing ourselves and others free. All this he owns, and yet (which is very strange) he denies the reality of liberty. He has conquered the necessity we are under, proved feeling itself (according to him, the source of the most important of our ideas and sentiments) to be, in this instance, deceitful; discovered the secret which, by his account, was intended to be concealed from us, and laid open the scheme formed to deceive us. But if, as this author asserts, morality implies liberty, and liberty there neither is nor can be, it follows, surely, that there neither is nor can be morality nor consequently religion; and that the subjects of his Essays are, the principles of what has no existence, of an impossibility."]

I am obliged, therefore, to desire the reader to consider what is said in that note as not applicable to this author's present sentiments; for he has very candidly acknowledged' that he was mistaken when he asserted that we have a feeling of liberty and that this feeling is delusive and that all praise and blame, merit and demerit, are founded on this delusive feeling, p.157.... I must not omit to observe further, with respect to the remark I have made on sentiments of this author in a note on page 35 [The note reads: "The author of the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion has insisted much on feeling as the original of these (the ideas of self-evident truth and impossibility) and many of our general sentiments and ideas. It is impossible to say what he means by this word as he generally uses it. But we are expressly told it signifies no kind of intellectual perception, and that though it informs us that nothing begins to be without a cause and that whatever
wisdom and perfection appear in the effect exist in a higher degree in the cause, we discern nothing in the contrary suppositions impossible or contradictory to the Natures of things. So that, for aught we know, something might have arisen from nothing without any cause, and all the order and beauty we see in the frame of things be produced by a blind and unintelligible agent or any the most inadequate cause. Why, then, since it appears not to us but that these things are possible do we believe that they have not actually happened? What is the meaning of saying that we have a feeling of the contrary? Is it not on account of the apprehended impossibility of these things and their obvious inconsistency with the principles of reason and the Natures of things that they have been hitherto universally rejected? In short, either there is in the nature of things some necessity of a cause adequate and proportionate to every alteration and every effect or there is not. If it is affirmed there is not, without farther pointing out the consequences, I shall only ask whether it is not reason that determines thus? If there is, why should not the understanding be capable of perceiving it, especially if it may perceive the contrary? Or how can we doubt that it actually does perceive it?"?

that he has in this second edition substituted sense and perception in the room of feeling and explained himself so as to make it appear to me uncertain whether he does not mean by them, in some instances, that very intellectual discernment which I have endeavoured to prove to be the source of the most important of our ideas.’ (This extensive "Advertisement" into which I have inserted the passages referred to by Price on his own earlier pages 318 and 35, is on pages 485-486 of the first edition of the Review).

While it is apparent that Price and the author of the Essays are involved in issues that are central to the epistemology of morals it is not clear that Price had convinced the author of the Essays of a mistake or that the author of the Essays was Hume. The dates of publication and Price's "advertisement" provide a fairly clear negative answer to the first question. Price's Review had been printed, but apparently not published, when he saw the second edition of the Essays. Whoever the author of the Essays, then, it is unlikely that he could be admitting that Price had convinced him of a mistake.

Was it Hume who was admitting this mistake, disregarding the question of how he was convinced of it? In a note on page 127 Laboucheix enlarges on the note of page 76. The text reads:
avait, d'abord reproché Hume d'avoir voulu rLLuire la liberte au hasard, (Footnote: Dans une note de la premiere edition de A Review, 1758, p.318).
ou a un simple sentiment, d'ailleurs illusoire. Mais, ayant pris connaissance de la deuxiame edition des Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, ou l'auteur modifait sa conception et considerait désormais la liberte comme une "sens" ou une "perception". Price pensa finalement que l'ecart n'etait peut-atre pas tellement grand entre sa theorie intellectualiste et celle de Hume.

Laboucheix's version of Price's footnote on page 318 of the first edition of A Review reads:
'Cf. advertisement a la fin de la premiere edition de A Review: he has (Mr. Hume) (sic) very candidly acknowledged that he was mistaken when he asserted that we have a feeling of liberty, and that this feeling is delusive..." : "he has substituted sense and perception in the room of feeling.'

By inserting Hume's name into the quotation from Price Laboucheix attributes the Essays to his authorship. If this were correct we would have an answer to the question about who was admitting the mistake. It is true that Hume was not averse to admitting mistakes, or at least to explicit expression of dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of his own doctrines. Think of his appendix to the Treatise where he criticizes his own doctrines of personal identity. It is true also that he wrote about morals and natural religion. And he wrote works that were originally published with titles such as Essays moral and political (Edinburgh, first edition 1741; second, edition, 1742; third edition 1748); Philosophical essays concerning human understanding (London 1748) An enquiry concerning the principles of morals (London 1751); Four dissertations including "The natural history of religion" (London 1757); Essays and treatises on several subjects, including Parts I & II of "Essays, moral, political and literary" (London 1758). Similar as these titles are to the title of the book referred to by Price, and by Laboucheix in discussing Hume's admission of a mistake, it is nevertheless not true that David Hume was the author of Essays on the principles of morality and natural religion. That was Henry Home, Lord Kames, Hume's older cousin, close friend, patron and adviser.

We do not, then, have the external evidence that would confirm Morgan's report; and we do not know on what point Price convinced Hume of error or inconclusiveness, assuming that Morgan's report is true. Nevertheless, we might proceed with the appropriately modified further question, whether Price convinced Kames of a mistake. The answer must be, I think, in
the negative. The evidence would take one of two forms; on the one hand, correspondence, autobiography, reports of conversations or the like or, on the other hand, acknowledgement in a subsequent edition. There is no such evidence in the first category. Such records and information in the case of Kames are extensive, because of his social and political positions and activities. Still, of course, it is unlikely that they are complete. Still again, however, if such influence had occurred there would probably be some indication of it, however indirect. Such records and information in the case of Price are much less extensive. The correspondence is much more scattered and difficult to locate. It is quite certain that the some three hundred letters I have been able to collect fall far short of the complete correspondence. But again, the absence of any indication of communication, however indirect, either in my collection or in D. O. Thomas's collection of over five hundred letters supports the negative conclusion.

This leaves the possibility of acknowledgment in a subsequent edition. Kames did bring out a third edition of the Essays, in 1779. And he is quite profuse in his acknowledgment of errors in the previous two editions. But although he modified his views on some of the topics criticized or questioned by Price there is no indication, direct or indirect, that he was led to do this by what Price had written in the Review. If E. C. Mossner is right the Essays were written by a man who was "astonishingly unlearned in metaphysics" and the corrections of errors in subsequent editions were the records of his learning more about philosophy from the Reverend Robert Wallace, lecturer in mathematics, and the Reverend Hugh Blair, Professor of Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres, both of the University of Edinburgh.(5)

So the problem of the point on which Price convinced Hume of error or inconclusiveness, if he did, still remains. Since we seem at present to be without the external evidence required to solve the problem we must, if we are to attack it in the meantime, while still looking for such evidence, turn to internal evidence. I believe such evidence is to be found in the fourth of Price's Four dissertations in which he criticizes Hume's essay, "Of miracles." I hope to deal with this issue and others raised by these two essays on a future occasion.

Duke University


3. A review of the principal questions and difficulties in morals, particularly those relating to the original of our ideas of virtue, its nature, foundation, reference to the Deity, obligation, subject-matter, and sanctions (London, printed for A. Millar in the Strand, 1758). The second edition was published in 1769 and the third in 1787. Both the second and the third editions were published by Cadell.


A note by Henri Laboucheix:

As Bernard Peach says in the previous article, Essays on the principles of morals and natural religion was indeed written by Henry Home, Lord Kames. Some two years ago D. D. Raphael who supervised the translation of my book on Price suggested that Kames and not Hume was the 'author' analysed in the 'Advertisement' at the end of the first edition of the review of the principal questions and difficulties in morals. At that time I decided to omit '(Mr. Hume)' from note 3 on page 127 and to replace the account which I had given on page 127 of Price's views on the matter with the following: 'Initially he had found fault with Kames for having wanted to reduce liberty to a simple feeling which was moreover illusory.' In addition I omitted the words 'quelles que soient rAme les retouches qu'il apporta a sa critique' on page 76 together with note 70 on the same page. Why Price decided to criticize Kames, who was more lawyer than philosopher, is unclear.
RICHARD PRICE'S PAMPHLETS ON AMERICA:

A NEW EDITION

BERNARD PEACH

Most of the readers of this Newsletter will know that Richard Price wrote two pamphlets in favour of the American colonies during the revolutionary period, that they aroused a rather extensive controversy, that he wrote another after the conclusion of hostilities, presenting his views on the importance of the revolution and the means of making it a lasting benefit to the world, and that he carried on an extensive correspondence with American and British leaders throughout this period. Long convinced of the intrinsic value of these pamphlets and the literature surrounding them, and because of their special relevance to the period of the bicentennial of the founding of the United States, I have recently completed a manuscript for a new edition that will also include selections from his correspondence, from his Fast Day Sermon, and from the writings of some of his critics. It will be published by the Duke University Press.

First, I'll give a short description of the contents for those who may not be familiar with the main themes in the pamphlets and then a brief outline of the point of view which is basic to my introductory essay. That point of view will explain the basis for selection where omissions were necessary or advisable. I will outline considerations that entered into the choice of copy-texts, describe some of the problems of comparing the texts, and note some of the points that emerged from the processes of comparison and annotation.

II

Price's first pamphlet, its Preface dated February 8th, 1776, is entitled Observations on the, nature of civil liberty, the principles of government and the justice and policy of the war with America (referred to hereinafter as Observations) After an analysis of the concept of liberty he applies the results of that analysis to the war with America. He argued that the war is unjust and dishonorable, besides being impolitic, contrary to the British Constitution and, furthermore, likely to fail. Observations had an immediate and large sale. Different methods of counting give different totals of the editions; but by any count there were more than a dozen in London in 1776 and probably over twenty altogether. It sold over a thousand copies in two days, went through five editions within a month and, according to William Morgan, had a sale of nearly sixty thousand 'in the course of a few months'. (1) It was published in Dublin and in Edinburgh, and was translated into German, French and Dutch, and circulated widely
widely on the Continent as it did in the colonies where it was reprinted or published in Philadelphia, New York, Boston and Charleston. It was widely recognized to be, and frequently referred to as, 'the most famous British tract on the war with America.' Although it concluded with a plea for the cessation of hostilities by Great Britain and reconciliation, its analyses, arguments and conclusions, along with its admiration for the colonists and their moral position and qualities, could hardly fail to contribute to their reluctant recognition that there was no real alternative to independence.

Observations raised an extensive and vigorous pamphlet controversy in England, most, although not all of the pamphlets coming from those who opposed Price. Many of the writers were employed by the government. Finding some of his views not only vilified but misunderstood, Price wrote Additional observations on the nature and value of civil liberty, and the war with America.... (referred to hereinafter as Additional observations) which appeared early in 1777. He expanded his analysis of liberty, extended its application to the war with America, and greatly expanded his discussion of the economic impact upon Great Britain. It had three editions in London in 1777 and was reprinted in Dublin in 1777 and Philadelphia in 1778.

In 1778 Price wrote a new, extensive, introduction and published Observations and Additional observations together under the title of Two tracts on civil liberty, the war with America, and the finances of the kingdom.... (referred to hereinafter as Two tracts) It had two editions in London in 1778. The second edition of the General Introduction was issued separately and contained a supplement on finance and economics. It was reprinted in Dublin and Philadelphia in the same year. The introduction is notable, among other things, for its response to the criticism of Edmund Burke, a prelude to the manifestations of their deep differences several years later over the French Revolution.

His third pamphlet was entitled Observations on the importance of the American revolution and the means of making it a benefit to the world.... (referred to hereinafter as Benefit) He offered advice to the United States on financial policy, on maintaining peace by increasing the powers of congress, argued for liberty of thought and discussion, warned of the dangers of debts, internal wars, too great inequalities of property, foreign trade, and oaths; and strongly criticized Negro trade and slavery.

This work was first printed in London in 1784, Price's aim being to provide a copy-text for an American edition which appeared in Boston in 1784. At first Price had no intention of publishing the pamphlet in London but fears of a pirated edition,
fears that were realized in the Dublin edition of 1785, led him to publish an edition in London in that year. Further American editions appeared in Philadelphia, New Haven and Trenton in 1785, in Charleston in 1786, in Amherst, New Hampshire, in 1805, and in Boston in 1812, 1818 and 1820. A French translation was included in Mirabeau's Considerations sur l'ordre de Cincinnatus which was published in London in 1784 and in 1788, and a Dutch translation appeared in Amsterdam in 1785. (2)

III

Within the field of philosophy, taken in a fairly narrow sense, Price is known primarily for his book on moral philosophy, A review of the principal questions in morals....It was written during a period of extensive study and deep reflection and published when Price was a relatively young man. Subsequent editions show that his ethical views changed very little throughout his life. And although one might argue that his religious views were most fundamental and basic to him throughout his life, I believe his ethical views were equally fundamental. Certainly his views in other fields were founded upon his ethical views, wherever they have relevance.

This issue, as Hume might point out, looks very much like an argument over degrees of quality and is, therefore, unlikely to come to any precise conclusion. Without attempting to argue to a precise conclusion on that point I am quite prepared to argue that his views in political philosophy are, to a very considerable extent, founded upon his views in moral philosophy. That is, in fact, the main theme of the introductory essay and provides the basis for the title of the volume, Richard Price and the ethical foundations of the American Revolution.

The introductory essay opens with an outline of the main points in Price's ethical theory. It then proceeds through an examination of each of the pamphlets, analyzing and interpreting them in terms of the concepts and principles that are central to his ethics. Briefly, the role of reason is fundamental to Price's ethics and its functions carry over into his political philosophy. The concepts of freedom and rightness are fundamental to his ethics and these also carry over into his political philosophy. For example, in political philosophy, as in moral philosophy, according to Price, intuitive reason discerns basic principles and deductive reason derives more specific conclusions. I maintain, further, that Price's use of reason does not rule out sensory experience, induction, emotion or conation, supporting this interpretation with his doctrine that reason, as he understands it, is sufficient for motivation and that the knowledge gained through these broad uses of reason is normative.
normative. I argue, in further interpretation, that Price's basic principles in ethics are defeasibly necessary and that their denial constitutes a pragmatic contradiction. And I show how this interpretation fits his political philosophy as expressed in the pamphlets.

I find that a justifiable interpretation of Observations is that, according to Price, political questions are to be decided in terms of ethical considerations, that ethical obligations determine political obligations and that prudence has ethical significance. In these terms I find that Price judges the war against America to be dishonorable from the moral point of view.

I find this interpretation supported by an analysis of the roles played by liberty and rightness in Additional observations. Besides expanding and clarifying his views presented in Observations Price condemns the offensive nature of the war against the colonies from the moral point of view; and, according to my further interpretation, he uses these grounds to point out that the inconsistency of Great Britain's actions make it impossible to generalize the principle of their actions. I also maintain that the imperatives with which Price closes Additional observations and the advice and exhorations of Benefit can be justifiably interpreted as an extension of the functions of reason and the application of the concepts of freedom and rightness from moral philosophy to political philosophy. I conclude this section of the introductory essay by recognizing that although the context has changed between the first two and the third pamphlets, the senses in which Price's moral philosophy provides the foundation for his political philosophy cut across the differences. In the final analysis there are, I find, nine closely related, but distinguishable, ways in which this founding relationship holds.

In the final two sections of the essay I argue that Price's imperatives are essentially a culminating phase of his extension of his moral philosophy to his political philosophy and, in particular, to the American Revolution. This, in turn, provides the basis on which I find that I can interpret Price's views and those of Thomas Jefferson and other founding fathers in such a way that they are compatible and basically humanistic. As exemplified and epitomized in the opening passages of the Declaration of Independence I suggest that they show their common background in the political philosophy of John Locke.
IV

This approach to the pamphlets provided the basis for certain editorial decisions; in particular, when questions about inclusion and exclusion of materials became relevant. This was a problem of considerable importance in selecting materials for the appendices. Combined with the aim of presenting selections from several of the people Price mentions or responds to explicitly, the ethical-political approach provided the basis for selections from Burke, Lind, Wesley, Ferguson and Markham. The selections from Price's Fast-day sermon provide passages which show the ethical foundations of his political views more explicitly than the pamphlets and probably more explicitly than any of his writing except, possibly, the later sermon, A discourse on the love of our country. The selection of correspondence was determined more by historical circumstances. But even when not explicit Price's ethical concern is never far below the surface.

The most significant result of the general orientation in terms of the ethical foundations of the Revolution shows up in the deletions. The Supplement to the General Introduction, Sections I and III of Part II and all of Part III of Additional observations deal quite specifically with financial matters. And although Price was deeply concerned to warn of the devastating economic impact of the war, these parts have been omitted as not directly in line with the ethical-political theme. Consequently the volume is incomplete from the standpoint of many details of Price's views on economics and finance.

V

Choice of copy-texts was partly a matter of convenience, partly arbitrary, partly luck. The second edition of the General Introduction was more complete than the first, and that seemed sufficient reason to choose it. Nor was there any particular difficulty in the case of Benefit. The textual differences between editions were minimal, but the English translation of Turgot's letter to Price was much better in the 1785 London edition. Even the choice of copy-texts for Observations and Additional observations did not present an initial difficulty. There is virtually conclusive evidence that Price himself revised the successive editions, so his own choice of editions to be combined in Two tracts seemed quite unexceptionable. But, of course, there was not only one edition of Two tracts. The first edition contains a new General Introduction

There are, then, enough variations in the versions of Two tracts to make the choice of copy-text the occasion for at least a short pause. When I turned to W. W. Greg's article 'The Rationale of Copy-Text' (3) I found some help in his general principle: '...the historical circumstances of the English language make it necessary to adopt in formal matters the guidance of some early text. If the several extant texts of a work form an ancestral series, the earliest will naturally be selected, and since this will not only come nearest to the author's original in accidentals (spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and the like), but also (revision apart) most faithfully preserve the correct readings when substantive variants are in question, everything is straightforward, and the more conservative treatment of the copy-text is justified. But whenever there is more than one substantive text of comparable authority, then although it will still be necessary to choose one of them as copy-text, and to follow it in accidentals, this copy-text can be allowed no over-riding or even preponderant authority so far as substantive readings are concerned. The choice between these, in cases of variation, will be determined partly by the opinion the editor may form respecting the nature of the copy from which each substantive edition was printed, which is a matter of external authority; partly by the intrinsic authority of the several texts as judged by the relative frequency of manifest errors therein; and partly by the editor's judgement of the intrinsic claims of individual readings to originality...° (4)

In subsidiary matters Greg proposes that the editor correct scribal or typographical errors, as well as those specified in an errata list. He would also have the editor correct misleading or eccentric spellings if not due to the author, and similarly for erroneous or defective punctuation. In the latter case, however, he holds that the editor should record the alteration whenever the sense is "appreciably affected". He should also, according to Greg, be free to modify capitalization and italics. Attention to graphic peculiarities belongs in an appendix, however, not in the text or in the 'general apparatus'. Greg's general point is to uphold the liberty of judgement of the editor.

When
When he comes to consider difficult cases, however, it seems to me that Greg rejects the principle of the liberty of judgement of the editor. At least I found that my judgement led me to follow a course that he finds unacceptable. Greg regards a policy that he attributes to Ronald B. McKerrow, the eminent authority on bibliography, as 'too sweeping and mechanical', 'namely, that an editor should take the original edition as his copy-text and introduce into it all the substantive variants of the revised reprint, other than manifest errors' (5) Yet this seems to me what should be done generally, and in particular with the various editions of Price's pamphlets. I would add the proviso, however, that it is not necessary to take the original edition as copy-text, but only to take account of modifications in such a way that all the variations of all the editions are noted.

In practice this inclusive policy may not be incompatible with some further guidelines set out by Greg. He suggests that the editor should ask himself two questions: (i) Is the original reading one that can reasonably be attributed to the author? (ii) Is the later reading one that the author can reasonably be supposed to have substituted for the former? In application, if the answer to (i) is negative then, Greg suggests, the later reading should be accepted as at least possibly an authoritative correction. If the answer to (i) is affirmative and the answer to (ii) is negative, then, he suggests, the original reading should be retained. Finally, he says, 'If the answers to both questions are affirmative, then the later reading should be presumed to be due to revision and admitted into the text, whether the editor himself considers it an improvement or not.' (6) Greg does not consider the cases where the answers to both are negative or where one or the other is not known or where neither is known. So his guidelines are both a bit more difficult and a bit more useful than his own specification of three cases would indicate.

My application of them to Price's pamphlets, then, required some modifications. Here are some examples. In the second edition of the General Introduction Price wrote, referring to people in a state where civil governors are accountable only to God, 'They are placed by their maker in the situation of cattle on an estate which the owner may dispose of as he pleases. Civil governors are a body of masters, constituted by such inherent rights and their power is a commission from Heaven, unbounded in extent, and never to be resisted.' In the first edition he had written, 'They are placed by their Maker in the situation of cattle on an estate which the owner has the right to dispose of as he pleases. Civil governors are a body of masters, constituted by such inherent rights and their power is a commission from Heaven held by divine right, unbounded in its extent.' In Greg's language these are substantive (not accidental) changes. They indicate
indicate different interpretations of a doctrine in which Price weakens the ascription of a certain right to the governor, withdraws the ascription of divine right and specifies non-resistance. There is no question that Price wrote the original passage and virtually none that he made the revision. According to Greg, then, 'the later reading should be presumed to be due to revision and admitted into the text whether the editor himself considers it an improvement or not.' (7) Surely it is the responsibility of an editor to let his reader know that Price had made such a change. So it seems to me that both passages and their order should be made explicit.

Greg continues, referring to the proposal in the passage just quoted, 'It will be observed that one implication of this procedure is that a later variant that is either completely indifferent or manifestly inferior, or for the substitution of which no motive can be suggested, should be treated as fortuitous and refused admission to the text - to the scandal of faithful followers of McKerrow.' The complications mentioned previously as not specified by Greg show up when this procedure is applied to a passage near the beginning of Section IV of Observations. In the eighth edition that constitutes the first tract in the first edition of Two tracts he wrote, referring to the Corsicans, "The Genoese, finding it difficult to keep them in subjection ceded them to the French." In all editions numbered from the first through the ninth, including those identified as the eighth but not used in the first edition of Two tracts, this passage reads, "The Corsicans had been subject to the Genoese but, finding it difficult to keep them in subjection, they ceded them to the French." The passage reads this way also in the eleventh edition. (Although there is an edition identified as the eleventh there is apparently none identified as the tenth; and although there is one identified as the thirteenth there is apparently none identified as the twelfth. Extensive searches by T. R. Adams and by P. A. L. Jones and D. O. Thomas add confirmation to these conclusions reached after my own extensive search.) In the thirteenth edition it reads, "The Corsicans had been subject to Genoa but that republic finding it difficult to keep them in subjection, ceded them to the French."

What is the editor to do with these three versions? First, probably, he should decide whether the modifications are substantive or accidental. It seems pretty clear that they are accidental. Greg proposes, as I understand him, in addition to the general principle quoted at the beginning of the preceding paragraph, that the copy-text should be followed, generally, in the matter of accidentals and that, therefore, in this case the reading of the eighth edition of Observations, as incorporated into Two tracts, should be followed. But what about the reading of the other editions? While any one of them expresses Price's meaning
meaning as well as another; that is, while there are no substantive differences between the alternative readings, no "best text", it seems to me, again, that it is the responsibility of an editor to reveal that Price had difficulty in style of expression, even as the rest of us, and that he fussed with sentences, others as well as this one, in an attempt to make them clear and precise and yet fluid. So it does not seem proper for the editor to ignore the alternative readings.

This case, and many others, seem to call for a procedure somewhere between Greg and McKerrow. So I have here, and in general, elsewhere throughout the volume, presented the text of *Observations* (and Additional observations) as it appears in Two tracts, but I have given all the variations from all the editions, whether they are substantives or accidentals. That is, I have used the second edition of the General Introduction, the first edition of Two tracts combining that eighth edition of *Observations* and the re-issued first edition of Additional observations, and the 1785 edition of Benefit, as basic texts in a modernized format. I have used the first editions of the General Introduction and Benefit as controls, and have included variations from the other editions of *Observations* and Additional observations in footnotes or other annotations.

This modification of Greg and McKerrow meant that once the decision had been made about copy-texts the main job was to be as complete as possible in comparing variants. This was not a major problem with the General Introduction or Additional observations because the financial sections which contained the most extensive modification were to be omitted from the volume. Nor was it difficult with Benefit, although there was a problem because some of Price's comments suggested that there might be a third edition, or at least a third version of the book separate from the two published editions. Information noted above from P. A. L. Jones and D. O. Thomas has clarified this point. The case was very different with *Observations*, and there were some interesting problems about the sequence of publication of Two tracts.

T. R. Adams in his survey of pamphlets on the American Revolution (American independence, the growth of an idea) lists, exclusive of translations, twenty-four separate editions or re-printings of *Observations*. I have examined all of the copies in the British Museum and in the Library of Congress (with the help of Jon Erik Larson, who assisted in research for the volume) and in several other libraries in the eastern United States, a total of something more than thirty-five books. I believe that I have examined a copy of every item in Adam's bibliography and have incorporated these results in the new edition. If there has been any tyranny, it has not been a 'tyranny of the copy-text' but a tyranny of the demand for completeness.
completeness of comparison. That, I believe I have accomplished, although in the nature of the case it is difficult to be sure.

As the volume is organized and annotated, then, the reader who is concerned to follow a continuous presentation of a significant political philosophy can proceed to read the text, ignoring the annotations and footnotes. Those who are interested in historical details that are relevant to the political philosophy will find annotations that provide information about various events, such as the passage of bills by Parliament, and the like. Those who are interested in the modifications of Price's views or in his manner of expressing them, will find them documented in footnotes. And this has been done, I believe, as completely as possible within the reasonable limits allowed by having but one life to live. Nevertheless, because of the complexities and extent of the details that must be covered, the volume, when it appears, may require additions or corrections. Needless to say, I will be happy to receive any such information.

In the word-by-word and line-by-line comparisons of the texts, carried out with the aim of completeness I have just been discussing, a number of interesting points emerged. In the next, and last section I will describe some of them.

VI

One of the points I found most interesting is Price's response to his critics. In the Preface to the fifth edition of Observations he says he loves quiet too much to engage in controversy. But it seems he could not avoid it. At the close of the Introduction to Additional observations he apologizes for speaking of, and for, himself in answering his critics, particularly John Lind. He says he will leave the field open to anyone who may take notice of him, indicating that he will not answer any further charges and ends by saying "I withdraw from politics". Yet, again, when he combined Observations and Additional observations into Two tracts he wrote a new General Introduction in which he responds to two additional critics, Edmund Burke and William Markham, Archbishop of York; and definitely returns to politics, if, indeed, he had ever withdrawn. One of the reasons he did not stay completely clear of controversy was undoubtedly personal. He simply could not fail to take account of responsible criticism from such eminent people. Price expresses regrets for his failure in Additional observations to dispel Burke's, and others', misapprehension that he maintained opinions subversive to all civil authority. Finding that this charge had been 'given the public from a writer of the first character it is impossible that I should not be impressed by it,
and I find myself under notice of taking further notice of it'.

Another reason was certainly philosophical. For example, he speaks of 'two accounts' of civil government, basically the contract theory in the tradition of John Locke, and the divine right theory. Price reiterates his strong support of the former but his treatment shows that for him this is not only a political issue, or even an issue solely in political philosophy. It is, in its most fundamental nature, an issue that involves his epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. These foundations are epitomized in Price's doctrines, in the Review, that rightness (an ethical characteristic) is really present in the nature of things (thus constituting a metaphysical characteristic); that rightness is known directly by intuitive reason and the implications of this knowledge reached by deductive reason. These basic principles receive their social and political application in a variety of ways throughout Observations and Additional observations, but nowhere more evidently than in Price's account of legitimate government.

If we limit attention briefly to just one strand in that account, it may be interpreted as beginning in his perceptive analysis of the concept of liberty. He defines moral liberty as the power of following our knowledge of right and wrong. He extends this definition to civil liberty by defining it as the power of a civil society to govern itself by its own discretion or by laws of its own making. He expands this analysis in Additional observations by introducing the concept of freedom. A citizen is free, according to Price, when the power of commanding his own conduct and the possession of life, person, property, and good name are secured to him by his being his own legislator in the sense he has explained, namely, that every independent agent in a free state ought to have a share in the government of it either personally or through representation. It follows for Price that a government is free when constituted so as to provide this security. He concludes that the freedom of a community or nation is the same among communities or nations that freedom of a citizen is among fellow-citizens. He maintains, in Additional observations, partly in answer to criticisms and partly by way of explanation and expansion, that his is the true account (that is, theory) of what government ought to be regardless of how people or governments in fact behave.

These epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical doctrines, and their social and political applications, provide the basis for his reply to Burke in the General Introduction and to Ferguson in Additional observations, in marked contrast to their criticisms based on appeals to historical fact and constitutional statutes. If that reply is stated in a way that makes his theoretical and philosophical foundations more explicit, it would take some such form as the following: My account (theory), reached by the operations of intuitive and deductive reason, is one that asserts descriptively and normatively true metaphysical statements about

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the real property of rightness and the essence of freedom as they obtain in the nature of things. A basic proposition in it is, 'that legitimate government, as opposed to oppression and tyranny, consists in the dominion of equal laws made with common consent, or of men over themselves, and not in the dominion of communities over communities, or of any men over other men'. (See General Introduction, and Introduction and Part I, Section II, of Additional observations.)

His political reasons for engaging in controversy as he did, are, perhaps, obvious enough in these replies to Burke and Ferguson. They are more or less evident, however, throughout Additional observations when he underscores, reaffirms, explains or expands the doctrines of Observations. For example, when he draws the conclusions that civil governors are only public servants with delegated and, therefore, limited, power; that civil liberty is the basis of the dignity of man in civil society, that it alone gives security against oppression, and the like.

His response to Markham enables him to expand on his political, and religious, views about the need for, and rightness of, the separation of church and state. And, finally, coming back to a personal note, his dropping of the controversy with Lind from the Introduction seems to me to be an appropriate recognition that Lind's arguments and the personal abuse that dominated them, did not warrant his attention.

Another point of some interest is his treatment of the 'Resolution of a Committee of Congress'. The resolution was not present in any of the thirteen editions of Observations published in 1776. It was inserted as an additional page without heading in the eighth edition of Observations that was published as the first tract in the first edition of Two Tracts. He apparently considered it of special significance, however, since he also included it, with only slightly different comments, as a headed section in Additional observations, as the second tract in the first edition of Two tracts. Here, if anywhere, I may be subject to the 'tyranny of the copy-text'. It has seemed to me appropriate to provide the text as Price presented it. This, I believe, is a way both to record and to express the degree of importance with which Price apparently regarded it.

In view of the many editions of Observations it was not surprising, of course, to encounter problems about order and sequence. One such problem, for example, has already appeared implicitly. If we consider Price's sentence about the Corsicans and the Genoese, and its variants, it would seem that he made changes in an eighth edition after changes in the eleventh and thirteenth, or that he had changed from one expression to a more felicitous one and back again to a less felicitous expression. This problem appears if we assume, as is natural, that the numbered editions form a series in which the temporal order matches the numerical order. In preparing the new edition and in writing a note about
about the various editions I had in fact assumed this, although I had also made clear that there were modifications in the eighth edition of Observations as the first tract of Two tracts that must have been made later than any of the 1776 editions numbered from one through thirteen. The assumption that Price's publishers numbered the editions of Observations in one straightforward temporal series has been questioned by P. A. L. Jones and D. O. Thomas, but, unfortunately, I did not learn of their contention in time to take account of it in the new edition of the pamphlets. They argue that there is strong evidence that Price's publishers numbered the pamphlets not in one but in two series. They hold that the more expensive Cadell editions which sold for two shillings do constitute such a direct temporal and numerical series from the first through the eighth, but that this is not true of all the editions considered as a whole. In a letter containing information from their forthcoming bibliography of Price's works, Thomas writes, 'When the cheap editions appeared the first was called the sixth (this in itself was unexceptionable because five of the two shillings had already appeared), but the fact that the first numbered cheap edition was termed the sixth did not deter Cadell from numbering the next two shilling edition the sixth. Publishers in Dublin and Edinburgh however, did take the cheap editions into account when they numbered their reprints '8th edition'. After this when Cadell and Dilly numbered the next cheap edition they called it the ninth, but the next two shilling edition they styled the seventh. What this shows is that the various editions do not fall into one simple, straightforward series, and that we cannot assume that a higher numbered edition was published later than a lower numbered edition. And if this line of argument is correct it is quite easy to see how the thirteenth in the cheap series could have appeared before the eighth edition in the two shilling series.' Thomas adds that Jones and he 'are inclined to think that the eighth in this format did not appear before 1778 and that it came out considerably later than the thirteenth (cheap) edition'. Part of the extensive evidence in support of this view is the failure of all searches and surveys, mine, theirs, and T. R. Adams's, to locate any eighth edition published by Cadell alone, that is, any eighth edition in the two shilling series, other than the one incorporated into Two tracts.  

This well supported theory of the two series of course resolves quite readily the apparent anachronism of the Genoese-Corsican passage and others, although my awareness of it came too late to take account of it in the new edition. That is, although all the modifications are noted and the posteriority of modifications in the eighth edition of Observations in Two tracts is made apparent, the distinction between the two series is not made explicit.

There is also some difficulty in identifying the sequence of the editions or variants of Two tracts because of the possible different
different combinations of the editions or variants of its parts. A full bibliographical study would be needed to establish the chronological order exactly and in detail. That is not appropriate to this general description of the new edition of Price's pamphlets on America. But there are, however, some general textual contents which provide a rough ordering. I have already discussed the way Price responded to his critics. In the case of Additional observations, then, and Two tracts, we can divide earlier from later versions by the presence or absence of eight paragraphs in the Introduction where Price took notice of writers for or against him. This divides Additional observations into two chronological groups that accord with their identifications by edition. That is, an edition quite clearly identifiable as the first, although not specified on the title page, and another, identified as the second on the title page, both contain the eight paragraphs. The edition identified as the third on the title page does not.

There are of course finer distinctions of chronological order to make. Without going into bibliographical details one of them shows up in variants of the third edition. In the first edition of Additional observations Price had mentioned M. Turgot, Comptroller General of Finances in France, 1774-1776. In the course of praising Turgot's financial ministry and regretting his dismissal, Price suggested that perhaps a partial cause of his dismissal was "want of address". Turgot wrote to Price, the letter dated March 22, 1778, giving him the truth of the matter and they continued their correspondence and friendship until Turgot's death. Price removed the passage about want of address after receiving the letter. This was late enough, however, that the first three editions of Additional observations and the first edition of Two tracts all contain the passage. In fact there is even an edition of Two tracts identified as the second that contains it. Its absence, then, might well identify the latest edition or variant of Two tracts. So, in addition to the intrinsic interest of Price's attitudes and practices with regard to controversy and his relationship with Turgot, his manner of dealing with these topics in the text provides significant information about the chronology of publication.

As indicated, the exact details of the sequence and dating in terms of a close study of advertisements, signatures, states, and other bibliographical data provide the materials for a separate study—perhaps by someone more skilled in bibliographical techniques. In the meantime these points of interest provide internal evidence that helps identify early and later versions as well as some in between. One problem that will complicate the detailed study is that identifying dates and sequences of the individual pamphlets will not, in itself, identify the dates or sequence in which they were combined and published as Two tracts.
Other points of a more minor and more obvious kind also emerged from the comparison and annotation of texts. For example, Price takes account of historical events when they are relevant. Thus in Two tracts he adds a footnote to the passage in Observations where he suggests that the colonists regard Independence as a calamity, reminding his reader that the passage was written before the Declaration of Independence; he mentions the ignominy of a British army in effect being imprisoned in Boston, and takes note of the power and extent of American privateers. He modifies his figures in the light of more accurate information, for example, he changes his estimate of the numbers of troops capable of being sent to America from 30,000 to 40,000. He withdraws passages that he may have thought, in the meantime, were in one way or another inappropriate. Thus, besides the passage about Turgot already discussed, he drops a reference to 'one of the most violent enemies of the colonies' who had called the colonists 'All Mr. Locke's disciples'. And there are other modifications of this same general nature sprinkled throughout the texts.

I might also mention, towards closing, a point that does not emerge from a comparison of these texts among themselves but is a point of philosophical interest in relation to his Review. Those who are familiar with Price primarily from an acquaintance with his moral philosophy in the Review will be somewhat surprised, I believe, to find how frequently, mostly in Additional observations, he quotes, with approval, or in support of his own views, Hutcheson and Hume. Despite his deep and fundamental differences from them in his epistemology, moral epistemology, and metaethics, he finds a considerable amount of agreement with their social and political philosophies. These details, and their historical and philosophical significance, however, are topics for another time.

This new edition of Price's political pamphlets will appear, I have strong reason to hope and expect, towards the end of 1978 or early in 1979. I hope also, although perhaps with less reason, that this preliminary description will lead to a lively anticipation of its appearance on the part of everyone interested in Price, including particularly the readers of the Price-Priestley Newsletter.
2. At this point I am indebted to P. A. L. Jones and D. 0. Thomas for information supplied from their forthcoming bibliography of Price's works.
4. Ibid. 29.
5. Ibid. 31.
6. Ibid. 32.
7. Ibid.

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RICE PRICE'S WILL

D. O. THOMAS

The will of Rice Price, which is reproduced here by the kind permission of its present custodian, The Librarian of the National Library of Wales, is valuable to those interested in the family background of Richard Price, Rice Price's son, because it enables us to expand and in some details correct the material presented in the biographies by William Morgan, Caroline Williams, Roland Thomas and Carl B. Cone and in the genealogies by Sir William Elderton. (1) It also helps us to clear up some points that have remained confused and perplexing, and it throws light upon those tensions in the family that had a marked influence upon Richard Price's intellectual and emotional development.

Rice Price was twice married: His first wife was Mary Gibbon (or Gybbon); and his second, Catherine, daughter of Dr. Richards, a physician at Oldcastle, Bridgend. There were seven children of these marriages, four of the first and three of the second, but although Price's biographers are agreed who the latter were, there has been some uncertainty and difference of opinion concerning the identities of the former. William Morgan acknowledges that there were seven children of both marriages, and that there were two sons by the first wife, but maintains that almost the whole of the fortune being left to one son and the rest of the family abandoned 'in great measure to provide for themselves', the eldest 'who practised physick at Newport in Monmouthshire, survived the disappointment but a short time'. (2) William Morgan's phrase is ambiguous: did he mean that the eldest son only lived a short while after the event which disappointed him, namely the reading of the will, or did he mean that the eldest son remained in a state of disappointment for nearly the whole of the remainder of his perhaps long life. If Morgan intended the former, which is perhaps the best reading, there is evidence that he was in error. Caroline Williams seems to have thought that there were only two children by the first marriage - both of whom were grown up by the time Rice married for the second time - and that they were John, who married Catherine Williams, and Mary, who married Walter Coffin of Selworthy, near Porlock in Somerset. (3) Roland Thomas lists the four children of the first marriage as: 'an eldest son whose name is uncertain, John, Samuel, and Mary'. (4)
The will, always supposing that Rice Price mentions all his children and was never so disenchanted with any of them that he refused even to name them in his last testament, establishes that the children of the first marriage were John, Samuel, Mary, and Ann, and confirms that the children of the second were Richard, Sarah, and Elizabeth. John, later known as John Price of Park, died in 1777 at the age of seventy six. (5) Samuel, about whom little is known other than what the will tells us, was his father's executor. Mary, as I have noted, married Walter Coffin, and Ann married a Mr. Phillips during her father's lifetime and her name appears in a codicil to the will. Sarah married William Morgan, a surgeon and an apothecary at Bridgend, and had eight children, including William Morgan, the celebrated actuary and biographer of Richard Price, and George Cadogan Morgan. Elizabeth married a Mr. Flew. (6)

The will also allows us to correct the rather bald and misleading account that Morgan gives of Rice Price's bequests. Several members of the family may well have been aggrieved that so much of the property, by no means inconsiderable, should have been left to Samuel; they may well have thought that the treatment of Catherine, Rice Price's second wife, was harsh and cruel, and that the provision for her children was inadequate, but it is not true, as Morgan affirms, that almost the whole of the property was left to one son. In ensuring that his two daughters by the first marriage, Mary and Ann, received five hundred pounds each, Rice Price was careful to respect the wishes of their grandmother and aunt. He left his eldest son John a lease, including a house, of property adjoining property that John had already acquired at Peterstone Wentlooge, near Newport in Monmouthshire. He also made some provision for the children of his second marriage. To Richard he left two houses at Bridgend, and not four hundred pounds which Richard is frequently said to have divided among his sisters. (7) In addition fifty pounds was to be laid aside for the completion of his education in the event of his not being settled in life before his father died. To the daughters of the second marriage, Sarah and Elizabeth, Rice Price left two hundred pounds each, to be paid when they came of age, and until that time they were to be placed under the guardianship and care of their step-brother Samuel, subject to a condition the significance of which I shall discuss below. In addition to these bequests within the family Rice Price made provision for the two Meeting Houses which the Price family had endowed: one at Newcastle, Bridgend and the other at City, Bettws. This included two hundred pounds and the rents from properties which the Price family owned in Bridgend. The bulk of the property including Tyn-ton, it is true went to the second son, Samuel, but the list of bequests to the other members of the family softens the severity of Morgan's claim that almost the whole was left to one and that the others were abandoned in great measure to provide for themselves.

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The will also indicates that on a further point William Morgan may have been too harsh in his judgment of Rice Price. In Memoirs he writes:

'Mr. Price...intended Richard, his youngest son, for trade; nor is it certain that he would have been divertied from this intention, had he lived long enough to carry it into execution.' (8)

But the will seems to suggest that Rice Price was not quite so autocratic, and that Richard would have enjoyed greater freedom in his choice of career than Morgan implies that he would, even had his father lived longer. The money set aside for the completion of his education was to 'settle him in a way of business trade or profession which his inclination shall lead him to.

There is no doubt that William Morgan was extremely hostile to the memory of Rice Price, whose opinions he thought were 'narrow, selfish and morose', and it is very likely that this hostility was caused by Rice Price's treatment of Catherine, in particular by the way in which the will left her and her children in considerable difficulties. Moreover the fact that Catherine did not outlive her husband (who was 23 if not 24 years older than she was) by a year invites the suggestion that her death was hastened by the heartbreak and the hardships that her husband's treatment imposed upon her. The memory of this rankled in the minds of her descendants for more than one generation, and the offensiveness of Rice Price's treatment of Catherine was heightened because it contrasted so starkly with his concern to maintain a religious discipline in the household, with his repeated professions of piety, with his vocation as a minister of religion, and with his devotion to maintaining the Meeting Places at Bettws and at Bridgend. His family could be forgiven for thinking that religious zeal had hardened his heart, and even if we should now discount as myth the story of the maid of Cefn Ydfa (9) in which Rice Price appears as a cruel guardian, there is evidence in the will that he was lacking in compassion and human feeling.

To his 'beloved wife' Rice Price bequeathed 'the use of one feather bed and bed cloaths' and all the goods she brought with her at the time of her marriage for the rest of her life, and in addition she was to receive meat, drink, washing and lodging 'as usual' for one year under the care of her step-son at Tyn-ton. Unless there is some undetected significance in the phrase 'as usual' such a bequest, it might be supposed, is hardly consistent with a profession of decent regard let alone of Christian charity. Neither does it argue that Rice and Catherine enjoyed a full measure of the felicities of married life. In the event, the prospect of staying on at Tyn-ton did not prove congenial and on Rice Price's death, Catherine and her two daughters moved to Bridgend.
Did Rice Price regret his second marriage? That he should have desired that his body should be buried with the remains of his first wife would hardly have been taken by Catherine as a compliment to her. Moreover there is evidence in the will to suggest that Rice Price disapproved of the way of life his daughters might have come to share if they were brought up near their mother's home at Bridgend. The provision he made for both his daughters was conditional upon their accepting the guidance of their guardians and upon their not being brought up at Bridgend. The reason Rice Price gives for this condition is his desire that they should have a pious education in a religious family, and it is difficult not to believe that this was a severe reflection upon the Richards family and upon Catherine. She was not to be trusted with the upbringing of her own children. It is not improbable that there was a considerable gulf between the life at Tyn-ton, with its strict, rather austere discipline, and the life at the Richards's home at Bridgend, and it is not unlikely that at Tyn-ton Catherine pined for the more congenial environment of her father's home. We do not have sufficient evidence to determine whether Rice and Catherine were happy in their marriage but there is little indication in Rice's will that they were.

What influence did life at Tyn-ton have upon Richard Price's intellectual and emotional development? As I have noted there is a tradition that the discipline there was strict and austere; there is also a tradition that Rice Price was a high Calvinist and that Richard reacted strongly against his father's religious convictions. As he grew older he came to lay increasing emphasis not upon the purity of doctrine but upon the cultivation of the virtues, especially upon sincerity and diligence. In The honest mind I have argued that throughout his life Richard Price retained many of the attitudes of the puritan: (10) pre-eminently the conviction that every man ought to devote the whole of his energy, his time, and his opportunities to the service of God, that to discharge the duties of our vocation we need to be pious, benevolent, charitable, industrious, frugal, sober, and diligent, that the rewards of eternal life are reserved to those who are acceptable to God. At the same time he came to insist more and more strongly that redemption depends much more upon cultivating and exercising the virtues than upon entertaining correct articles of faith. What produced this change; what reasons governed the new orientation? No doubt they were complex but it is tempting to think that the contrast between his father's no doubt sincere desire to inculcate a pious discipline in the life at Tyn-ton and his harsh unfeeling treatment of Catherine led Richard Price to turn away from his father's pre-occupation with doctrine and 'the duties of devotion', and insist upon the importance of cultivating the virtues, especially those of benevolence and charity which had they been more manifest in his father's dispositions towards his mother and in his care for her would have redeemed the closing months of her life from desolation and despair.

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THE TEXT OF THE WILL

In the name of God Amen I Rice Price (11) of Ty'ronton in the parish of Llangeinor in the County of Glamorgan Gentleman being of good and perfect health and of sound and perfect memory (thanks be to God) Considering the frailty of this life the Certainty of Death and the uncertainty of the time of Death DOE therefore hereby make and ordain this my last will and testament in manner and form following that is to say first and principally I commend my soul to the mercy of Allmighty God hoping to be saved by the merits of Christ's alone and my body to the grave to be buried in the grave of my beloved wife Mary Price (02) in the chancel of Bettus and as to my worldly estate goods and effects I give devise bequeath and dispose of as follows

First I give and bequeath unto David Thomas minister of the Gospel at Neath Thomas Leyshon schoolmaster formerly of Watertown and Thomas Howell of Nantmouth in the parish of Bettus and all the County of Glamorgan two hundred and eighty pounds which said sum together with the two hundred and twenty pounds I paid my eldest daughter Mary Coffin (13) the wife of Walter Coffin towards the discharge of the legacies given her by her grandmother Anne Gybbon and her aunt Mary Gybbon as fully appears by her receipt makes the sum of five hundred pounds upon this trust and confidence and to the intent and purpose that my said daughter Mary Coffin may receive the product and interest thereof during the term of her natural life, and after her Death the said principal interest to be to the use and behalf of the heirs of the body lawfully begotten forever PROVIDED my said Daughter and her husband Walter Coffin or his Executors do release and discharge my Executor hereafter named forever and also I give and bequeath unto my daughter Ann Price (14) four hundred and fifty pounds to the fifty pounds due by bond to her from her brother John Price (15) with their lawful interest from the day of my death Provided my daughter and her husband if married Do release my said Executor hereafter named from the legacies given her also by her Grandmother Anne Gibbon and her aunt Mary Gibbon and from all other legacies dues and Demands whatsoever willing and Desiring her to marry with the advise Consent and approbation of my trusty friends before named and also I give and bequeath unto my eldest son John Price one chattel lease upon a parcel of lands at Peterstone adjoining to his lands there together with all its appurtenances in as large and ample a Manner as mentioned in the said Lease under the rents and Covenants therein mentioned for and during the term unexpired in the said lease, with all my household goods that shall be at the house at Peterstone at the time of my death

and
and also, I give devise and bequeath unto my son Richard Price two houses I purchased from William Robert at Bridgend in the parish of Coyty in the aforesaid County to have and to hold these houses to him and his heirs forever, and also I give and bequeath unto him the sum of fifty pounds of good and lawful money towards his education, and to settle him in a way of business trade or profession which his inclination shall lead him too and my will and meaning is that the said fifty pounds is to be laid out according to the Discretion of my trustees before named Provided my said son be not educated and settled as aforesaid before my Death then and in such case the said fifty pounds to be proper Money of my Executor hereafter named and also, I give and bequeath unto my Daughters, Sarah (16) and Elizabeth (17) Price, and every other child that shall be begotten by me on the body of my present wife Cate Price the sum of two hundred pounds to be paid to every one of them when they arrive at the age of one and twenty years except Richard Price the eldest who is before provided for, and it is my will that my Executors hereinafter named maintain them with sufficient meat drink washing and lodging and all other necessaries until they arrive at the age of one and twenty Provided they are contented to live with him or where he and my trustees hereafter named shall think most proper to place them. Provided it be not in that town commonly called Old and New Castle and Bridgend lying and being in the parish of Coyty and in the parish of Newcastle for the promotion of their Spiritual as well as temporal welfare, Desiring above all things they may have pious education in a religious family (18)

and also I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife Cate Price (19) the use of one feather bed and bed cloaths and of all the other goods she brought here at the time of marriage from her father's house during her widowhood and after that term I bequeath them to my said son Richard Price for ever and it is my will that my Executor should give her meat drink washing and lodging as usall for one year from the Day of the Death Provided she be contented to dwell with him so long.

and also, I bequeath unto the said David Thomas, Thomas Leyson and Thomas Howell and Samuel Price (20) my brother the sum of two hundred pounds of Lawful money in trust and to the intent and purpose that they may apply the interest thereof from the day of my death for the support of the ministry of the Gospel and its ordinances at the meeting house at City so called in the parish of Bettus and at the meeting house at Newcastle (21) and for want of such uses the interest of the said money to be laid out for the maintaining poor and pious children of Dissenting Protestants in a pious schoole where they shall be brought up in piety and useful Learning, Impowering the surviving trustees to name such other faithful trustee as they shall think most
most proper to preserve the said trust, and also I give devise unto my said trustees all those two houses where Isaac Thomas formerly lived and the house adjoining to the aforesaid meeting house in Newcastle and aforesaid County To hold to them and their heirs the said two houses in trust and to the intent and purpose my said trustees may apply the rents and profits thereof to the aforesaid pious uses that is to say for the support of the minister at both meeting houses, or the said children of Dissenting protestants, Impowering my said trustees to preserve the trust.

and I also give Devise and bequeath all and singular my messuages lands and tenements with their appurtenances lying and being within the several parishes of Langeinor Newcastle, Coyty and Lanilyed or any other parish whatsoever within the said County of Glamorgan in my power or possession of what kind soever to Dispose of unto my son Samuel Price (Except what is Disposed by me in this will) To have and to hold the said messuages lands and tenements with their appurtenances unto my said son Samuel Price his heirs and assigns and to the only proper use and behoof of my said son Samuel Price his heirs and assigns forever and also The residue of all my goods cattles chattles and Debts after my Debts funeral expenses and Legacies are paid and discharged I wholly give and bequeath unto my said son Samuel Price; I do appoint my said son Samuel Price sole and whole Executor of this my present will and testament Provided also and it is my express will intent and meaning that if my wife sons and Daughters or husbands of my said Daughters if any be, shall endeavour to controvert this my will and meaning or sue and disturb my Executor and trustees in the due Execution of it, then and in such case the Legacies benefit or advantage that should accrue by this my will and testament to any of them that shall controvert or sue and Disturb my Executor and trustees shall be void to all intents and purposes anything herein contained to the Contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding and Lastly I Do hereby declare this to be my true real Last will and testament revoking and annulling all former wills by me made; reserving to myself a power to add too or alter what I think fit on the back of this my will by way of Codicils, and I do appoint my said trustees and Executor to be Guardians of my younger children In witness whereof I have subscribed my name and put on my seal to this my last will and testament this sixteenth day of December one thousand seven hundred and thirty four

Rice Price

(Codicil on Ann Price, now Phillips)
Proved 2 August 1739.

3. Caroline Williams, 17, 18.
4. Roland Thomas, 7.
5. Elderton, 337.
7. Caroline Williams, 19; Roland Thomas, 15; Cone, 11.
9. For the demolition of the authenticity of the story of the Maid of Cefn Ydfa see G. J. Williams, 'Wil Hopcyn a'r Ferch o Gefn Ydfa', Y Llenor, VI (1927), 218–29; VII (1928), 34–46.
11. Rice Price (1673–1739) was the son of Rees and Catherine Price of Tyn-ton. He was educated at Brynlywarch Academy under the celebrated Samuel Jones, and in 1695 he assisted his mentor both as a tutor at the Academy and as a minister to congregations meeting at Brynlywarch and at Cildeudy. Samuel Jones died in 1697 and thereafter the Academy is said to have been moved to Abergavenny and placed under the direction of Roger Griffith. Griffith, however, conformed not long afterwards to the Church of England – he became Archdeacon of Brecon in 1702 – and the Academy returned to Rice Price who conducted it at Tyn-ton until 1704 when it was moved to Carmarthen. There is evidence, however, that Rice Price continued teaching beyond this date for as late as 1730 Lewis Rees of Llanbrynmair studied under him. Dr. John Evans's list of Nonconformist congregations includes Rice Price as an Independent Minister at Cildeudy c.1715. Later in his career he also officiated at the Meeting Places which were established at Newcastle, Bridgend and at City, Bettws. His first wife was Mary Gibbon (see fn.12) and his second wife Catherine Richards (see fn. 19).( D.–O. Thomas, The honest mind, 1–3, 8–10.)
12. Mary Price (nee Gibbon or Gybbon). According to Caroline Williams she was not only rich but saving to the verge of eccentricity (Caroline Williams, 17).
13. Mary Coffin married Walter Coffin of Selworthy near Porlock, Somerset at Bristol in 1729. Her son Walter Coffin married Anne 'Nancy' Morgan, and her grandson, also Walter Coffin (1784-1867) became M.P. for for the period 1853-71 and a director of the Taff Vale Company. See Elderton, 338.


15. John Price (1701-77) married Catherine, daughter of John Williams of Lianair. She is said to have been an heiress, and the fact that this son was thus well provided for might have influenced Rice Price in the distribution of his property. John Price's daughter, Margaret, married a Mr. Lewis of Newhouse. Their son's widow - Mrs. Wyndham Lewis - married Disraeli. See Elderton, 337.

16. Sarah Price (1726-1803) married William Morgan (1708-1772) a physician at Bridgend. She was Morgan's second wife and they were married at Llandaff on 7 Dec. 1744. They had eight children, including William Morgan (1750-1833) the celebrated actuary and Richard Price's biographer, and George Cadogan Morgan (1754-98). After Richard Price's wife, Sarah, died, Sarah Morgan went up to Hackney with her daughter Sally to keep house for him.

17. Elizabeth Price married a Mr. Flew. See Richard Price's will, MS. American Philosophical Society.

18. Rice Price seems to have been concerned that in the event of his death during their minorities his daughters Sarah and Elizabeth should not be brought up at his wife's home at Bridgend. This would seem to indicate that he did not approve of the way of life at his second wife's father's home at Bridgend, and to give some support to the tradition that the discipline at Tyn-ton was both pious and strict.

19. Catherine Price (nee Richards), Rice Price's second wife was the daughter of Dr. David Richards of Bridgend. She was born in 1697 and died in 1740 not a year after the death of her husband. After Rice Price's death she went to live with her two daughters, Sarah and Elizabeth at Bridgend. She was much loved by her children who cherished her memory. Rice Price's treatment of Catherine, his meagre provision for her, it is said, shortened her life, and no doubt contributed to the undying hostility that his grandson William bore to his memory.

20. Samuel Price (1676-1756). Like his brother Rice, Samuel was educated at Brynilywarch under Samuel Jones, and thereafter at Timothy Jollie's Academy at Attercliffe near Sheffield. In 1703 he became assistant to Isaac Watts at St. Mary Axe, Bury Street, London. In 1713 he became joint pastor when the burden of the work, due to Watts's ill-health, fell upon his shoulders. On Watts's death in 1748 he became full pastor. See Walter Wilson, The history and antiquities of dissenting churches and meeting houses in London, Westminster, and Southwark (4 vols., London, 1808), I, 318-20.
21. The Prices of Tyn-ton played a substantial part in establishing Meeting Places at Bettws and at Bridgend. In 1702 Rees Price (Rice Price's father) and his sons Rice and Samuel obtained the lease of a property at the foot of Newcastle Hill, Bridgend, on condition that it was to be used as a Meeting Place for Protestant Dissenters. A Meeting Place was built on the site c.1717. In 1727 a newly built house at Bettws was demised by Rice Price and his son John to William Morgan of Coity, Rees Morgan and Thomas Howell for use as a place of worship for Dissenters. As noted above Rice Price officiated as minister at both these Meeting Places. See J. Cyril Bowen (ed.), Hanes Eglwysi y Tabernacl, Penybont-ar-Ogwr, 1662-1850 (1950), 21ff.

Richard Price and Rice Price

Professor J. Gwynn Williams, The University College of North Wales, Bangor, sends the following extract from the transcriptions made by David Jones of Wallington from the manuscript diary of William Thomas (1727-95):

Fo. 166 (Sub) Memorials in April 1971

Dyed lately in London Dr. Price a celebrated Divine and a politician. a Dissenter and renowned in Matters of Liberty a Relation of John Price Esqr of Landaff's Court.'

In the notes he added to his transcriptions from the Diary, David Jones, after saying the conventional things about Richard Price writes:

'Altogether he was one of the most distinguished men of his age, and his genius conferred lasting honour on the country that gave him birth. His father, it is said treated him with great harshness - having from some cause or another conceived a (much unfounded) dislike to him. This was carried to such extreme that he was all but disowned. His elder half brother it was said fanned the flame of the father's dislike from interested motives.' Cardiff Central Public Library, MS. 4.877, Vol. 11, 156.
REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

From Dr. Charles H. Lesser:

Charles H. Lesser, currently Assistant Director for Archives and Publications at the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, continues sporadic work towards expanding his doctoral dissertation (University of Michigan, 1974) into a full scale biography of Joseph Priestley. A special interest in the way in which materialism informed all aspects of Priestley's thought is reflected in the dissertation title: "Joseph Priestley (1733-1804): The Mind of a Materialist; An Intellectual Biography." Dr. Lesser would especially like to hear from or of anyone who can read the shorthand system of Peter Annet, which Priestley used throughout his adult life. In addition to printed versions of the system, a manuscript key in Priestley's hand is extant, but Dr. Lesser has yet to find anyone who can read the system or the time to try to learn it himself. At least one manuscript worthy of publication is partially in the Annet shorthand and collaborative publication might be possible. Dr. Lesser can be reached at 1624 Heyward, Columbia, South Carolina, 29205, U.S.A.

From Professor Robert E. Schofield:

Any information regarding the location of any of these manuscripts or collections will be gratefully received:

1. The papers of William Bewley (d. 1783), apothecary of Great Massingham, Norfolk and reviewer for The Monthly Review. Bewley was a friend of Charles Burney and his letters to Burney have been located and preserved at Yale. Priestley's letters to Bewley have not been located and, according to Priestley's Memoirs would make "still more" than several volumes.

2. The "Memoirs" of Martin Dean of Galway, friend of the Anglo-Irish chemist, Richard Kirwan. William John Fitz-Patrick Irish Wits and Worthies (Dublin, James Duffy, Sons, & Co., 1873) refers to "MS. of the late Martin Dean, Esq., of Galway" in which are preserved records of the brilliant conversations in Kirwan's home
home in Dublin and earlier in London, which were attended by "Dr. Priestly (sic), Horne Tooke, Sir George Banks, and Mrs. Macaulay." The reference was picked up and repeated by Father P. J. McLaughlin in his essay on Richard Kirwan in Studies (1939), 600. Who was Martin Dean and where are his manuscript memoirs?

3. The Register of the independent church of Osset, West Riding, Yorkshire, from 1741, kept by the minister, George Haggerstone. Haggerstone tutored Joseph Priestley in mathematics and natural philosophy and the church register, which contains "kind of a diary," in 1901, according to Bryan Dale ("Non-Parochial Registers in Yorkshire," Transactions of the Congregational Historical Society 1 (1901-04), 5-25) was in the custody of the Registrar-General at Somerset House, London.

The collections at Somerset House have been dispersed. Where is the register today?

Robert E. Schofield, History of Science & Technology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106, U.S.A.

From Professor Bernard Peach and Dr. D. O. Thomas:

We have recently joined forces to produce an edition of the correspondence of Richard Price and should be grateful if any reader could help us to locate copies of the letters Price wrote to his sister Sarah Morgan and to other members of his family at Bridgend. Caroline E. Williams used these letters in writing A Welsh Family, the first edition of which appeared in 1885. Several attempts have been made to trace this correspondence, as yet with no success.

Price's nephew George Cadogan Morgan who was in Paris at the time of the Fall of the Bastille wrote a long letter to Price in which he gave a detailed account of that event. This letter was subsequently published in The Gazetteer on 13 August 1789 under the title 'A Letter from a Gentleman in Paris to his Uncle'. We should like to know where a copy of this newspaper for that date may be consulted.

Professor Bernard Peach, Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 27708; Dr. D. O. Thomas, Department of Philosophy, The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Dyfed, SY23 3DY.
BENTHAM STUDIES CONFERENCE

The Conference will take place on 9 and 10 July 1979 at University College London. The Chairman will be Professor H. L. A. Hart.

The titles of the papers have not yet been finally settled but the main speakers and the fields within which their papers will fall as follows:

Eldon J. Eisenach (Cornell University) Bentham's jurisprudence
Sam Hollander (University of Toronto) Bentham's economics
Len Hume (Australian National University) Bentham's theory of fictions
Warren Roberts (Tulane University) Bentham on poor relief
Fred Rosen (London School of Economics) Bentham and democracy
James Steintrager (Wake Forest University) Bentham on religion

There will be a Workshop session on Bentham's interest in, and influence on the Iberian world. This will consist of three short reports on their work by Sister Theodora McKenna, Dr. Miriam Williford, and Dr. Pedro Schwartz. There will also be time for discussion of other points.

On the first evening a dinner will be held at University College, in the presence of Jeremy Bentham; speeches will be made by Professor J. H. Burns, retiring General Editor, and Professor Hart, the Chairman.

The cost of the Conference, including the dinner, will be £25 with accommodation and £12 without. A limited amount of accommodation is available at Canterbury Hall, Bloomsbury. This consists of bed and breakfast for two nights at a cost of £13: those wishing to book this should send a deposit of £2. A meal on the evening of 8 July may be booked separately by writing in advance to Canterbury Hall. All cheques (sterling) should be made payable to University College London, and all correspondence concerning the Conference addressed to:

Clare H. G. Gobbi
Bentham Project
University College
Gower Street
LONDON WC1/ 6BT.

OUTSIDE U.K.

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The Bentham Newsletter

Editor: Claire H. G. Gobbi, Department of History.
University College, London.

This Newsletter has been started to advance all aspects of Bentham Studies. The amount and variety of Bentham's work is not fully known and it is hoped that the Newsletter will serve as a vehicle for remedying this. Scholars all over the world are using Bentham manuscripts or printed sources in various fields of research and this journal will attempt to print as much of this work as possible. We are also planning to publish in each issue parts of a Bentham Bibliography which we hope, with suggestions from readers, will be as full as possible and will be kept up to date.

Professor J. H. Burns (University College, London) and Dr. John Dinwiddy (Royal Holloway College, London) are editorial advisers; and members of the Bentham Committee will make contributions. Lord Robbins has contributed the foreword for the current issue.

The Newsletter is to be published once annually, with an extra issue after the 1979 Conference. The first issue is now available free of charge, and subscriptions for the next issue (March 1979) are £1, payable in advance. Contributions are welcome, either in the form of articles or notes, and should be sent in typescript to

Claire Gobbi, Department of History, University College, London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT.

Q 1977: Martin Fitzpatrick and D. O. Thomas, The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth.

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